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This dissertation examines the effects of ridicule on emotions and communities in 
Latin literature. Ridicule has a social function of marking objectionable behavior and 
reinforcing acceptable behavior, since individuals seek to avoid ridicule by acting in a 
manner that has been deemed appropriate by their community. Errors in judgment of the 
power relationship between two parties can also provide opportunities for ridicule, since 
an individual who esteems himself too highly is brought down by the ridicule of his peers 
because of that prideful over-estimation (superbia). Ridicule evokes an emotional 
response known as the “shame state,” or a cluster of emotions, including shame, 
humiliation, and embarrassment. By emphasizing the values and emotions privileged by 
groups of people, or “emotional communities,” I focus on these social functions of 
ridicule, and I explore the ways that an emotional community responds to ridicule. 
In the introduction, I contextualize my study in the scholarship on ridicule, 
emotion, and emotional communities. I discuss the function of pride and ridicule in 
ancient Rome, and I provide an analysis of the Latin words for laughter and ridicule. The 
body of this dissertation is divided in two, with concentrations on ridicule domi 
militiaeque, or at home and abroad. The first chapter focuses on the Roman army as an 
emotional community. I offer an overview of evidence for this militiae emotional 
community, and I review in detail some examples of the army experiencing ridicule from 
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Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita, Vergil’s Aeneid, and Tacitus’ Annales. I demonstrate that the 
Roman preference for victory narratives encourages an exaggeration of the Roman 
army’s shame state in response to ridicule, in order to allow for a more impressive 
recovery and eventual triumph. The second body chapter explores the domi emotional 
community of elite civic leaders in the Republican period. I use Cicero’s In Verrem to 
show that members of this community perform their membership by participating in legal 
and political matters. I argue that Cicero presents himself as the embodiment of the 
emotional ideals of the community, and that he attacks his opponents for their failure to 
live up to those standards. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 According to one version of the story, Romulus, the founder of Rome, killed his 
brother Remus because he had mocked the low walls of the nascent Rome by jumping 
over them.1  
Volgatior fama est ludibrio fratris Remum novos transiluisse muros; inde 
ab irato Romulo, cum verbis quoque increpitans adiecisset, "Sic deinde, 
quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea," interfectum. Ita solus potitus 
imperio Romulus; condita urbs conditoris nomine appellata.  Livy 1.7 
 
The commoner story is that Remus jumped over the new walls in mockery 
of his brother, and so was killed by an angry Romulus, who added these 
words also in chiding him, “And thus from now on for anyone else who 
jumps over my walls!” Romulus thus became sole ruler, and the city was 
named after its founder.2 
 
When Livy tells this popular story (volgatior fama), he uses the word ludibrium to 
describe Remus’ intentions. By laughingly jumping over the wall, Remus demeans his 
brother by belittling the walls of his new city; Romulus asserts his dominance by 
immediately and angrily (irato) silencing his brother with scornful comments 
(increpitans) of his own. Romulus refused to allow his brother’s ridicule to challenge his 
authority, so he responded with more mockery and more violence in order to reassert his 
position of power.  
Ovid rehabilitates Romulus’ temper in the Fasti by giving the deathblow to one of 
Romulus’ deputies, and giving Romulus the opportunity to mourn his brother. Still, 
Remus is credited with mocking (contemnere) the low walls. 
                                                
1 See Wiseman 1995 for a full discussion of the foundation myth of Rome and the accounts of Romulus 
and Remus. 
2 All translations are my own. 
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quod Remus ignorans humiles contemnere muros 
   coepit, et 'his populus' dicere 'tutus erit?' 
nec mora, transiluit: rutro Celer occupat ausum; 
   ille premit duram sanguinulentus humum. 
haec ubi rex didicit, lacrimas introrsus obortas         845 
   devorat et clausum pectore volnus habet. 
flere palam non volt exemplaque fortia servat, 
   'sic' que 'meos muros transeat hostis' ait. Fasti 841- 848 
 
But Remus, unaware, began to mock the low walls 
And said, “Will the people be safe with these?” 
And he hopped over without delay. Celer attacked the bold man with a 
shovel; 
Remus, bloody, hit the hard ground. 
When the king learned these things, he swallowed deep his shed tears 
And held his pain shut in his heart. 
He did not want to weep openly and wanted to serve as an example of 
strength, 
And said, “May every enemy who crosses my walls die thus.” 
 
As part of Ovid’s sympathetic depiction of Romulus, he includes the emotional reaction 
to his brother’s death. Romulus has to swallow his tears (lacrimas introrsus obortas/ 
devorat, 845- 6; flere palam non volt, 847) and buries his pain deep down (clausum 
pectore volnus habet, 846), so that his grief is not apparent. He models bravery 
(exemplaque fortia servat, 847) for his men, remaining steadfast and consistent in his 
orders.  
 This dissertation is about the intersection of emotion, ridicule, and community in 
ancient Rome. As these two passages have shown, ridicule has a way of exposing the 
boundaries of behavior for a group. The way a group responds (or not, as the case may 
be) to ridicule shows us their priorities and preferences. In the chapters that follow, I will 
explore the ways that ridicule works in Latin literature, with a particular emphasis on 
understanding how ridicule elicits an emotional reaction in a group or community of 
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people. Before I turn to case studies of ridicule and emotion in the communities of 
Romans, let me first establish the terms and positions of this analysis.   
EMOTIONS 
 There is still no one definition of “emotion” agreed upon by scholars of emotions. 
There does not appear to be a universal concept of emotion,3 and emotions are not 
classified the same way in different languages. The English term “emotion” came about 
as part of the growing interest in the study of the sciences in the nineteenth century;4 
before then, terms like “passions” or “affections” or “sentiments” were used.5 Ancient 
Greeks and Romans argued about the definitions, too. Aristotle, in the Nichomachaean 
Ethics and in the Rhetoric, puts forth a cognitive theory of emotions, connecting 
emotions with thoughts.6 Emotions are therefore judgments that can be determined to be 
true or false. In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero, after considering Peripatetic and 
Epicurean models of emotion, promotes the Stoic view of emotions as representations of 
a diseased mind (aegritudo).7 As Cicero argues, emotions represent a choice or a 
                                                
3 See Grima 1992 on the universality of emotion; through her own work on Paxtun women and 
performance of despondency, she demonstrates that there is no word that maps accurately onto the English 
“emotion.” 
4 See Dixon 2003 for an in-depth exploration of the study of emotions in the nineteenth century. 
5 Rosenwein 2006: 3. 
6 "Emotions are the things that cause men to change their minds concerning their judgments, and are 
accompanied by pain and pleasure: for example, anger, pity, fear, and all similar such things and their 
opposites." (ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι᾽ ὅσα µεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰςκρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, 
οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία, Rh. 1378a8) Aristotle's focus on the 
effects of emotions on the thought process is related to his interest in analyzing poetry or political theory. 
For Aristotle on emotions, see Leighton 1982 and Fortenbaugh 2003. 
7 See Graver 2009 on Cicero's outline of the emotions in Tusculan Disputations. 
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judgment to experience distress or upset at something outside one’s control, so emotions 
should therefore be avoided by thoughtful leaders.8  
 Modern historians of emotion are in similar dispute over the proper definition of 
“emotion.” Rosenwein acknowledges the term as “a convenience” for “affective reactions 
of all sorts, intensities, and durations.9 Nussbaum has argued for an updated Stoic view, 
understanding emotions as thoughts that judge the value of external objects or ideas.10  
This interpretation generally leaves out physical reactions as part of the 
requirement of an emotion, though it acknowledges that they may appear for some 
people.11 Kaster avoids a direct definition, but makes it clear that he considers “emotion” 
to be a term for “affective experiences.”12 Cairns declines to define “emotion” at all, 
though he ascribes to the understanding that emotions are cognitive and involve some 
sort of evaluation.13 Fulkerson acknowledges the complications of interpreting emotions 
as physiological and therefore universal, as well as strong cultural influences on which 
emotions are good or appropriate for a person to experience, especially in public, without 
being considered a social outcast or even insane.14  
                                                
8 Cicero argues, for instance, that because, Pompey’s men, upon seeing him fall dead, were able to save 
themselves and flee danger before grieving for him, men must have control over whether to feel emotions 
(…si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem 
confitendum est; Tusc. Dis. 3.66).  
9 2006: 4- 5. 
10 2001: 22- 30. As Wilson points out, the physiological responses to humor vary based on social context, 
and can even be faked (1979: 3ff).  
11 ibid. 25; 56ff. 
12 2005: 7. 
13 1993: 5. 
14 2013: 3- 5. See also Ekman 2003 on the universality of emotions: he argues for physiologically 
universal facial expressions of emotions, identifiable across cultures, and interprets that as evidence for 
universal experiences of emotion, as well. 
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 There is some general agreement here: emotions are affective reactions, in that 
they are moods or feelings. I support Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic approach to emotions as 
thoughts (“emotion-thoughts”) and judgments of value.15 If we combine these ideas, we 
can define an emotion as an affective reaction to a judgment of value: this is the 
definition of “emotion” used in this dissertation. By considering emotions as affections, 
we include the various synonyms (as Rosenwein allowed) of feeling and mood; by 
focusing on the evaluative properties of an emotion, we maintain its cognitive functions 
so that we can carefully consider how an emotion is constructed and shaped by the values 
someone attaches to other objects, persons, or ideas. In this way, we can understand 
strong emotions to be indications of significance and value: the stronger the attachment to 
an object, the stronger the emotional reaction to the judgment about that object. For 
example, Nussbaum’s chief example is her grief at the death of her mother. She 
acknowledges that her mother had great value for her, and that her grief is the emotional 
reaction to an evaluation of the loss of that value.16  
 Now that we have defined “emotion” as an affective reaction to a judgment of 
value, we can consider how values, and therefore emotions, are influenced by 
membership in a particular group.  
                                                
15 The notion that emotions are elicited by evaluations of events or situations (e.g. a romantic relationship 
ends, and therefore a thing of value has been lost, and therefore a person feels sadness) is known as 
appraisal theory. This approach further assumes that each emotion is triggered by a distinct pattern of 
appraisal – the same situations causing the same appraisals evoking the same emotions in each person. This 
theory of emotion seems to me to be too rigid for the full texture of human emotion. See Roseman and 
Smith 2001 for a summary of appraisal theory, published at roughly the same time as Nussbaum’s 
monumental tome on emotions as thoughts (and evaluations). 
16 2001: 39ff. 
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EMOTIONAL COMMUNITIES 
 Because emotions are connected to evaluations of value, it is important to 
consider how objects come to receive that value. I suggest that we consider the socio-
cultural norms that shape these values as a result of an “emotional community.” 
According to Barbara Rosenwein, who coined the term, an emotional community is “a 
group of people animated by common or similar interests, values, and emotional styles 
and valuations.”17 An emotional community is a group in which people have common 
interests and shared goals – often a social community, like a town or a congregation or a 
political party, but just as possibly what Rosenwein calls a textual community, one 
“created and reinforced by ideologies, teachings, and common presuppositions.”18 A 
single person might therefore be in multiple emotional communities. Importantly, an 
emotional community contains a set of emotions and values, not just one or two; the 
pattern of emotions, felt in specific circumstances and by certain types of people, is what 
defines the emotional community. We can think of these emotional communities as 
snapshots of these circumstances, so that emotional communities can evolve as the sets of 
emotions and values do. 
                                                
17 Rosenwein discusses emotional communities in Rosenwein 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2010, but she 
provides the more succinct definition quoted above in Plamper 2010: 253. Rosenwein reported being “still 
quite happy” (Plamper 2010: 252) with her full definition of “emotional community” from Rosenwein 
2006: 35, that they are “precisely the same as social communities – families, neighborhoods, parliaments, 
guilds, monasteries, parish church memberships – but the researcher looking at them seeks above all to 
uncover systems of feeling: what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as 
valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others’ emotions; the nature of the 
affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they 
expect encourage, tolerate, and deplore.” 
18 Rosenwein 2006: 25.  
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 Rosenwein’s term “emotional community” is deliberately named. Her term 
“emotional” recalls Reddy’s term “emotive,” which he uses to refer to the emotional 
expressions, gestures, and speech that can “perform” acts.19 “Community” emphasizes 
the “social and relational nature of emotions.”20 Regularly occurring emotives become 
engrained to the point of automaticity in a community: only the most common emotional 
processes become subconscious cognitive habits.21 These most frequent emotives become 
the most privileged emotives in a community, as others are repressed; the power in the 
community lies in these approved, habituated emotives.  
 Rosenwein herself presents an array of emotional communities, ranging from a 
community of one (Gregory the Great) to the emotional communities of three different 
towns in medieval France, represented through epitaphs experiencing variations of 
tenderness and excitement in their commemoration. Other historians have analyzed the 
emotional communities of late nineteenth and early twentieth century middle class white 
women who were anxious and frightened of the pain of childbirth,22 or parents of young 
children in Georgian England who experienced parental love, anger, anxiety, grief, and 
more. There are as many possibilities of emotional communities as there are social 
communities, and a single person might inhabit several overlapping or intersecting 
emotional communities at once. 
                                                
19 Reddy 2001: 105. 
20 Rosenwein 2006: 25. 
21 Isen and Diamond 1989 first proposed the idea of emotives as automatic cognitive habits. Their 
hypothesis has been confirmed multiple times; see Reddy 2001: 17. 
22 Wood 2014: 189. 
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 In the accounts of Roman emotional communities that follow, I have termed the 
constellation of emotions that any one particular emotional community privileges (or 
minimizes) the “emotional apparatus.” By this, I refer to the emotional experiences and 
personal values that an emotional community emphasizes, in addition to the emotions 
that it devalues and avoids, or neglects entirely. The emotional apparatus is a network of 
interrelated, inter-dependent emotions and values, so, as we will see, if one part of the 
apparatus is over-emphasized, the emotional community is thrown off-balance and 
becomes dysfunctional.  
 In her definitions of emotional communities, Rosenwein includes “what these 
communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful 
to them,”23 and I want to be careful to emphasize the inclusion of common interests and 
values in the emotional apparatus of the community. The emotional apparatus contains 
more than just emotions. Since, as I have just described above, an emotion is connected 
to an evaluation of the value of an object, a community’s strongest emotions are 
connected to what it considers most important. If, for example, an emotional community 
attaches a strong value to the quality of honesty, then the members of that emotional 
community will react very negatively when they judge that it has been threatened or 
devalued. We can transfer the value of that object (in this example, the personal quality 
“honesty”) to the emotional apparatus of that community. 
                                                
23 2006: 842. 
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EMOTION, RIDICULE, AND EVALUATION 
 Thus far, we have established that an emotion is an affective reaction to a 
judgment of value, and that emotional communities are groups of people with common 
values and ideologies. Ridicule emerges as a sort of connection between these two ideas. 
I first present a basic process of ridicule and its effects, and I will then explain each step 
in more detail. 
 First, a person must have a series of beliefs about himself. For example: 
 (1) I am a good person. 
  I have a nice house. 
That person must also hold that these beliefs are good and important. In other words, the 
set of beliefs needs to be closely-held, like the emotions and values in a community’s 
emotional apparatus.  
 (2) I am a good person. AND It is good to be a good person. 
  I have a nice house. AND It is good to have a nice house. 
When the person encounters ridicule, he is forced to make a reassessment of these beliefs. 
The jokes at a person’s expense challenge the previously-held beliefs. The effect of the 
ridicule will vary based on the connections a person feels to the beliefs, to the ridiculer, 
and to the audience of the ridicule.  
If a person feels strongly about a set of beliefs and experiences ridicule from 
someone he does not care about, he will experience minimal suffering as a response. But 
if the feelings are strongly held, and the ridiculer’s opinion is esteemed by the victim of 
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the joke, and especially if the ridicule is performed in front of others who are esteemed 
by the victim, the victim will suffer more acutely.24 
 (3) I am a good person. It is good to be a good person. 
   Ted is also a good person. He joked that I am not a good person. 
   George and Brenda are good people. They laughed at Ted’s joke. 
Am I still a good person if another good person (Ted) made a joke at my 
expense, and good people (George and Brenda) laughed in 
agreement? 
 
This basic analysis is a sketch of the thought process that the victim of ridicule goes 
through in reaction to the joke. This sudden realization that one’s own beliefs about 
himself (or other things) are not the same as those of others in the community causes an 
individual to re-evaluate those beliefs and his position in the community. If the victim of 
the joke determines that the ridicule contains valid criticisms, he experiences humiliation 
at being outed as not as well-versed in the emotional community’s apparatus, and he is 
ashamed of the fact. Depending on the relationship between the joker and victim, the 
presence or not of witnesses, and the context of the joke, a victim may experience anger, 
guilt, physical illness, self-hatred, disgust, depression, regret, chagrin, dishonor, scorn, 
mortification, or wounded pride in a confusing cluster of emotions labeled by 
psychologists as the “shame state.” In response to suffering the pain of the shame state, 
                                                
24 This analysis generally follows Veatch’s theory of humor (1998: 178), which suggests that the more 
closely held a belief is, the less likely it is that a joke about the belief will be considered funny. 
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the victim of ridicule may attempt to recover his position in the community, or he may 
yield entirely.25 
RIDICULE 
I define ridicule as a negative evaluation in the form of a joke or amusement that 
is meant to mock or belittle the victim of the joke. The evaluation at stake here is the 
victim’s status in the community. Ridicule exposes a deficiency: with a joke or some 
mockery, the victim suddenly revealizes that he considers himself to be more, or better, 
than the rest of the group does, usually because he has done something that breaks the 
social rules of the community. When the victim of ridicule realizes this discrepancy 
between his self-evaluation and his group’s evaluation of him, he feels embarrassed, 
humiliated, ashamed, or any combination of these or other feelings.26 This experience of 
exposure is so uncomfortable that people go to great lengths to avoid it. In this way, 
ridicule enforces the social rules – and the emotional apparatus – of a community. The 
members of the community act within the boundaries established by the group in order to 
avoid the pain of ridicule and exclusion from the group. 
 Ridicule always involves this negative evaluation. The nature of ridicule is that it 
exposes a discrepancy between the joker’s perception of the victim and the victim’s 
perception of himself, so by definition there must be a negative judgment. Ridicule is a 
kind of humor, but it does not always need to be laugh-out-loud funny (and probably 
                                                
25 As I demonstrate in the following chapter, the Roman presentation of the army’s emotional community 
is always to recover a lost position in the community by correcting the judgment inherent in the ridicule. I 
focus on the shame state in more detail below. 
26 This combination is the “shame state;” for more detail, see below.  
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never is funny to the victim). It is amusing to the joker, at least, and perhaps also to the 
audience, if there is one. Ridicule is malicious and is intended to hurt the victim, pushing 
him out of the community; teasing, on the other hand, is light-hearted and is not meant to 
cause pain in the butt of the joke.27 Ridicule and teasing can each hide criticism in a joke, 
but, with ridicule, the tone and intent of the joker is malicious. The ridiculing joker wants 
his victim to understand the difference in power between them. The emotional reaction to 
being ridiculed causes the victim to feel diminished and weak, and the joker, especially if 
encouraged by an audience of community members who conform with his evaluation of 
the victim, is elevated.  
Ridicule therefore benefits from an audience. The pleasure at the joke (and at not 
being the butt of it) and from being included in the resulting laughter makes the audience 
want to conform to the social rule at the heart of the joke.28 In this capacity humor can 
work as a social lubricant or as an abrasive: it can keep a social group running smoothly, 
with light-hearted teasing to redirect behavior, or it can create tension and disruption in 
the community, with aggressive ridicule.29 Even the mere observation of another person 
                                                
27 Platt 2008: 105; see also Titze 2009. Platt’s argument is that gelotophobes are unable to distinguish 
good-natured teasing from ridicule, and react strongly with shame, fear, and anger to both types of jokes. 
Gelotophobes are pathologically afraid of ridicule and mockery, to the extent of paranoia and social phobia. 
Titze describes several case studies of gelotophobes, whose paranoid fear of ridicule drives them to avoid 
the potential for mockery at all costs, even resulting in severe social phobias, including agoraphobia. Even 
for those who are not gelotophobes, the distinction between teasing and ridicule can sometimes be blurred, 
especially in sensitive subjects. 
28 Wilson 1979: 189- 225, Billig 2005: 200ff, Holmes 2000: 164ff. Bergson 1900 put the reinforcement of 
social order by humor at the center of his scheme of humor. Richlin 1992 and Corbeill 1996 rely on the 
idea of corrective humor. Billig 2005 argues that too much discussion, both academic and among 
laypersons, of humor inappropriately promotes “positivist” ideas such as humor being “good for you,” or a 
nice stress-reliever to share with friends, since, as he sees it, humor is really negative reinforcement. 
29 Martineau 1972: 103. See also Holmes 2000 for the positive and negative effects of humor in group 
settings (in this case, the modern office workplace). 
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being ridiculed – without being the actual target – can have an inhibitive effect on a 
group member, according to Janes and Olson. This “jeer pressure,” as they cleverly term 
it, or the anxiety of being ridiculed in the same way, instills a desire for conformity and a 
fear of failure in the observing group member.30 This controlling function of humor is 
generally considered by modern scholars to be useful for people in positions of power, 
since a more powerful person can use humor to hedge an order or criticism of a less 
powerful person, thereby appearing less cruel or judgmental.31 For instance, a boss may 
gently chastise a subordinate for inappropriate workplace behavior by making a joke 
about a failed task.32  
Ridicule reinforces existing group dynamics and power structures because it 
usually moves down or across social hierarchies, and rarely up.33 It also supports a 
group’s belief systems, since those who do not conform to the group’s norms are 
ridiculed. Generally group members do not mock those who hold similar beliefs. Instead, 
the usual victims are group members who are on the fringe of the group, or perhaps 
aspirational group members who would like to move “up” to another group.34 The chart 
below demonstrates the effect of ridicule on the audience (A) and the butt of the joke 
(A*). 
  
                                                
30 2000: 474. 
31 Holmes 2000: 175, Martineau 1972: 114ff. 
32 This technique is more useful in teasing than in ridicule: in order to have the desired corrective effect 
without the disruption of upsetting the employee for being the butt of a joke, a supervisor would need to 
tred a fine line between humor and humiliation. See Holmes 2000: 165.  
33 Wilson 1979: 212. 
34 Martineau 1972: 103, Wilson 1979: 212ff.  
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Audience’s reactions to the form and content of derisive jokes35 
 Reaction to content criticizing A* 
Reaction to joke 
“form” 
Net reaction to 
joke 




If A is indifferent 
to A* Indifference Pleasure Moderate pleasure 
If A dislikes A* Pleasure Pleasure Extreme Pleasure 
Table 1: Audience’s reactions to the form and content of derisive jokes. 
 
As the chart makes clear, if the audience dislikes or is indifferent to the victim of the 
joke, they will feel at least some pleasure at the joke – thereby reinforcing whatever 
social rule the victim had been shown to have violated. In this way, the audience (or 
emotional community) builds cohesion in its group members by confirming the rules of 
membership and isolating or excluding those who do not conform to those rules.37 
On the other hand, ridicule can also be rebellious or “contestive.”38 In this 
function ridicule is used by less powerful groups to disguise a challenge to the authority 
of the powerful. Ridicule allows a criticism of power and provides relief from oppression 
                                                
35 Wilson 1979: 205. 
36 It is possible for A and A* to be the same, as in cases of self-deprecation, but since this dissertation is 
focused on ridicule in a group context, that notion is generally not relevant. 
37 Martineau 1972: 116ff. 
38 Graham et al 1992: 162, Winick 1976. 
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while being a safe form of expression for both the powerful and powerless – since, after 
all, it’s just a joke.39 For example, an employee may safely camouflage a criticism of her 
boss in a joke at a board meeting. Not every humorous utterance can be neatly 
categorized into either repressive or contestive, and there may be some overlap. 
 In this section, I have defined ridicule as a negative evaluation, couched in the 
form of a joke, that is intended to mock or belittle the victim. Ridicule articulates the 
social rules and the membership of a community, since it provides a strategy for members 
to point out violations of social rules and to negotiate which members are included in the 
audience and which are reduced to the butts of jokes. The victims of ridicule, who want 
to be accepted by the community and are devastated to be found lacking, suffer an 
emotional reaction, known as the shame state, at the realization and exposure of their 
error in self-evaluation. 
SUPERBIA 
In Latin, a person who fails to recognize his proper place in the community is 
labeled superbus, or proud (literally: “that which is above”). A haughty person becomes 
irritating or dangerous to his community, disrupting the emotional apparatus and social 
structure. To restore order to the community, other members might use ridicule to reduce 
the superbus member to his proper status.40 However, the same social miscalculation that 
                                                
39 Wilson 1979: 192- 4. 
40 Baraz 2013: 217ff. In the next chapter, we will see instances of members of a Roman emotional 
community using ridicule to take down members of a non-Roman emotional community. See Figure 1 
below for a pattern of ridicule, shame state, and reparation: ridicule can be countered with more ridicule to 
correct the balance of social relationships. 
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makes a person superbus also encourages that person to ridicule. As we will see, 
ridiculers, such as Turnus and Arminius, are often described as superbi.  
The Latin word superbia generally covers the negative aspects of pride, such as 
the haughtiness and over-stepping described above, but it does not quite cover the lexical 
ground of the English phrase “to take pride in something.” Even more confusingly, 
soldiers can be called superbus in a positive sense, in that they are outstanding or brave.41 
The term is also used in connection with royalty, but this use is frequently tinged with the 
typical Roman distaste for royalty.42 But when sympathetic characters in the Aeneid are 
called superbi, it is from the perspective of the audience, who knows of impending 
doom.43 For example, the superbi walls of Troy, the adjective indicates the formerly-
great or the “once proud, but proud no more.”44 The walls of Troy are superbi because 
they retain their former glory despite their current lowly status as captured and fallen. 
Because the “self” evaluation of the walls (through Aeneas) is higher than their status as 
perceived by others, they are called superbi. So, the use of superbus and superbia is 
dependent on the perception of status and power between the described object or person 
and the speaker or narrator. Even when superbus is used to describe objects or people in a 
mostly positive sense, like the Trojan walls, it is with a pessimistic shade of 
foreshadowing. When superbia mixes with ridicule, it is almost always negative, since 
                                                
41 The stock miles gloriosus character, with his over-abundance of self-pride, could be considered the 
caricature of this phenomenon: he is superbus or gloriosus because he is overconfident and boastful of his 
own skills. Superbus is not a positive descriptor here (Murphy 1997: 77, Baraz 2013: 215).  
42 See Baraz 2008: 382- 7 for more on the connection between superbia and royalty. 
43 For example, Pandarus and Bitias are fratres superbi just before their deaths at Aen. 9.695. See Lloyd 
1972: 128 and Traina 1991. 
44 Lloyd 1972: 128.  
 17 
both superbia and ridicule involve a mistake in self-evaluation. As I will explain further, 
the negotiation of pride (and superbia) is extremely important for the emotional 
community’s confrontations with ridicule. 
Superbia is not a good quality, then. In English, we speak of a good sort of pride: 
in one’s child, for example, as he succeeds in school, or in a friend who is getting 
married, or in ourselves for having accomplished a goal. This is a happy, excited feeling 
on behalf of ourselves or of someone close to us. But there is also negative pride, when 
someone has too much of the first kind of pride and is arrogant and overconfident. The 
English word “pride” covers both the positive and negative aspects, but the Latin word 
superbia does not map directly onto these meanings. Generally, superbia did not connote 
the same feelings of positive pride that are familiar to us in English.45  
The Roman emotional vocabulary lacks a label for this kind of positive pride. I do 
not mean that the Romans did not feel the warm, puffed-up glow of happy pride, but that 
there was no name for that feeling. The absence of a specific term for a particular 
emotion cannot mean that the emotion was not felt. Surely English speakers would agree 
to the existence of a feeling of positive pride, but we know there is no separate term for 
that feeling. The ancient Greek term µεγαλοψυχία is sometimes mapped onto the English 
                                                
45 In modern French and Italian, there exist separate words for the negative and positive aspects of pride: 
fier and orgueilleux and fiero and orgoglioso respectively, although the division between the uses of these 
terms is often not clear-cut. The positive terms, fier and fiero, derive from the Latin ferus, “wild and 
uncivilized.” The related word ferox shares a stem with ferus, with the suffix –ox (cf. atrox) “seeming, 
looking;” thus ferox means “ferus-looking” (Fay 1917: 82). The “positive prize” meaning of ferus is post-
classical; I can find no instance of ferus in classical Latin that means something like “fierce positive pride.” 
Even in post-classical Latin, then, the conception of positive pride arose from a sense of impropriety and 
social misconduct. 
 18 
sense of positive pride, but is now more commonly translated more literally (greatness of 
spirit).46  
 I argue that the notion of positive pride was subsumed into ideas of gaudium or 
laetitia, words for joy. Cicero provides a definition of laetitia that neatly maps onto the 
modern sociologists’ definition of positive pride. In the Tusculan Disputations, he defines 
laetitia as the opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri rectum esse videatur (a newly-
formed opinion that a good is present, about which it is appropriate to feel uplifted; Tus. 
Dis. 4.14). Later in that same work, Cicero elaborates. He describes as bona the sort of 
things we, as English speakers, might also identify as things to be proud of (honores 
divitiae voluptates cetera: holding office, wealth, other pleasures; 4.66), and he cautions 
against excess feelings of laetitia. Seneca echoes Cicero in his discussion of gaudium at 
Ep. Mor. 59.2. 
 It is clear from their definitions that, in common usage, these words did much the 
same lexical work as the English “pride” in its positive sense. An ancient Roman felt joy 
or pleasure or even (if I may) pride at the birth of his child or at a friend’s success, even if 
there was no specific word for it. And because Cicero and Seneca could articulate this 
phenomenon, although they acknowledged it as potentially troublesome for some 
philosophies, we can still consider it to be an emotion. So, the Romans felt positive pride 
– as members of the army’s emotional community did – without having a specific word 
for it. 
                                                
46 Baraz 2008: 365ff. 
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 Latin does have several terms that suggest the haughty, negative kind of pride: 
adrogantia, insolentia, fastus, and superbia.47 Of course, the most common word for 
negative pride, and one that maps most closely onto ideas of English negative pride, is 
superbia. A person is superbus if he esteems himself or something close to him to be 
higher than an observer (the one who labels him as superbus) does; this comparative 
quality is important to the notion of superbia. Superbia is a miscalculation, or a mistaken 
self-evaluation.  
Because it requires a comparison between one’s self and others, superbia implies 
a negative assessment of others: therein lies much of the offense of superbia. This 
definition of superbia, provided by Isidore, is close to the emotional evaluative process in 
haughty pride outlined by modern sociologists and psychologists:48 superbus dictus quia 
super vult videri quam est; qui enim vult supergredi quod est, superbus est (He is called 
proud because he wants to appear to be more than he is; for he who wants to overstep 
what he is is proud, Orig. 10.248). 
 For the army, a person who was superbus did not understand his position in the 
army, or the army’s emotional community; by elevating his own position, he demoted 
others, to their offense. Often foreign warriors are considered superbi, since as non-
Romans who fight Romans, they challenge Rome’s authority.49 
 
                                                
47 See Baraz 2008, 2013 and Kaster 2005 on negative pride. 
48 Davidson 1976: 746ff, Taylor 1985: 21ff; c.f. Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. 
49 Lloyd 1972: 126ff, Murphy 1997: 77ff. 
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SHAME STATE 
If a victim of ridicule does accept the premise of the ridicule, he experiences a 
cascade of negative emotions, known as the “shame state,” in response to the ridicule.50 
The shame state is comprised of feelings of shame, guilt, embarrassment, humiliation, 
chagrin, mortification, dishonor, fury, wounded pride, scorn, disparagement, wanting to 
disappear, and more. “Feeling ridiculous, embarrassment, chagrin, mortification, 
humiliation, and dishonor are all variants of the shame state,” according to Helen Block 
Lewis, who coined the term.51 Shame is an emotion of negative self-evaluation: when a 
person is disappointed in or disgusted with himself, especially because of some moral 
lapse that has been observed by others, he feels ashamed.52  
Shame is the key emotion in this reaction. Shame is the belief that someone has 
failed to meet the standards of a community’s emotional apparatus, and is disappointed in 
himself and before others.53 The judgment in a joker’s ridicule is mirrored in the self-
assessment of the victim. The phrase “shame state” implies that shame is the core 
emotional reaction, but it is not the only one. Shame may be accompanied by humiliation, 
which is the sense that someone has been disparaged “for what one is rather than what 
one does.”54 Embarrassment and mortification are the results of “accidental foolishness” 
                                                
50 This term originates in Lewis 1971. 
51 Lewis 1976: 188.  
52 Buss 1980: 148- 9. 
53 Klein 1991: 117.  
54 ibid. 
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or other failures that are perceived to be temporary, fleeting, small, or uncomfortable 
mishaps.55  
This process is represented in the flow chart below. When a member of the 
emotional community (M) experiences ridicule, he must determine whether the ridiculer 
and the ridicule have some merit or standing. If M agrees with the judgment conveyed in 
the ridicule, then he enters the shame state; if not, he finds some tactic for correction of 
the ridiculer’s assessment.56 The eventual goal is reparation, through ridicule or another 
method. If a victim of ridicule is eventually able to recover himself, he can work to regain 
the esteem lost in his own opinion and in that of others; a victim of ridicule who did not 
enter the shame state might move directly to this step.57  
 
                                                
55 Buss 1980: 140- 1. Buss, a psychologist like Ekman, focuses on the expressive elements of emotion. He 
argues that embarrassment, of all the emotions, is most tied to a physiological reaction, particularly 
blushing (see especially 1980: 129ff). Although the definition of emotion I have outlined above follows the 
cognitive approach of Nussbaum and others, and therefore does not require a physiological reaction like 
blushing in order to classify an emotion, I do not actively exclude physiological reactions from the study of 
emotions. 
56 I will provide examples of these scenarios in the chapters that follow. 
57 One tactic for reparation is the rage or fury of humiliation, especially in instances of war, personal 
vendettas, or other violent attacks that sometimes accompany ridicule. See Buss 1980: 119f. 
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Figure 1: The shame state 
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The shame state encompasses any combination of these emotions and physiological 
reactions, and individuals might even experience different groups of emotions at different 
times. A community’s emotional apparatus privileges certain types of emotions and 
reactions in the shame state, so some community members favor particular reactions 
more than others.  
LATIN DEFINITIONS 
 Now that I have defined the theoretical terms of this study, I will turn to some 
relevant Latin terms. The following is a review of words for laughter, including rideo and 
its compounds derideo, inrideo, and surrideo; cachinno, cavillatio, contemno, 
contumelia, facetiae, insulto, iocor, lepos, ludibrium, ludicrus, ridiculus, and salsus. 
These words for laughter are frequently in scenes of ridicule, so it will be useful to 
understand precisely what kind of laughter and expression each term connotes. For 
instance, an author’s choice of derideo, which frequently denotes ridicule, over rideo or 
iocor, which do not normally indicate ridicule, tells us that the derisive laughter is 
important in that passage.  
 Of the laughter terms, rideo is the most common laughter word.58 Its ubiquity 
gives it a neutral meaning that can range from to smile59 to to laugh gently60 or to laugh 
                                                
58 A search of the Packard Humanities Institute’s Latin corpus for forms of rideo and ridiculus, using rid- 
and ris- as terms, returns 1173 instances, after removing irrelevant results (like ridica, a wooden stake for 
vines). 
59 cf. OLD definition A3: (transf., of things having a bright and cheerful or welcoming aspect) to ‘laugh,’ 
‘smile.’ 
60 See note 59, and also OLD A2: to laugh as a sign of goodwill or the absence of hostility (perhaps 
sometimes almost equal to ‘to smile’); (especially with the dative of person favoured, or ad). 
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mockingly.61 Rideo is used to indicate the act of laughing at something or someone, and 
someone smiling or laughing more generally. In an example from Terence, risisti refers 
both to the sound and act of Chremes’ laughter and to the object of his laughter:  
CH. Hahahae! MEN. Quid risisti?  
 
CH. “Hahaha! MEN. What are you laughing at?  Ter. HT 886  
 
Often, as when rideo is used to indicate approval or goodwill, no actual laughter is 
implied: dum iuvat et vultu ridet Fortuna sereno (“While Fortune helps and smiles 
approval with a peaceful face,” Ov. Tr. 1.5.27). Rideo can also be used metaphorically of 
objects, in describing a bright or pleasant aspect of a garden, for example, but these 
instances are not relevant for our purposes here.  
 It is clear even from this brief outline that it would be foolish – or, dare I say, 
ridiculous – to rely on a word search of rideo to find instances of ridicule. But ridicule 
appears far more often in the compounds of rideo. For example, derideo gives us the 
English synonym derision for ridicule, and indeed in Latin its use is to indicate objects of 
scorn; derideo therefore is a generally reliable indicator of ridicule. Derideo is used for 
instances of mockery and other ridicule; it is not used of inconsequential joking or in 
jovial conversations, like rideo is.62  
In a letter to Cicero, which dates to January 45 BCE, when Caesar was fighting 
the Pompeians in Spain, Cassius expresses his concern about the younger Pompey’s 
reaction to the derision he senses from the other senators: scis Gnaeum quam sit fatuus, 
                                                
61 cf. OLD A1d: (in mockery), or B6a: to deride, laugh at, make fun of. 
62 OLD definition: a: to deride, laugh at, make fun of. b: to be able to laugh, i.e. to escape, get off scot-free. 
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scis quo modo crudelitatem virtutem putet, scis quam se semper a nobis derisum putet; 
vereor ne nos rustice gladio velit ἀντιµυκτηρίσαι (You know that Gnaeus Pompey is so 
foolish, you know how he thinks cruelty is a virtue, you know how he thinks we laugh at 
him. I’m afraid he wants to answer the mockery in the rustic sense, with a sword, ad 
Fam. 15.19.4.6). Cassius’ use of derideo here, and his accompanying concerns for the 
negative effects of that derision, demonstrates the power such ridicule can have in social 
situations. This same social effect of ridicule is seen in a passage from Seneca’s letters: 
nulla res citius in odium venit quam dolor, qui recens consolatorem invenit et aliquos ad 
se adducit, inveteratus vero deridetur, nec inmerito; aut enim simulatus aut stultus est, 
(“Nothing becomes odious more quickly than grief. When it is recent, it finds a consoler 
and it attracts others to itself. But after it becomes entrenched, it is mocked, and not 
undeservedly: for it is then either pretended or foolish,” Epi. Mor. 63.13.8). 
In this example, Seneca uses derideo to describe mocking as a social censure for 
behavior he finds inappropriate. Unlike Cassius’ letter to Cicero, where derideo 
represented ridicule that might have negative repercussions, Seneca feels that the 
mockery is shaping good habits in its ability to curb unnecessary grief. In both senses, 
however, derideo represents negative or ridiculing jokes and laughter. 
Irrideo, the compound of in and rideo, means to direct one’s laughter at someone 
or something, often maliciously.63 For instance, in Plautus’ Captivi, the senex Hegio 
exclaims per urbem irridebor! (“I will be mocked throughout the city!” Capt. 785). This 
                                                
63 OLD definition: to laugh at, mock, make fun of (persons), b (things), c (with quod clause), d (elliptical 
or absolute). 
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is a fairly typical usage of irrideo: Hegio fears he will be the target of mocking laughter. 
In his comments on Vergil’s Eclogues, Honoratus suggests, without further comment, 
that we read ridens as irridens (RIDENS irridens, 6.23.1),64 intensifying and focusing the 
action from something like smile or laugh to smile at or laugh at. His comment implies 
that irridere is a bit stronger than rideo, although I detect no malice in either Vergil’s 
original line or in Honoratus’ comment.  
In another comment, Honoratus also glosses insultare65 as irridere per 
cavillationem: 
INSULTENT RUTULI: propter illud “interea Rutuli portis circum 
omnibus instant.” insultare autem est inimicis irridere per cavillationem, 
exultare vero gloriari et laetum esse.  In Libros Verg. Aen. 10.20.4 
 
[How] the Rutulians mock [us]: because of the phrase “meanwhile the 
Rutulians stand around all the gates.” insultare means “to laugh at enemies 
through raillery,” but exultare means to be truly boastful and bountiful. 
 
Here, Honoratus clarifies the mocking laughter of insultare, explaining that this behavior 
is like jeering at someone.66 As we have seen, irridere is not necessarily a malicious 
laugh, although it has a focused target. Cavillatio is a witty jeer or cleverly mocking 
banter (as below), so irridere per cavillationem is to laugh at someone in particular with 
clever jokes at the target’s expense.  Honoratus explains that Venus says insultent Rutuli 
because the Rutulians have menacingly surrounded the Trojans, as readers learn when 
Vergil shifts the narration from the council of the gods to the Trojan camp.  
                                                
64 Ecl. 6.23: ille dolum ridens “quo vincula nectitis?” inquit (“Laughing at the trick, he said, ‘Why bind 
me in chains?’” 
65 See more on insulto below. 
66 Or “malicious exulting,” as Harrison puts it (1991: 64). 
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Only subrideo (or surrideo) typically avoids associations with ridicule. It most 
often means to smile upon someone or something, as in the Vergilian formula olli 
subridens, although even this may have the connotations of the condescension of an 
“archaic smile.”67  
Cachinno is an onomatopoeic term for a loud laugh, like a guffaw, or for similar 
sounds, like the slapping of waves against the shore.68 Its loud, boisterous laughter is 
often considered to be aggressive and inappropriate.69 Cachinno is not as frequent as the 
broader laughter terms, but it appears frequently in Apuleius, where it often connotes 
derisive laughter.70  
Iocor is a generic term for teasing or jesting.71 In my study of laughter terms I 
found only a handful of instances (out of 677 results) in which forms of iocor might 
indicate ridicule; most commonly it is used for light-hearted jokes or otherwise 
unparticular instances of humor. Petronius’ Satyricon features one of the few instances in 
which it is clear that iocus sim refers to being the butt of others’ jokes, but, as with many 
instances of iocor, the joking is vague or unspecific: et nunc spero me sic vivere, ut 
nemini iocus sim (“And henceforth I hope to live a life beyond the reach of any one's 
ridicule, 57.5.1). In this instance, a freedman is denouncing his former status as slave, 
                                                
67 See Uden 2014. 
68 OLD definiton: 1a: (intransitive) to laugh, especially loudly or boisterously, guffaw, b: (transitive, of the 
sound of the sea), 2: (transitive) to laugh loudly at. 
69 Cicero Tusc. Disp. 4.66 distinguishes appropriate laughter from inappropriate guffaws: if it is permitted 
to laugh, guffaws may still be reproachable (si ridere concessum sit, vituperetur tamen cachinnatio). 
70 Cachinn- appears only 46 times in the PHI Latin corpus, including two instances where the term is 
applied to the sound of waves crashing. Nine of these instances are in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses: perhaps 
the sound of cachinno is especially appropriate for the tale of a donkey and his social misfortunes. See 
Lateiner 2001. 
71 OLD definition: to jest, joke. 
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claiming that, now that he is free, he will never brook ridicule again. He uses rideo four 
times in his harangue about one’s status and the accompanying susceptibility to mocking 
laughter.  
 Ridiculus is the adjectival form of rideo, describing something capable of causing 
laughter, or something absurd.72 This word can therefore be used to indicate something 
simply amusing or something condemnable by ridicule; often, the term implies that 
something is preposterous without actually portraying ridicule. Frequently the accusative 
neuter ridiculum! is used in exclamations to indicate incredulity or absurdity. In this 
example, Quintilian is baffled by the idea of certain school exercises: ridiculum est ergo, 
in exercitationibus quae foro praeparant, prius cogitare quid responderi quam quid ex 
diuerso dici possit (“It is therefore ridiculous, in exercises which prepare the student for 
the actual courts, to consider what answer can be made before ever giving a thought to 
what the opposing counsel is likely to say,” Inst. Orat.5.13.44). Quintilian finds these 
school exercises – or perhaps the teachers who assign them – to be foolish and silly, 
worthy of laughter because of their absurdity. The term ridiculus can have an ambiguous 
meaning, however, as we will see in more detail in Chapter Two. Something can be 
funny or absurd, and therefore labeled ridiculus; but that laughter can easily turn into 
derisive, mocking laughter that is invited by the very same word, ridiculus. This is the 
technique that Cicero uses against Verres: a slow accumulation of ridiculus phrases that, 
together, work as ridicule.  
                                                
72 OLD definiton: 1: capable of arousing laughter, funny, comic, amusing; b: (of persons); (masc. as sb.) a 
jester, buffoon; c: (neut. as sb.) a piece of humour, a joke; per ridiculum, jokingly, in fun. 2: (in bad sense) 
absurd, silly, ridiculous; b: (neut. as interj.) the idea, question, etc., is absurd! 
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 Other terms in my search included those that describe the cleverness of a person, 
particularly in occasions of wit, such as cavillatio, salsus, and ludicrus. Cavillatio is a 
term describing a witty banter or a verbal joke, but it also refers just as often to the sort of 
quibbling over minutiae that frequently occurs in discussions of philosophy.73 Cicero in 
de Oratore defines it as the sort of wit that is found throughout a speech, instead of 
infrequent touches of humor (alterum aequabiliter in omni sermone fusum, illa a 
veteribus superior cavillatio, 218). This use of cavillatio aptly conveys its sense of 
clever, verbal wit. But as demonstrated above, in the example of Honoratus’ comment on 
Aeneid 10.20, the word could also be used in situations of more serious taunting. 
Suetonius uses the word in a description of one of Tiberius’ cruel jokes: 
Nec multo post in senatu Pompeio cuidam equiti R. quiddam perneganti, 
dum vincula minatur, affirmavit fore ut ex Pompeio Pompeianus fieret, 
acerba cavillatione simul hominis nomen incessens veteremque partium 
fortunam.  Tib. 57.2 
 
Not long after, when a certain Roman equestrian Pompeius disagreed with 
something in the Senate, Tiberius threatened him with imprisonment and 
declared that he would make a Pompeian from a Pompeius, attacking the 
man’s name and the fate of the old Pompeian party with a cruel witticism. 
 
This use of cavillatio encompasses both senses of the word: a witty verbal joke and a 
taunt. So, cavillatio is used in instances of ridicule and not; it is not an obvious indicator 
of ridicule. 
 Insulto can mean to trample, literally or figuratively. In nonliteral use, it means to 
mock or scoff; in other words, to trample over someone’s feelings.74 When insulto is used 
                                                
73 OLD definition: 1: raillery, banter, badinage; 2: sophistry, quibbling, captiousness. 
74 OLD definition: 3a to behave insultingly, mock, scoff, jeer; b (with accusative) to mock at. 
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figuratively, it almost always conveys demeaning ridicule. In this example, the Roman 
army seethes with indignation, eager to fight the Sabines again after some 
embarrassments: 
ad id, quod sua sponte satis collectum animorum erat, indignitate etiam 
Romani accendebantur: iam alterum exercitum uictorem in urbem 
rediturum; sibi ultro per contumelias hostem insultare; quando autem se, si 
tum non sint, pares hostibus fore? Livy 3.62.1 
 
Besides the fact that they had a ready supply of spirit, the Romans were 
also burning with indignation. The other army would return to the city 
victorious, but the enemy mocked them with insults. When would they be 
equal to the enemy, if not now? 
 
Not only had the Romans lost to the Sabines, but the Sabines made it all the worse by 
mocking their enemies, taunting the Romans for losing. Livy conveys the embarrassment 
and the shame of the situation in his metaphor indignitate…accendebantur (burning with 
indignation) and by offering the Romans’ private thoughts as part of his own narrative. 
The taunts of the Sabines (per contumelias hostem insultare) affect the Romans as much 
as the military defeat. 
 Similarly, contemno conveys, at least, dismissive treatment,75 and extreme scorn 
and insult at most.76 Contemno is not always associated with ridicule. It does, however, 
describe a derisive attitude and therefore does frequently appear in instances of ridicule. 
In his speech against a law that would have established a veterans’ colony at Capua, 
                                                
75 cf. OLD definition 2: to treat as of no importance, pay no heed to, disregard; b: (poet., of things); 3: to 
keep away from, avoid, have nothing to do with (a thing). 
76 OLD definition 1: to regard with contempt, look down on, take a poor view of, despise; b: (refl.); c: to 
treat with contempt in word or action, scorn, insult. 
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Cicero imagines a frightening future in which Capuans, in their shiny new city, grow to 
look down on Rome: 
Romam in montibus positam et convallibus, cenaculis sublatam atque 
suspensam, non optimis viis, angustissimis semitis, prae sua Capua 
planissimo in loco explicata ac praeclarissime sita inridebunt atque 
contemnent.  Cic. Agr. 2.35.96 
 
They will laugh at Rome, despise Rome, situated in the mountains and 
valleys, stuck up and suspended in attics, not on good roads, with very 
narrow streets, as compared to their own Capua, luxuriating in a wide 
open space and situated most beautifully. 
 
In Cicero’s nightmarish vision of Capua’s future, the city regains enough power to turn 
on Rome once again and mock Rome for its foolishness in restoring Capua to glory. 
Capua had been an ally of Rome’s until Rome’s loss at the Battle of Cannae in the 
Second Punic War; Rome duly punished Capua for its treachery, and Capua had never 
recovered its importance and power. In this instance, then, contemno (accompanied by 
inrideo) compounds ridicule with just the possibility of regret of giving strength to a 
former enemy and of shame in being mocked by that former enemy.  
 Lastly, a ludibrium is a mockery, in either of its English senses: a ludibrium is a 
sham (or sometimes a plaything), or it is the object or the act of mockery.77 In this second 
sense it is connected to ridicule. An excellent representation of the sense of the word is in 
Livy’s representation of Brutus, who played the fool in order to stay safe from the ruling 
Tarquin family. Brutus is both a plaything and the butt of jokes for the Tarquin brothers 
                                                
77 OLD definition: 1: a plaything, toy; b: playful or frivolous behavior or an instance of it; c: a product of 
playfulness, jest, or similar. 2: an object of derision or reproach, laughing-stock or similar, (especially in 
predicate dative); 3: insulting treatment, mockery, derision, or similar; b: (pl) instances of such treatment, 
insults, outrages, affronts; 4: something that mocks by seeming to be other than it is, a pretence, sham, 
imposture, etc. 
 32 
on their trip to Delphi: is tum ab Tarquiniis ductus Delphos, ludibrium uerius quam 
comes, aureum baculum inclusum corneo cauato ad id baculo tulisse donum Apollini 
dicitur, per ambages effigiem ingenii sui (“Then it is said that when he was taken to 
Delphi by the Tarquins, more as a butt for their jokes than as a companion, he brought a 
golden staff enclosed in a hollow wooden staff as a gift for Apollo, an enigmatic 
representation of his own character, 1.56.9). Brutus endures his status as ludibrium verius 
quam comes until the time is right for him to reveal his true sensibility; with this 
deception, he rather makes the Tarquins his playthings.  
 Often the word ludibrium has dire consequences for one’s reputation: a Roman 
fears becoming a ludibrium, or laughing-stock, for others. This is often presented as the 
worst possible outcome of a social or political situation, both for individuals, as in 
Brutus’ case above, and for larger groups. For example, in the thirteenth Philippic, Cicero 
quotes Antony, who suggests to Hirtius and Octavian that their feud could make their 
cause (the Caesarians) into a laughing-stock (ludibrium) for their enemies (the senatorial 
party). 
Quam ob rem vos potius animadvertite utrum sit elegantius et partibus 
utilius Treboni mortem persequi an Caesaris, et utrum sit aequius 
concurrere nos quo facilius reviviscat Pompeianorum causa totiens 
iugulata, an consentire ne ludibrio simus inimicis. Phil. 13.38.5 
 
Accordingly pay attention to whether it is more proper and more useful to 
your party to seek the death of Trebonius or Caesar, and whether it is more 
reasonable for us to meet in battle, so that the Pompeians’ cause, which 
has so often been butchered, may all the more easily revive; or to come to 
an agreement so that we are not a laughing-stock for our enemies. 
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Since Cicero publicly picks apart and mocks Antony’s letter for most of the Thirteenth 
Philippic, it would seem that Antony, at least, became the ludibrium he had feared. The 
insult to one’s dignitas and reputation can be magnified if the ludibrium is aimed at a 
larger group. In Tacitus’ Annals, the Roman army and the general Corbulo, who received 
a message from the emperor Claudius to stop his campaign immediately, became an 
object of scorn for the Germans whom they had been fighting and a laughing-stock to the 
Roman allies: ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex imperatore, 
contemptio ex barbaris, ludibrium apud socios, nihil aliud prolocutus quam 'beatos 
quondam duces Romanos,' signum receptui dedit (“When the dispatch arrived, although 
he was overwhelmed by many things (dread of the emperor, contempt from the 
barbarians, ridicule from his allies), he said nothing except, “Happy those Roman 
generals of old!” and gave the signal for retreat, Ann. 11.20.1). 
Contumeliae are insults or taunts, representing the same sort of ridiculing abuse 
as ludibrium.78 In a basic sense, contumeliae represent derisive behavior or malicious 
intent, as in this example from Cicero’s first Philippic: ego, si quid in vitam eius aut in 
mores cum contumelia dixero, quo minus mihi inimicissimus sit non recusabo (“If I have 
said anything malicious against his life or morals, I will not object to being his bitterest 
enemy,” Phil. 1.27). Here, Cicero uses cum contumelia to refer to any sort of ridiculing 
speech at Antony’s expense. He acknowledges that such spiteful speech deserves 
animosity in return: to speak cum contumelia is to breed contempt.  
                                                
78 OLD definition: insulting language or behaviour or an instance of it, indignity, affront; b: (transf.) rough 
treatment. 
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Often, these ridicule words appear in clusters, working together. The use of 
several synonymous ridicule words, or perhaps even the iteratio of the same ridicule 
word, draws attention to the ridicule and emphasizes the damage done by the derision. A 
cluster of ridicule words can also emphasize the severity of the ridicule. For example, in 
the sixth of Seneca’s Suasoriae, the participants discuss whether Cicero should beg for 
his life from Antony. Seneca’s character Cestius Pius suggests: 
In hac parte cum descripsisset contumelias insultantium Ciceroni et 
verbera et tormenta, dixit illam multum laudatam sententiam: tu 
mehercules, Cicero, cum veneris ad Antonium, mortem rogabis.  
  Sen. Suas. 6.10.14 
 
He said it would be useful to avoid the torture of his body, since he would 
not simply die if he fell into Antony’s hands. And when he had described 
the mockeries and insults [lit. mocking abuses of insults] and beatings and 
torture in store for Cicero, he gave a much-praised opinion: “By Hercules, 
Cicero, when you come to Antony, you’ll be begging for death!” 
 
Cestius argues that Cicero should die, but considers that if Cicero should choose to live, 
Antony would be so incensed with violence towards him that Cicero would hope for 
death. Cicero’s actions and, importantly, his Philippics against Antony have created such 
an animosity between the two, that Antony’s natural response includes mockeries and 
insults and beatings and torture (contumelias insultantium Ciceroni et verbera et 
tormenta). As we have established above,79 Cicero’s Philippics ridiculed Antony and 
contributed to the bitter rivalry between them. Although Cicero did not use violence 
against Antony, Cestius’ comment here demonstrates that Cestius (or rather, Seneca) 
believes that Antony will respond to Cicero’s non-violent ridicule with more ridicule and 
                                                
79 v.s.in the discussion of contumelia, Cic. Phil. 1.27. 
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with violence. Seneca’s pleonastic contumelias insultantium and the polysyndeton of et 
suggests that he views the ridicule (contumelias insultantium) as much a part of Antony’s 
punishment of Cicero as the physical punishments verbera et tormenta. The real situation 
of Cicero’s mockery of Antony, and this hypothetical response of Antony’s ridicule of 
Cicero, demonstrate the real, physical effects of ridicule. 
A cluster of ridicule words can also emphasize the significance, or even the 
success, of ridicule.80 For example, in the following passage, Livy describes the situation 
in Istria, as the leaders Marcus Junius and Aulus Manlius, together with their legions, 
defy and mock the newly elected consul, Gaius Claudius, who had urgently traveled to 
Istria to command them to retreat. At first, Livy establishes the contempt with which 
Claudius treats Junius, Manlius, and their soldiers, and vice versa; as he concludes the 
story and employs three ridicule words to describe the soldiers’ mockery of the consul: 
…ad extremum utrumque decedere provincia iussit. Ad quod cum illi tum 
consulis imperio dicto audientes futuros esse dicerent, cum is more 
maiorum, secundum vota in Capitolio nuncupata, lictoribus paludatis 
profectus ab urbe esset, furens ira vocatum, qui pro quaestore Manli erat, 
catenas poposcit, vinctos se Iunium Manliumque minitans Romam 
missurum. Ab eo quoque spretum consulis imperium est; et circumfusus 
exercitus, favens imperatorum causae et consuli infestus, animos ad non 
parendum addebat. Postremo fatigatus consul et contumeliis singulorum et 
multitudinis – nam insuper inridebant – ludibriis, naue eadem, qua 
uenerat, Aquileiam redit. Livy 41.10.10 
 
He [Gaius Claudius, the consul] ordered both of them [the former consuls 
and generals, Marcus Junius and Aulus Manlius] to leave the province. 
When the consul’s order was announced, they said that they would listen 
when he had arrived at camp in the old manner, after offering a votive at 
the Capitol, and with the lictors and in military garb. Furious with anger, 
he summoned the man who was Manlius’ quaestor, and demanded some 
                                                
80 See, e.g., Moore (1989: 149ff) on clusters of virtue words in Livy. 
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chains, threatening to send Junius and Manlius to Rome in fetters. The 
consul’s imperium was spurned by this man, too, and the surrounding 
soldiers, favoring the cause of their leaders and angry with the consul, also 
refused to obey. At last the consul, worn out by the insults of individuals 
and the jeers of the whole crowd —for they ridiculed him as well —
returned to Aquileia in the same ship in which he had come. 
 
Livy establishes the indignation of the consuls, the quaestor, and the soldiers through his 
description of their escalating disobedience of the consul Claudius’ orders. We 
sympathize with the soldiers, who are loyal (favens) to their immediate commanders (the 
former consuls Junius and Manlius). The disobedience of Claudius’ imperium begins at 
the top with Junius and Manlius, then spreads to the lower officer (the unnamed 
quaestor), and finally spreads to the soldiers, and as the defiance spreads, so too does the 
indignation.  
Finally, with the chiastic structure and Livy’s inclination to variatio, we can liken 
contumeliae to ludibria in the phrase et contumeliis singulorum et multitudinis… 
ludibriis. In this situation, then, the mockery of the leaders (singulorum) and the men 
(multitudinis) is analogous. Their similarity is further clarified by the parenthetical 
explanation nam insuper inridebant. Livy adds that “they” (the multitudo, or the crowd of 
soldiers) mocks the consul Claudius, as their leaders Junius and Manlius do. The soldier’s 
mockery is all the more insolent because of the disparity of their respective positions of 
authority, and Livy reminds us of this discrepancy by using the word imperium twice. 
The saturation of ridicule words in this passage, following a description of the 
increasingly indignant anger of the crowd of soldiers at the consul’s presumption, 
emphasizes the overwhelming force of the derision in this scene. The episode concludes 
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(after the quoted section) as Claudius submits to the insolent army’s commands, returning 
to Istria in the mos maiorum as ordered. In this case, defiance and derision have 
accomplished their goal in shirking the new consul’s authority, and the accumulation of 
key words, including ridicule words, has accomplished Livy’s goal in describing this 
successful challenge of authority, and the efficacy of this ridicule. 
Not every laughter term in my search yielded examples of ridicule. Salsus,81 
facetiae,82 and lepos83 are often used to describe a clever person’s wit but only rarely 
describe ridicule. A ludicrum84 is a play or musical performance, and the adjectival 
ludicrus refers to light-hearted jokes or songs. I did not find any instances of ridicule in 
the uses of ludicrus.  
STRUCTURE 
 As case studies for the ways emotional communities navigate ridicule, the shame 
state, and the recovery, I have focused on two emotional communities in Latin literature, 
representing Rome domi militiaeque: the Roman army and the senatorial elite.85 In each 
chapter, I define the emotional community and its emotional apparatus before turning to 
at least one case study of the community’s engagement with ridicule. 
                                                
81 OLD definition: 3: (of situations, speech, etc.) salted with humour, witty, funny; b: (of persons). 
82 OLD definition: 1: skillfulness, cleverness; a clever action; b: cleverness or aptness of expression; 2: the 
quality of being witty or facetious, wit; b: (sg.) an amusing thing or remark, joke. 
83 OLD definition: 1: charm, grace, attractiveness; b: (as a term of endearment); 2: charm or cleverness of 
language, wit, humour; b: (usually in plural) an instance of this, pleasantry, witticism. 
84 OLD definition: 1: a source of fun, amusement, diversion; b: a plaything, toy; c: a piece of light verse, 
etc., trifle; d: a witticism, joke; 2: a public entertainment, show (sporting or theatrical); ludicrum Troiae, a 
kind of sham fight. 
85 Note that I use the terms domi and militiae for the sake of convenience in referring to the two emotional 
communities described in this dissertation. 
 38 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I detail the emotional community of the 
Roman army, or what I have called the militiae emotional community. I provide an 
overview of its emotional apparatus and the hierarchy of the army, with its officers as 
leaders of the emotional community.  
I then turn to three case studies to focus on ways in which Roman authors use 
scenes of ridicule and the shame state to shape the narrative of their histories. In Livy’s 
description of the disaster at the Caudine Forks, he exaggerates the bitterness of the 
ridicule and the shame state that the Roman army must endure before recovering their 
community by defeating the Samnites. I argue that Livy uses ridicule and the shame state 
to benefit his victory narrative, making the Romans’ eventual defeat of the Samnites all 
the more impressive. The next case study is Vergil’s depiction of the Trojans encounters 
with the native Rutulians in the Aeneid. Here, I argue that Vergil establishes Aeneas as a 
positive exemplar of the emotional apparatus of the militiae emotional community, 
contrasted with Turnus, who is characterized as superbus and derisive. I explore scenes 
of ridicule from both camps, arguing that the final scene of the Aeneid is so confusing 
because the audience has had certain expectations of ridicule throughout the work. Last, I 
detail the ridicule in Tacitus’ description of the Roman campaign against Arminius. 
Vergil’s Aeneas and Turnus serve as models for Tacitus’ Germanicus and Aeneas, and I 
suggest that, while Tacitus attempts a ridicule-turned-victory narrative like Livy’s, it is 
less successful.  
 In the second chapter, I turn to the elite senatorial class in the late Republic: 
Cicero’s emotional community, which I have labeled the domi emotional community. 
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After providing a survey of the community’s emotional apparatus, I argue that 
membership in this community is so valued that it becomes the focus of Cicero’s 
campaign against Lucius Verres, our last case study. These speeches are nominally a 
persecution of Verres by Cicero for charges of corruption, but they are really about 
Verres’ poor performance as a member of the emotional community, and Cicero’s 
embodiment of the ideals of the emotional apparatus. I suggest that much of oratory is the 
performance of membership in the community, and that success in oratory is based on 
one’s skill in portraying oneself as the ideal member of the emotional community. I 
conclude by offering some summarizing thoughts and some suggestions for future work 
in the intersection of emotion, community, and ridicule in Latin literature. 
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Chapter 1: Ridicule and the Militiae Emotional Community 
Ridicule is part of a process of emotional reactions experienced by a group of 
people. The social functions of ridicule, and the emotional response it triggers, are felt by 
an emotional community. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which Roman authors 
present this social process of ridicule in their depictions of the Roman army. I suggest 
first that the Roman army, as presented in Latin literature, functions as an emotional 
community that privileges certain emotions and rejects others. Next, I define the 
emotional apparatus of that community, arguing that Roman authors rely on their 
audience’s familiarity with this apparatus to use ridicule to shape a text to fit other 
literary goals. For situations involving ridicule in the Roman army, the process of ridicule 
is employed as part of a victory narrative: to emphasize the emotional lows of the Roman 
army in order to later emphasize the army’s impressive victory. In addition, the ridicule 
process provides an opportunity to characterize antagonists as haughty ridiculers who 
need to be reformed by virtuous Romans. Authors benefit from their audience’s 
understanding of the social context of ridicule and, by using ridicule in this way, 
reinforce the social rules of ridicule and emotion in Rome. 
In the first part of this chapter, I build on the definitions of ridicule, shame state, 
and emotional community offered in the Introduction and tailor them for discussion of 
the Roman army. I first establish that the Roman army functions as an emotional 
community, offering some literary and archaeological evidence. In the next section, I 
outline the major emotions and values that were privileged or rejected in the army’s 
emotional community. I then present the possible emotional reactions to ridicule in the 
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Roman army. I focus in particular on interactions between the Roman army’s emotional 
community and foreign armies.  
As case studies of this situation, I feature discussions of the ridicule process in 
Livy, Vergil, and Tacitus. I begin with Livy’s presentation of the disaster at the Caudine 
Forks, which prominently features the reactions of the Roman army’s emotional 
community. The Caudine Forks episode allows Livy’s audience to observe the ridicule 
process from its beginning to the end, including the emotional community’s recovery 
from its shame state and an application of Livy’s victory narrative. Next, I analyze 
Vergil’s characterization of Aeneas, Turnus, and their men in the context of ridicule and 
victory, particularly in light of his discussion of superbia, or haughty pride. Vergil 
establishes the enemy as superbus and inclined to ridicule, and he blends the Trojans’ 
recovery from Rutulian ridicule with their military triumph in Italy. Last, I show that 
Tacitus uses Vergil as a model for the characterizations of his protagonist, Germanicus, 
and his antagonist, Arminius, just as he uses Livy as a model to craft a victory narrative 
out of the folly and ridicule of his protagonists.  
THE ROMAN ARMY AS AN EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY 
The Roman army spanned hundreds of years and thousands of miles and lives, so 
naturally the army evolved over time. But within such a vast entity, there were patterns of 
behavior – a code of conduct – that helped to develop a sense of community in the army. 
The army functioned as a social unit, marked out by a set of behaviors and signs that 
indicated its special status. Shaw suggests, in a discussion about the distinctions 
maintained between a Roman army and local civilians, that the Roman army could be 
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considered a total institution.86 Goffman, a sociologist, first coined the term “total 
institution” to refer to any “place of residence and work where a large number of like-
situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, 
together lead an enclosed, formally administered life.”87 Goffman’s original analysis 
featured mental hospitals in the most detail, but he noted that many other organizations, 
like army barracks or jails or monasteries, functioned as total institutions. By his 
definition, a total institution had three basic characteristics: a single authority who (or 
which) controlled all aspects of life, daily activities conducted in the close company of 
many others, and a tight schedule of daily activities.  
 As Shaw, and later Pollard, demonstrates, the Roman army operated as a total 
institution.88 First, there was an authority: the army operated under the command of its 
generals. Second, daily life was controlled: the soldiers lived and worked close together, 
often for years. And third, there were regular routines for setting up camp and for 
fighting. Soldiers showed their membership in this community, as we have seen, through 
their dress, their diet, their living quarters, their names for each other, and even their 
gravestones.89  
  Because it functioned so successfully as a total institution, the Roman army is a 
perfect example of the sort of unit that can become an emotional community. With shared 
goals and accomplishments and failures – not to mention the normal drudgery of daily 
                                                
86 Shaw 1983. 
87 Quoted from Goffman 1961: xxi. 
88 Shaw 1983 and Pollard 1990. 
89 See Lendon 1997: 238- 240 in particular. 
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life on campaign – the army formed its own emotional community. In addition to terms 
of endearment like commilitiones and amici, legionaries called each other, and especially 
their own tent-mates, fratres; we might infer a close, family-like atmosphere from such 
nicknames.90 Entire legions could earn nicknames for outstanding service; for instance, 
after defeating Boudicda, Legio XIV became known as Martia Victrix.91 These epithets 
served to enhance a sense of cohesion in a unit, and they represented a sense of pride in 
being a member of a community known for a particular accomplishment. In particular, 
soldiers who have experienced particular campaigns together, or who have followed a 
specific general for much of his career, form another set of emotional communities within 
the Roman army. Veterans might identify with current legionaries in a broader emotional 
community. In these situations, emotional communities overlap with social communities, 
but our emphasis is on the systems of feelings experienced by the community; in this 
case, our focus is on the community’s emotions related to ridicule.  
Thinking of the army as a total institution is particularly useful after the Marian 
reforms of the first century BCE, when all citizens were eligible to join the army, even if 
they did not meet earlier property requirements that would have limited the army to 
certain classes. From that point on, the Roman legions were mostly volunteer forces of 
semi-professional soldiers in what came to be standing armies.92 During that time, a 
soldier and his comrades would have spent long years on campaigns together, away from 
                                                
90 MacMullen 1984: 443, and passim; Lendon 1997: 253. 
91 Goldsworthy 1998: 254. 
92 Watson 1969: 21, 36ff. 
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home and family, in stressful situations. It is easy to see how a person could form close 
bonds in such circumstances.  
When we speak of the Roman army as a community, it is possible to consider the 
entire army, with its legions spread across the Mediterranean, as a very broad community 
whose members would recognize each other by certain symbols of their community: their 
military titles, their oaths of service, their code of conduct, and perhaps also their dress or 
routines. These signs of membership in the army community would have been intelligible 
to anyone familiar with the Roman army.93  
Clothing was one such way to mark out membership in the army community. 
While there was no official uniform for Roman soldiers, each man typically wore a tunic 
and boots, with a sword belted around his waist.94 The military boots, caligae, were 
typical enough of a soldier’s outfit that the future emperor Caligula earned his nickname 
because, as a child, he dressed up like a soldier. To be seen without a belted tunic (to be 
discinctus) was a form of shaming – a symbolic and temporary removal from the 
community – and was used as punishment.95  
                                                
93 When we consider smaller communities within the Roman army, such as the legions stationed together 
in a particular area, we can focus on even more specific details, such as diet or family status, that are 
markers of a more specific community. For example, soldiers were prohibited from marriage for much of 
the empire, but this rule was overlooked more often than not in certain locations, especially where soldiers 
were stationed indefinitely; in long-term posts where soldiers married and started families, new forms of 
community developed (Scheidel 2007: passim). For more on the Roman army as a community, see 
Goldsworthy 1998, Goldsworthy and Haynes 1999. 
94 Phang 2008: 84ff. 
95 Williams 1999: 147- 8; Phang 2008: 141- 2. 
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The soldiers also cooked and ate together96 because they were required to cook 
their own food with their tentmates in their barracks (or contubernia), where they also 
slept. These close quarters became a home for the soldiers, who were often on campaigns 
together for years. The soldiers felt pride in the maintenance of these contubernia and 
their camps in general. As Tacitus has Vespasian’s soldiers put it, “the army camp is the 
soldier’s special pride, his homeland, his penates” (proprium esse militis decus in castris: 
illam patriam, illos penatis; Hist. 3.84). Since the soldiers lived in such close quarters, 
and since they were often on campaigns for years at a time, it is not surprising that the 
soldiers developed close relationships with each other.  
Tacitus suggests that men joined the army because they were failures otherwise, 
and the army provided an opportunity to grow and improve one’s lot in life.97 If these 
men could adapt to the new rules and habits of the community, they could not only be a 
part of the community, but they could find success in it, with rewards and promotions for 
a job well done. The army community was therefore not just a place to live and work, but 
a way of life and a path to the future. 
Proud soldiers and veterans make mention of their achievements in service, and 
even under whose leadership they served, on monuments and in epitaphs.98 By noting a 
commander, the authors of these inscriptions imply a particular pride in serving under 
                                                
96 Phang 2008: 249- 284. 
97 Tacitus has Tiberius complains that the army is made up of men who sought the army because they had 
no other options, and that their position makes them uninspired or undisciplined soldiers: nam voluntarium 
militem deesse, ac si suppeditet, non eadem virtute ac modestia agere, quia plerumque inopes ac 
vagisponte militam sumant (For there was a lack of volunteers for the army, and even if there were a supply 
of them, they did not carry themselves with the same virtue and discipline, since most take a military post 
on account of poverty or homelessness; Ann. 4.4). See Goldsworthy 1998: 252. 
98 Lendon 1997: 260ff. 
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that leader and in being a part of that military unit. This pride in community is an 
essential part of a successful Roman army, and, as I will note later, it is an important 
feature of an emotional community. 
  One complication in this social community is the status of the officers, who were 
generally of a different social status than the majority of their soldiers, but more 
importantly were supposed to be leaders of the community. Successful Roman military 
officers had to articulate carefully their relationship with the army community: they could 
not be too close with their soldiers, or risk losing face and the respect required for a 
leader.99 But they could also not become too haughty or disdainful of their men without 
losing the men’s favor and loyalty, which were essential not only on the battlefield but 
more broadly for the wealth and popularity they needed to be successful leaders. 
Essentially, the army’s leaders were caught between emotional communities: their 
militiae community with the legionaries, and their domi community in Rome with other 
elite leaders. As a result, in order to be well-received in both communities, they needed to 
embody the ideals of each group’s emotional apparatus. 
Evidence for the Roman Army’s Emotional Community 
In these discussions of the features of the emotional community, I have drawn on 
the literary evidence of historians. It is important to acknowledge the handicaps of these 
sources: these are not snapshots of actual conversations or situations, but stylized works 
of literature. These are not useless for learning about emotions and ridicule in these 
                                                
99 Phang 2008: 239ff. 
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communities; we simply need to be mindful of the author’s personal goals in writing as 
we consider his representations of the community’s emotions and ridicule. 
There is also evidence for the emotional community of the Roman army available 
through other sources. For primary sources, we might turn to the personal letters from 
soldiers at Vindolanda or in Egypt, or to archaeological and papyrological evidence from 
a site like Dura-Europos (as Pollard has done). These sources do not contain the extended 
scenes of ridicule that are essential to this study, but they do convey some of the army’s 
evidence of the emotional apparatus. We have even less in the way of physical evidence, 
as Rome did not honor its war dead with memorials in the field, as the Greeks often did, 
so battlefield memorials are few and generally not helpful for reconstructing an emotional 
community.100   
There are many epitaphs for soldiers, however, and the choices made in 
commemorating these soldiers reveal the priorities of the members of this emotional 
community. We can consider the epitaphs that identify the decedent as a soldier (usually 
a name with the abbreviation mil.) as a minimum indication of membership in the army, 
and therefore the emotional community. Many epitaphs contain no further detail about 
the decedent or his relationship to the army. Some may go further, carefully listing out a 
curriculum vitae of the decedent’s military career, including his honors and awards from 
military service. If there is any discussion of the decedent’s personal emotional apparatus, 
                                                
100 Greek monuments to the war dead were erected for victories and defeats. The most famous Greek 
epitaph, for example, is Simonides’ epigram for the Spartans lost at Thermopylae, as reported by Herodotus 
(7.228): “Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that we lie here, obedient to Spartan orders (Ὦ ξεῖν', 
ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιµονίοις ὅτι τῇδε/ κείµεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήµασι πειθόµενοι.).” The Roman focus on a 
victory narrative also made Romans less likely to devote field memorials for military defeats. See Clark 
2014: 9ff. 
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the most common is the simple dedication that the memorial is “well-deserved.”101 This 
praise is so ubiquitous on funerary inscriptions as to be almost meaningless for the 
specific purpose of understanding the militiae emotional community.102 A similar claim 
of “deservedly” (ob merita) earning the military promotions is cited in the epitaph of 
Gaius Oppius.103 At least once, the long list of military achievements grants that one such 
promotion is due to the soldier’s virtus, but no other virtues are mentioned in the entire 
epitaph, and the only adjectives of praise are for the decedent’s wife and son, who was 
also a soldier: 
[-------] / militavit L annis, IV in leg. III A[ug(usta)] / libr. tesser. optio, 
signifer / factus ex suffragio leg. [A]u[g. pr. pr. 7] / militavit 7 leg. II Ital., 
[7] leg. VII ---- / 7 leg. I Min., 7 leg. X Gem., 7 leg. II [----] / 7 leg. III 
Aug., 7 leg. II[I] Gall. 7 leg. XXX U[l]p. / 7 leg. VI Vic., 7 leg. III Cyr., 7 
leg. XV Apol. / 7 leg II. Par., 7 leg. I Adiutricis / consecutus ob virtutem 
in / expeditionem Parthicam / coronam muralem vallarem / torques et 
phaleras, agit in / diem operis perfecti annos LXXX, / sibi et / Claudiae 
Marciae Capitolinae, koniugi karissimae, quae agit / in diem operis 
perfecti / annos LXV, et / M.Petronio Fortunato filio / militavit ann. VI 7 
leg. X[X]II Primig. / 7 leg. II Aug., vixit ann. XXXV, / cui Fortunatus et 
Marcia parentes / karissimo memoriam fecerunt. CIL VIII 217  
 
In the epitaph, both father and son are credited with military service, and the father has a 
full list of titles, positions, and awards (including the one earned “through his virtus”). 
The relationship between husband and wife and between parents and child is described as 
karissimo, but no other adjectives are used to describe the family members. Because so 
                                                
101 e.g. CIL IX 1415: d.m., / Ti. Cl. Maximo / II vir, aed. quaes /. pecuniae alim. / vixit ann. XXVII m. V / 
Ti. Cl. November / et Cl. Hermio/ne filio bene / merenti fec. / et sibi. 
102 bene merenti is frequently abbreviated b. m., with the option of adding a dative noun (also frequently 
abbreviated) specifying the decedent’s relationship to those who erected the monument (as in filio bene 
merenti = f. b. m.). 
103 e.g. CIL IX 5839: C. Oppio C. f. Vel. / Basso p.c., / pr. Auximo, leg. IIII Fl. fel., evoc. Aug. / ab actis 
fori, B pr. pr. signif. option. tesse. / coh. II pr., mil. coh. XIIII / et XIII urbanarum, / coll. cent. Auxim. / 
patr. ob merita eius. / L. d. d. d.   
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much care was taken in describing the units and the years of military service, we might 
assume that this military service was considered the most important aspect of the 
Fortunati men’s lives. In terms of emotional community: being a member of the militiae 
community was so significant that the bona fides of that experience needed to be captured 
on a tombstone for eternity. That each was a good member of the army is implied through 
the descriptions of their service, but that they were good members of the emotional 
community is largely neglected. 
Only rarely do we see inscriptions detailing the kinds of values privileged by the 
emotional community. Descriptions of a soldier “fighting hard for the republic” (pro r. p. 
fortiter pugnans), as in one inscription placed in the Forum of Trajan for a fallen soldier 
in the Dacian wars, are the exception rather than the norm.104 In epitaphs I have also 
noted descriptions of the deceased soldier as optimo et dignissimo105 and as piisimo,106 
but, while these are surely compliments for any Roman, neither truly evokes an ideal 
member of the militiae emotional community that I describe below. 
                                                
104 CIL VI 1377: M Claudio Ti f Q / Frontoni cos / leg Aug pr pr provinciarum Daciarum et / super simul 
leg Aug pr pr pro Vincia / Daciar leg Augg pr pr Moesiae super / Daciae Apulesis simul leg Augg pr pr pro 
vinciae Moesiae super comiti divi Veri / Aug donatd donis militarib bello Ar/meniaco et Parthico ab imper 
tore Antonino Aug et a divo Vero Aug corona / murali item vallari item classica item / aurea item hastis 
puris IIII item vexillis / IIII curatori operum locorumq publicor misso ad iuventutem per Italiam legen/dam 
leg Augg pr pr exercitus legionarii / et auxilior per Orientem in Armeniam / et Osrhoenam et Anthemusiam 
ducto/rum leg Augg legioni primae Minervi/ae in exspeditionem Parthicam deducen/dae leg divi Antonini 
Aug leg XI CL prae/tori aedili curuli ab actis senatus quae/stori urbano X viro stlitibus iudicandis. / Huic 
senatus auctor e imperatore M Au/relio Antonino / Aug Armeniaco Medico / Parthico maximo quod post 
aliquot se/cunda proelia adversum Germanos et Iazyges ad postremum pro rp fortiter / pugnans ceciderit 
armatam statuam poni in foro divi Traiani pecunia publica censuit. 
105 CIL IX 5840: C Oppio C f Vel / Basso p p, p c, / pr id Aux, leg IIII / Fl fel et leg II Tr for / evoc Aug 
ab act fori / pr pr, mil coh II pr / et coh XIII et XIIII urb, / omnibus officiis / in caliga functo, / centuriones 
leg II / Traianae fortis / optimo et dignissimo. / In cuius ded cenam col ded. / Lddd. 
106 CIL VI 2977: dm / M Aur Augustiano / coh V vig vix an XXXIIII / provitus ann XVII excep/tor 
presidi provincies / M s ann IIII, lectus in prae/toria, eques sive tabu/larius ann V, factus in Syria, vixit ann 
VIII, / Claudia Pacata coniux / piissimo et Ulpius Mar/cellus nepos b m fece/runt. 
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We might conclude, then, that the community’s emotional apparatus is not well 
represented in epigraphical evidence. What few mentions are made of emotions or of 
personal virtues or values are too general to be useful for understanding the militiae 
emotional community. There are a few explanations for this. First, the limited space 
available on an epitaph naturally requires abbreviated descriptions of a decedent. Second, 
perhaps inscriptions are simply not a place where this information was conveyed. But I 
would argue that, to a Roman soldier, the truly impressive part of military service was the 
rank and service itself. It was noteworthy simply to be a member of the emotional 
community, but it was all the more impressive to document one’s advancement through 
the ranks of that emotional community.107 That a person also embodied the emotional 
apparatus of the community is not useful in commemorating a fallen soldier, or perhaps it 
is simply implied through descriptions of military service.  
To continue beyond epigraphical evidence: there are no extant literary records of 
an average soldier’s experience in battle or on campaign. Such accounts do not exist, and 
perhaps never did. Much of the literary evidence is fiction, like the stylized epic poems of 
Romans at war, or history, written for the most part decades or even centuries after the 
events. Caesar’s commentaries provide a unique opportunity for this study, since Caesar 
himself was a part of the wars he describes. 
So, given the limits of evidence I have just outlined, we must be careful, in the 
following analysis of scenes of ridicule and the army’s reaction to them, of the limitations 
                                                
107 The importance of displaying membership in the emotional community foreshadows the role of 
ridicule in the domi emotional community in the next chapter. 
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of the sources and therefore our understanding of them. In the next section, I outline the 
emotional apparatus of the Roman army community, as depicted in literary evidence. An 
understanding of “anything so romantic as the soul of the soldier”108 might still be out of 
reach, but the real goal of this study is to understand the ways that authors relied on their 
readers’ understanding of these emotional communities in order to use scenes of ridicule 
to manipulate the plight of the ridiculed Romans to fit the author’s own literary goals. 
Most of the evidence for the emotional apparatus of the militiae emotional 
community is the constellation of emotions and values that were idealized by the men 
who wrote the literary works that survive today. The men involved in the emotional 
community as it truly existed are those memorialized in epitaphs. The reactions of the 
emotional communities to ridicule are based on evidence of real human behavior, but the 
ideals of the apparatus are loftier and more abstract. This chapter is chiefly concerned, 
then, with the connection between these two concepts, and the interplay between that 
connection and the literary goals of each author studied. 
 In the next section, then, I give an overview of the emotional community of the 
army. This is a generalized description, gathered from literary evidence spanning several 
hundred years. Further, the emotional apparatus outlined below is prescriptive: the 
Roman authors have provided their readers with an ideology for the emotional 
community of the Roman army. Importantly, though, this is the literary depiction of the 
                                                
108 Quoted from Macmullen 1984: 440: “Historians usually and rightly look at the outside of legions and 
at their impact in battle. Armies have historical importance only because they win or lose. Of course it is 
recognized that certain of their internal features have a bearing on their success or failure, notably their 
training and supply. As a guide to the archeologist or as the yield of excavation, studies exist on military 
living conditions and leisure facilities. But an attempt to understand anything so romantic as the soul of the 
soldier has, I think, yet to be made (emphasis mine).” 
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army’s emotional community, so this is the basis for our understanding of how Romans 
thought about the army. 
Militiae Emotional Apparatus 
 An emotional community is a social community defined by its shared system of 
feeling: the things that are privileged or deemed harmful, the emotions that are respected 
or repressed, the bonds between people, or the ways that people express their emotions.109 
The army’s emotional community centers on the feelings that promote the well-being of 
the army. To discover how the army functions as an emotional community, we can focus 
on the kinds of things that the soldiers and their leaders focused on as valuable. 
A soldier privileges what will make the best soldier: strength, bravery, skill, 
endurance, and so forth. Most of these features are bound up in the term virtus, which is 
the driving force behind the individual soldier. Virtus is the kind of excellence of spirit 
that makes a man great: it is all the features of strength and bravery of a soldier, but also 
the moral uprightness and good nature of a person. It is a moral quality of a person, and it 
is certainly the ideal for Roman men, especially Roman soldiers and military leaders.110 
Because virtus was so esteemed as the most important quality of a soldier, we can 
consider it to be at the center of the army’s emotional system, even if virtus is not 
                                                
109 See Rosenwein 2009, and above in the Introduction, for a review of emotional community. 
110 This moral aspect of virtus is developed after the Greek virtue ἀρετή, which, along with so many other 
Greek ideas, became popular at Rome. In the republic, as well, virtus was connected to an aristocratic idea 
of gloria and personal achievement. For more on virtus, see Eisenhut 1973, Moore 1989: 5ff, McDonnell 
2006, Riggsby 2006: 83ff, and Phang 2008: 3ff,. 
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properly an emotion.111  Other values and emotions, as we will see, revolved around the 
presence or absence of virtus.  
For the emotional community to function at its best, certain features needed to be 
prominent, and other, more negative qualities needed to be controlled. All these moral 
qualities and emotions – good and bad – were a part of the emotional community, so it is 
important to understand the full scope of the community’s emotional apparatus. When we 
study the community’s emotional response to ridicule, we see the community at zeniths 
and nadirs of emotional reactions. I will now outline the range of features of the army’s 
emotional community, beginning with virtus, and working through positive and negative 
qualities in the emotional apparatus.  
Virtus 
 Virtus is that characterstic of soldiers that allows them to best serve their leaders 
and Rome. With soldiers in Livy, Moore notes that virtus is particularly connected with 
bravery and courage, and with the steadfastness necessary to overcome challenges; virtus 
is the physical and emotional strength needed to be a great soldier.112 Men earn virtus 
through their experience and exercise; the grit and determination to see a battle through, 
and the know-how to understand how to handle a situation.113 Since part of the quality of 
virtus is experience, it is possible that, over the course of a narrative, an army might gain 
                                                
111 Virtus is not included on Cicero’s list of emotions in Tusc. Dis. 4, for example, although Cicero admits 
that the list is not intended to be an exhaustive inventory of all possible emotions. 
112 1989: 5ff. 
113 Riggsby 2006: 88- 91. 
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virtus.114 For instance, even Caesar’s horsemen, who had formerly been put to flight by 
the enemy, are able to save face and recover by showing enough virtus to overcome their 
earlier embarrassment. 
Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui 
vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, 
calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis 
occurrerent, equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus 
in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent.  BG 2.27.2 
 
At their arrival there was such a great shift in the situation that our men, 
even the ones who had fallen down, worn out by their wounds, leaned on 
their shields and re-entered the fight. Then the camp slaves saw that the 
enemy was completely terrified, and they ran into the battle, even though 
they were unarmed. Our horsemen, too, so that they might cover up the 
disgrace of their flight with their [current] courage (virtus), put themselves 
in front of the legionary soldiers in every part of the battle. 
 
Caesar found that his troops were motivated by a sense of “competitive virtus,”115 so that 
they might outdo each other, earn more rewards, and impress their commander.116  
Military leaders have a special position in the army’s framework of virtus. In 
Horace’s famous ode about military service to Rome, virtus takes the emphatic position 
at the beginning of two successive stanzas. Virtus, Horace says, maintains its honor when 
it is undefeated, when it grants honor to the worthy, and when it does not yield to the 
whims of the mob: 
                                                
114 As in De Bello Gallico: Caesar is uncertain of his troops’ virtus (2.8.1), but after gaining experience 
against the enemy, Caesar becomes reassured of their virtus (2.20.3). Riggsby 2006: 86- 7. 
115 Phrasing Phang’s at 2008: 47. 
116 A useful example is at BG 5.44, when two centurions, T. Pullo and L. Vorenus, attempt to settle a 
personal dispute by showing off in battle. When it appears that their bickering might backfire and Pullo 
suffers a setback, Vorenus steps in to shield his comrade. They return to the fortifications after killing many 
of the enemy. Caesar concludes: Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri 
inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur (And so 
Fortune handled them in this rivalry and conflict so that one rival was the safety and the salvation of the 
other, and it could not be said which one ought to be considered to have more virtus than the other).  
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Virtus, repulsae nescia sordidae, 
intaminatis fulget honoribus 
nec sumit aut ponit securis 
arbitrio popularis aurae. Od. 3.2.17- 20 
 
Virtus, ignorant of filthy defeat, 
shines with untarnished honor 
and does not take up axes or put them down 
at the impulse of an inconstant mob. 
 
The rest of Horace’s ode, including the famous line dulce et decorum est pro patria mori 
(it is sweet and right to die for the fatherland), which occurs just before these stanzas, 
emphasizes the possibility of glory and honor achieved through virtus in military 
sacrifice. These accomplishments are solemn and weighty and probably intended mostly 
for the wealthy elite who would lead soldiers. As I will describe below, the leaders of the 
Roman army were also considered to be leaders of the militiae emotional community; in 
both capacities, they were expected to be the best representation of the emotional 
apparatus. Such a manifestation of their virtus not only benefits each leader personally, 
but also the army as a whole. As for the Roman authors describing such circumstances, 
the skilled, noble leaders of the army provide protagonists around whom a historian can 
frame his narrative. 
Polybius, the Greek author of Roman history, claims that courage is the most 
essential virtue in every state, but especially in Rome: “It remained for him [Scipio] to 
achieve a measure of courage, practically the most important virtue for a leading man in 
every state, but especially in Rome, and the training for this was correspondingly 
difficult” (Λοιποῦ δ' ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν µέρους καὶ κυριωτάτου σχεδὸν ἐν 
πάσῃ µὲν πολιτείᾳ µάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώµῃ, µεγίστην ἔδει καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν περὶ τοῦτο τὸ 
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µέρος ποιήσασθαι; 1.29.1). Polybius singles out this aspect of virtus that connotes manly 
bravery (or what Polybius calls ἀνδρεία) as the most important virtue for young Roman 
leaders. Elsewhere he suggests that every elite Roman is pushed to success by a desire to 
suffer even the worst in order to achieve glory (εὐκλεία) on behalf of the state (τὸ δὲ 
µέγιστον, οἱ νέοι παρορµῶνται πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ὑποµένειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν πραγµάτων χάριν 
τοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς συνακολουθούσης τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐκλείας, 6.54.3).  
Virtus was the most important moral quality for a Roman man, and especially a 
member of the army’s emotional community. Virtus was the summation of all the good 
features of a Roman soldier, and the other qualities and emotions – not to mention 
successes and failures of the military campaigns – hinged on the proper nurturing of 
one’s virtus.   
Positive Qualities in the Emotional Community 
Virtus is certainly the most important moral quality in the emotional community, 
but virtus is supported by other characteristics that are likewise privileged in the 
emotional community. These positive qualities, including magnitudo animi, animus, 
impetus, and modestia, are all required for the maintenance of the army and therefore the 
emotional community. Such features are esteemed in individual members of the 
emotional community, and the community is praised when the group works together to 
display these characteristics. These positive features are balanced by a natural (for a 
soldier) inclination to violence and quickness of temper, so a member of the emotional 
community must become skilled in constantly checking the appropriate balance of these 
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positive and negative characteristics of a solider. I will briefly review each of these 
features. 
Magnitudo animi is an extension in the spirit of virtus. It implies a certain sense 
of self that, while present in the best soldier, was really most common in the elite leaders 
of the army, since it more frequently connoted the sort of official honors and political 
offices that would be out of reach for the average soldier.117 In Livy, magnitudo animi is 
closely tied to self-esteem and the confidence that helps to accomplish military 
success.118 This connection to actual achievement (as opposed to empty boasts, which is a 
trademark of insolentia) is the most important feature of magnitudo animi for the army’s 
emotional community.119  
Animus is the strength of spirit, or morale, that inspires confidence and dedication 
to an army’s military goal. Without animus, the emotional community would suffer 
because they would fail to complete their military orders. Animus is often paired with 
impetus, or the energy to rush forth into battle.120 Animus is distinguished from impetus 
by the timing and the endurance of each feeling. Where animus sustains an army through 
a campaign, impetus is the sudden urge that drives the men onto the field at the moment 
of battle. This is not to say that animus is at a constant high throughout a campaign; as 
argued below, the emotional community benefits from its leaders’ encouragement and 
                                                
117 Moore 1989: 141. 
118 ibid. 141- 7. 
119 See Baraz 2008: 375- 376. 
120 pace Lendon, who construes animus as more of the psychological component to the physical act of 
impetus (eg 1999: 290; cf. OLD definition 13b “courage, spirit, morale”). I count impetus as both the act of 
rushing forth into battle and the mindset to do it. (s.v. OLD 2b “a military charge, assault” and 5 “a violent 
mental impulse, urge, effort [often unpremeditated], 6 “an impulse to do something.”  For more, see below 
and Phang 2008: 37ff. 
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direction in balancing negative qualities with animus. For example, Livy contrasts 
impetus with consilium at 42.29.11: impetuque magis quam consilio (“more from impulse 
than planning”); here, Livy intends to present an impulsive action. At 6.38.4, however, he 
pairs animis with concilium [plebis], or both the emotional and political prerequisites for 
action, at 6.38.4: ingentibus animis armant concilioque (“they armed themselves with 
great courage and a resolution”). While animus is the emotional mindset, impetus also 
suggests an emotional eagerness and drive: Caesar commented on the importance of 
impetus for success in battle, noting that generals needed to focus their troops’ impetus 
for best results.121 So, impetus indicates the impulse, and animus represents a mindset. 
These qualities of animus and impetus can easily tip into furor and ira, negative but 
necessary qualities in the emotional community.  
 Modestia is a soldierly respect for authority.122 This obedience is vital for military 
operations, but as a moral quality in the emotional community, modestia was valued for 
its counterbalance to the violence that could easily overwhelm a soldier.123 Of course, this 
kind of obedience is most important for soldiers, not leaders; the leaders of the emotional 
community were tasked with enforcing the proper modestia in their men.124 
                                                
121 Caesar describes the emotional background to impetus at BC 3.92: …propterea quod est quaedam 
animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non 
reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent (…because there’s a certain enthusiasm of spirit and a speed 
naturally found in everyone, which is inflamed by a desire to fight. Generals should not repress this, but 
instead increase it). cf. Phang 2008: 47. 
122 Moore 1989: 75: “Modestia, like moderatio, means self-restraint, but while moderatio is usually used 
of those who have power, Livy nearly always uses modestia to describe the restraint of those under the 
control of others.”  
123 Phang 2008: 73ff.  
124 ibid. 
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So, virtus was a quality that needed to be refined and practiced, under the careful 
leadership of one’s superiors.125 Other positive qualities, like magnitudo animi, animus, 
impetus, and modestia also served as counterpoints to negative qualities that, despite their 
helpfulness on the battlefield, could detract from the optimal operation of the Roman 
army and its emotional community. In other words, virtus, in its sense of requiring the 
very best of a soldier, also required him to restrain his less helpful emotions and features.  
Negative Qualities in the Emotional Community 
In discussions of the best features of soldiers and the emotions and qualities that 
are privileged in the emotional community, we often see descriptions of the negative 
emotions and features that should be limited in the emotional community. A passage 
from Caesar’s de Bello Gallico illustrates the balance of states of emotions and moral 
qualities that Caesar expects from his soldiers: 
Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum 
reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid 
agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab 
tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent… Quanto opere eorum 
animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non 
altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam 
arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria 
atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent; nec minus se ab milite modestiam 
et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.  
 BG 7.52 
 
The next day, after he called a meeting, Caesar reproached the temerity 
(temeritas) and the greed (cupiditas) of his soldiers, since, as he said, they 
seemed to have judged for themselves where they should go or what they 
should do, and could not be held back, even when the sign had been given, 
by either the tribunes of the soldiers or by the legates… As much as he 
admired the greatness of spirit (magnitudo animi) – since they could be 
                                                
125 ibid. 42, 65- 67, and passim. 
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held back by neither the fortifications of the camps nor the height of the 
mountain, nor the city wall – he just as much blamed their disorderliness 
(licentia) and arrogance (arrogantia), because they thought that they knew 
more than their leader about victory and about tactics. He wanted no less 
discipline (modestia) and self-restraint (continentia) from his soldiers than 
he did virtus and magnitudo animi.    
 
This passage illustrates the careful balance of qualities necessary for a successful soldier: 
just as much virtus as modestia, and just as much magnitudo animi as continentia. 
Keeping negative qualities, like temeritas, cupiditas, licentia, and arrogantia in check is 
just as important as honing the positive qualities. The emotional community’s safety 
hinged on the proper balance of these features.  
Some of the negative qualities that Caesar describes in this instance can be 
considered an absence of the positive qualities mentioned earlier. Temeritas, for instance, 
is the brashness, or temerity, that indicates an absence of magnitudo animi. The greatness 
of spirit (magnitudo animi) and military order (modestia) that achieves good things has 
become uncontrolled and out of control. This in turn indicates both licentia 
(disorderliness) and arrogantia (arrogance), which are symptoms of a lack of modestia, 
since these qualities imply a belief that the soldier does not need the guidance of his 
commander. Without a tightly functioning hierarchy, the emotional community suffers.  
Anger is a complicated characteristic for a soldier. A certain amount of ferocia 
(ferocity) and ira (anger) is required for surviving close combat, or for war in general; in 
this way it could certainly be classified as a positive value for the army. The adjectives 
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ferox (spirit, rage)126 and acer (keen energy)127 are used to convey the bursts of energy or 
fiery passion (furor) that were useful in making an attack. But anger is potent and 
sometimes unpredictable. Because it can cause distraction and disruption, anger (ferocia 
or furor) posed a threat to disciplina.128 For the emotional community to function 
properly – and not just the military unit of the army – the amount of ira needed to be just 
right. The Stoics Cicero and Seneca argue, for both the soldier and the orator, that ira is 
not necessary for impetus.129 Ira, furor, and ferocia130 were connected to themes of 
violence between citizens, especially in the civil wars of the first century BCE.131 Ferocia 
is frequently connected with disorderliness or barbarians.132 Anger, in its forms of ira and 
ferocia, must be kept under control and in the right amounts in order to be an ideal for the 
militiae emotional community; to ascribe these qualities to Roman soldiers connotes civil 
war or barbarity. 
For our purposes, in analyzing the emotional community’s responses to ridicule, 
anger is important in its relationship to the shame state. Anger is just one of the features 
of the shame state, and is an especially common reaction for men, like soldiers, who are 
already accustomed to violence. As we will see, the shame state is a reaction to the 
internalization of ridicule. But anger can also be helpful: the iusta ira of the vengeful 
                                                
126 Phang 2008: 46ff. 
127 Moore 1988: 23ff. 
128 Lendon 2005: 185 specifically ties ferocia and furor to the young men of the army, who are more eager 
to compete for glory than older men, who have already had opportunities to accumulate a personal history 
of “great deeds.” See Cairns 1989: 81ff on furor. 
129 Cic. Tusc. Dis. 4.43; Sen. Ira 1.9, 171; Phang 2008: 47- 49. 
130 On ferocia and furor, see Thompson 1965: 19ff and Oakley 1985: 104- 5. 
131 Oakley 1985: 104- 5, Harris 2001: 214ff. 
132 See Traub 1953: 252ff on defiant barbarians.  
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Aeneas, for example.133 This type of anger in reaction to ridicule is the opposite of the 
shame state, as I explain in detail below. For now, it is important to note that ira for the 
army’s emotional community holds a power of chaos and destruction that makes it a 
negative virtue for the community’s well-being; ira must be checked by other positive 
qualities and by the emotional community’s leaders. 
When the army fails – when its military prowess is not enough, and when its 
negative emotions overwhelm the positive qualities – the emotional community suffers 
ignominia, or disgrace. When his army was starving due to dwindling resources in a 
siege, Caesar proudly explained that each of his legions declared they would rather starve 
and continue the siege than quit and suffer ignominia:  
sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam 
acciperent, numquam infecta re discederent: hoc se ignominiae loco 
laturos, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent; praestare omnes perferre 
acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum 
interissent parentarent. BG 7.17 
 
They said that they had served several years under his command, and that 
they had never endured disgrace (ignominia); that they never left a task 
unfinished, and that they would bear it as a disgrace (ignominia) if they 
left the fight once it was begun, and that it was better to endure every 
hardship, than to not avenge those Romans who died at Genabum because 
of the perfidy of the Gauls. 
  
According to Caesar’s depiction of his legions’ emotional community, ignominia 
is absolutely to be avoided and is worth further suffering. Ignominia is a sign that the 
army has failed, and therefore it represents the ultimate low for the emotional 
                                                
133 Harris 2001: 218 briefly discusses iusta ira. Certainly from Juno’s perspective, her ira memor is 
justified, and is a driving force in the Aeneid. 
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community. The infamy of ignominia will haunt the community members’ reputations 
even beyond the militiae community. 
 One final, but extremely important, feature of the emotional community is the 
proper place of pride. We have already described the army as taking pride in their 
emotional community, or in their position in the army. Soldiers needed such pride in 
order to maintain their campaigns and have success in battle. They also needed to be 
careful not to have too much pride, when they might overstep their position in the 
military hierarchy and become superbus, thereby disrupting the carefully constructed 
emotional community. 
The emotional apparatus of the army’s emotional community emphasizes the 
kinds of values and emotions that make good soldiers, and it avoids an excess of violent 
emotions that would threaten the safety of the army and its emotional balance. The 
leaders of the army are also leaders of the emotional community, and they are looked to 
as examples of the best of the emotional apparatus’ features, as I will explain below in 
more detail. 
THE EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY AND RIDICULE 
 The army’s social structure is a rigid hierarchy of officers and soldiers, but they 
are nonetheless all involved in the emotional community. The community’s hierarchy 
adds an extra step of evaluation for the emotional community’s response to ridicule (see 
Figure 1.2). The member of the emotional community (M = member) must contemplate 
the ridiculer’s (J = joker) status in respect to his own. Reactions to ridicule will be bound 
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Figure 2: Post-ridicule evaluation 
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 A member of the army’s emotional community must take several steps of 
evaluation. First, he must determine if the ridiculer (J) is Roman (and therefore a member 
of the extended Roman emotional community). Since the army is frequently in contact 
with non-Romans or enemy combatants, this is a crucial first step. If the ridiculer is not 
Roman, the default response is outrage: a barbarian should not confront a Roman in this 
way. The power relationship is clearly misunderstood by the ridiculer, and the victim 
(who chooses not to be a victim, as it were) is tasked with correcting his ridiculer’s 
understanding of the power relationship. This is situation B in Figure 2. 
 An author may choose to dwell on situation A: a foreigner ridicules the army (or a 
member of its emotional community) and the victim of the ridicule acknowledges some 
truth to the criticism contained in the ridicule. (Note that for Roman authors, situation A 
almost always resolves into situation B with some time for recovery of the emotional 
community.) This demoralizing realization that an enemy has seen some embarrassing 
truth about the Roman army sends the victim of the ridicule into a shame state. This is the 
context of two of the case studies below, Livy’s Caudine Forks episode and Tacitus’ 
extended description of Germanicus and the Roman army’s interaction with Arminius 
and his German army.  
 In these circumstances, something has gone terribly wrong: the army has suffered 
a military defeat and the emotional community begins to fall apart. The historian slows 
down and focuses on the episode for dramatic effect, because, at least in these cases, 
ridicule of the army is an opportunity for the historian. These episodes allow the historian 
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to emphasize the disaster in order to extoll a later victory. The army’s emotional 
community eventually recovers enough gumption to recover the lost status from the 
ridicule (and the military defeat that inspired it), and eventually the episode concludes 
with the Roman army victorious. This particular course of the ridicule/shame state cycle 
is featured in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Ridicule and shame state cycle 
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This figure makes the distinction between humiliation (a public emotion) and shame (a 
private emotion), but these are also meant to stand in for the accompanying emotions of 
sadness and feelings of despair that are described in the individual texts. Generally, the 
last emotion is anger (ira), which leads the emotional community to conviction and desire 
to set the record straight, or reparation. This in turn leads to a restoration of pride – and 
can even cause the members of the emotional community to rise to the occasion and 
return the ridicule. 
 Situation G offers a similar scenario, in that the Roman army emotional 
community must repair its reputation to those outside the community. However, in this 
case, those outside the community are still included in the greater emotional community 
of Romans in general. The main tension here is between the army and civilians; this was 
not always a peaceful situation, but it only occasionally is mentioned as coming to a 
head.134 
 Situations C, D, E, and F are a bit more complicated, since they arise within the 
emotional community. Since both the ridiculer (J) and his victim (M) are members of the 
same emotional community (the Roman army), they must also negotiate their respective 
positions within that community. Because of the rigid hierarchy in the army, there are 
other social rules that govern how the victim (M) can react to the ridicule. 
 In situations C and D, the ridiculer (J) and his victim (M) are peers. There are no 
power differentials to navigate; they are on even ground. Next, the victim must decide if 
                                                
134 See e.g. Alston 1999. 
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there is real criticism contained in the ridicule. If he decides that the ridiculer has raised a 
serious issue, he might enter the shame state and correct his behavior to avoid future 
ridicule and its accompanying emotional reactions. This is situation C: the severity of the 
shame state might well be less than that of situation A, since the ridiculer and his victim 
are peers. However, if the ridicule challenged a closely held belief, or if the audience was 
vast, the shame state might still be very deep and powerful.135 
 Unfortunately, given the complete absence of first person accounts from soldiers, 
we have very few examples of these interactions.136 One representation of two soldiers 
jesting with each other is from Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum: two of his soldiers challenge 
each other and find common ground when threatened by the Gauls (5.44ff). We might 
reasonably assume that situation C is the most common: tentmates tease each other and 
brush off the joke. Again, we suffer a lack of evidence, but in modern sociological 
studies, this peer joking relationship is the most common.137 In this case, the ridicule in 
question comes closest to simple joking, where no real criticism is intended. Since the 
ridiculer has no real authority over his peer, the criticism contained in his ridicule has no 
real force behind it. 
Situations E and F involve a power disparity in the relationshp between ridiculer 
(J) and victim (M). In situation B, a subordinate steps out of bounds with ridicule of his 
superiors. This is not behavior that is encouraged by the standards of modestia or 
                                                
135 For more, see above Introduction, page 30. 
136 The Vindolanda tablets did not reveal any such examples, and, as might be assumed, epitaphs – even 
ones that take the time and space to announce that they were erected on behalf of the decedent fellow 
soldiers – do not typically have space for such an extended exchange. 
137 For more on the peer pressure of humor (“jeer” pressure), see Janes and Olson 2000.  
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enforced by disciplina militaris, and instances of this situation, while they do exist, are 
not very common. In Situation F, a commander uses ridicule to enforce the very rules of 
modestia and disciplina militaris that are challenged in Situation E. 
A famous example, albeit from Greek literature, illustrates both situations E and F 
clearly. In the second book of the Iliad, a common soldier, Thersites, disfigured and 
vulgar and known to us only from this episode, interrupts an assembly to attack 
Agamemnon in front of the entire emotional community. Thersites is described as 
particularly loathed by Odysseus and Achilles because they were the most frequent 
victims of his abuse (ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆϊ µάλιστ' ἦν ἠδ' Ὀδυσῆϊ·/ τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε, Il. 
2.220). Odysseus responds by scolding Thersites, beating him, and threatening to strip 
him naked and beat him publicly. Thersites doubles over, sheds a tear as a wound festers 
on his back, and quietly sits down. The rest of the assembly laughs mercilessly at 
Thersites. One of the soldiers comments that Odysseus did well in silencing that 
“slanderer” and that Thersites will never again challenge a king with “reproachful words” 
(ὃς τὸν λωβητῆρα ἐπεσβόλον ἔσχ' ἀγοράων./ οὔ θήν µιν πάλιν αὖτις ἀνήσει θυµὸς 
ἀγήνωρ/ νεικείειν βασιλῆας ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν, Il. 2.275- 277). 
The episodes from Roman literature that fit situation E are not quite so violent nor 
so infamous as the Thersites episode, but the message is still clear: respect the authority 
of the commanders. Despite the literary ideal of the historians’ version of the Roman 
army, there are still several instances of this situation. Perhaps the inclusion of some 
insubordination, even among the idealized versions of the Roman army, implies that 
insubordination happened in the real Roman army even more frequently. To that end, 
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there are several instances in which a military commander must use ridicule and mockery 
to keep his soldiers in line (Situation F), as it seems that no other motivation for 
obedience is successful. 
Now that I have outlined the circumstances and evidence for each situation, I will 
provide further detail and context for each possibility, this time in reverse order. As I will 
show through the case studies below, Roman authors tended to focus on situations A and 
B most of all, since they provide the most opportunity to advance the victory narrative 
favored by Roman historians. We will turn to examples from Livy, Vergil, and Tacitus in 
order to understand how recovery from ridicule works in the militiae emotional 
community. 
Situations E and F: Superiors and Subordinates 
Although the picture painted by historians and epic poets is often one of Roman 
glory and success, there are still scenes of faltering and terror and panic. In these 
situations, soldiers balk at their orders or speak out of turn to their commanders. To 
inspire their troops back to the fighting form, commanders used a variety of tactics, 
including shaming punishments like flogging or forcing a soldier into public 
nakedness.138 One such technique was to shame one’s soldiers back into their proper 
place in the emotional community. In this way (that is, in Situation F), ridicule serves to 
reemphasize the community’s emotional apparatus and rules for behavior, to unify a 
splintering community group, and, as a more literary function, to make the commander 
                                                
138 See Phang 2008: 140ff for shame punishments.  
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look at once stern, for enforcing proper behavior, and gentle, for not resorting to crueler, 
more violent tactics. 
Like the Thersites episode, in which Odysseus chastizes his soldier not only for 
speaking out of turn and against his leaders, but also for showing signs of weakness and a 
lack of interest in continuing the fight, one story, as told by Suetonius, Appian, and 
Dio,139 has Caesar shame his troops by calling them Quirites – a name for civilians, not 
soldiers. The tenth legion, after years of faithful service in Gaul, was proving 
troublesome in the civil war against Pompey. They mutineed and Caesar only 
begrudgingly allowed them back into service, Suetonius says. But with a single command 
(sed una voce), Caesar lowers the troops to the status of citizens, and easily brings them 
around and bends them to his will (tam facile circumegit et flexit; DV 70). 
In Appian’s version of the story, Caesar extends the tension of the shame state 
even longer.140 Appian first reports that a mutiny had sprung up, and that the soldiers, 
protesting unfulfilled promises, were making demands of payment from Caesar. When 
the soldiers almost killed the legate who had been sent with Caesar’s latest promise of 
more payment, Caesar boldly (µάλα θρασέως) went to the rioting, furious soldiers 
(στασιάζουσιν), despite the protests of his officers (2.13.92). Caesar’s mere appearance at 
the Campus Martius was enough to startle the soldiers back into formation (καί, ὡς ἔθος, 
ἄφνω φανέντα σφίσιν ἠσπάζοντο αὐτοκράτορα, 2.13.93). Caesar’s calm demeanor and 
                                                
139 Suet. Div. Jul. 68- 70, App. BC 2.13.92- 94, cf. Tac. Ann. 1.42, where Germanicus refers to the 
episode. 
140 I include Appian here, in a study of ridicule in Rome, because his subject matter and his floruit were 
Roman, although his language was Greek. Further, his presentation of the episode is echoed in Latin 
sources, as in the previous note.  
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the sudden acquiescence to the soldiers’ demands began to sink them into a shame state: 
shame took hold of all of them, and jealousy of their comrades who would achieve the 
glory and riches that they themselves were giving up, and silent, embarrassed 
astonishment at the ease with which Caesar rid himself of them: 
αἰδὼς αὐτίκα πᾶσιν ἐνέπιπτεν καὶ λογισµὸς µετὰζήλου, εἰ δόξουσι µὲν 
αὐτοὶ καταλιπεῖν σφῶν τὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἐν µέσοις τοσοῖσδε πολεµίοις, 
θριαµβεύσουσιδ᾽ ἀνθ᾽ αὑτῶν ἕτεροι καὶ σφεῖς τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ κερδῶν 
ἐκπεσοῦνται, µεγάλων ἔσεσθαι νοµιζοµένων, ἐχθροί τεὁµοίως αὐτοῦ τε 
Καίσαρος ἔσονται καὶ τῶν πολεµίων. δείσαντες οὖν ἔτι µᾶλλον ἡσύχαζον 
ἐξ ἀπορίας, ἐλπίζοντες ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ τὸν Καίσαρα καὶ µεταγνώσεσθαι 
διὰ τὴν ἐνχερσὶ χρείαν. BC 2.13.93 
 
Shame immediately took hold of all of them, and a calculation, along with 
jealousy, if they seemed to be leaving their commander in the middle of 
such wars, and that others would triumph with him instead of themselves, 
and of losing their plunder in Africa, which they thought would be great, 
and of becoming enemies of Caesar and of the opposing party. They 
stayed all the more silent, fearing these things, and hoping that Caesar 
would give in and change his mind, since there was urgent necessity. 
 
Caesar only exacerbated their shame state when, at the urging of his officers to say 
something more to his longtime soldiers, he began to speak by calling them “citizens” 
and not “comrades,” as he had done before, thus implying they had already been 
discharged from service (ἀρχόµενος λέγειν πολίτας ἀντὶ στρατιωτῶν προσεῖπεν, 2.13.93). 
At this last shameful remark, the soldiers broke down (οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες ἔτι, 2.13.94), 
and begged Caesar to reinstate them. After more delays, he reaffirmed that he would give 
prizes as promised, and would reinstate everyone except the tenth legion, shamefully 
reproaching them about their previous glories under his command. 
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 In this story, repeated by two sources years after Caesar’s civil war, Caesar is able 
to silence his subordinates with one sneering word: Quirites. The remark cut so quick and 
deep that his troops were instantly in a shame state, begging for readmission into 
Caesar’s army’s emotional community. Caesar, as ridiculer, did his job of making them 
feel removed from the emotional community; Caesar, as commander, removed them from 
the army. 
 There are other versions of commanders mocking their troops for poor service 
that do not end so unhappily. Tacitus describes the commander Antonius Primus using 
“shame and insults” (pudore et probris) to inspire some troops, along with “praise and 
encouragement” (laude et hortatu) for others.141 In general, it appears that commanders 
used ridicule as a form of tough love for inspiring honor in their troops. By encouraging 
them to embody the ideals of their emotional community, and avoid the lowest forms of 
dishonor and despair in the community, everyone in the emotional community benefits. 
Situations C and D: Peer Ridicule and Joking 
Because of the lack of evidence from soldiers themselves, peer ridicule is 
difficult. We see the soldiers almost exclusively through the lens of the commanders or 
historians (sometimes the same man, e.g. Caesar or Velleius Paterculus). In Caesar’s 
Bellum Gallicum there is a quarrel between two soldiers,142 when Caesar interrupts a 
                                                
141 Tac. Hist. 3.24: Igitur Antonius, ubi noscere suos noscique poterat, alios pudore et probris, multos 
laude et hortatu (And so, when Antonius could recognize his men and be recognized by them, he stirred 
some of them up with shame and reproaches, and many with praise and encouragement, and all with hope 
and promises.)  
142 BG 5.44, cf. note 116 above. 
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description of a battle against the Belgic tribes with a focalized episode of a battle of 
virtus between two of his men, Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo. 
The two centurions are introduced as fortissimi viri, the bravest or strongest of 
men. Caesar claims that they have an ongoing rivalry (perpetuas inter se controversias) 
about which one should receive the best positions. Pullo dares Vorenus to follow him into 
the fray, tauntingly asking Vorenus why he was hesitating at the chance to prove his 
virtus (Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "Quid dubitas," inquit," Vorene? 
aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas? 5.44). Vorenus follows because he 
worries about what the other men would think (Ne Vorenus quidem tum sese vallo 
continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur, 5.44). In battle, the men help 
each other fight off the enemy, and they each display virtus. 
This episode serves more as an example of the competitive valor and virtus of 
Caesar’s men than of their contests of mockery. There is no indication that Pullo and 
Vorenus’ personal competition involves any mockery or battle of wit; Caesar uses no 
terms of derision. Vorenus does act in order to avoid the low opinion (existimationem) of 
his fellow soldiers, and we might interpret that as an action to avoid the shame state. But 
there is no ridicule here. 
It seems unlikely, given the length of time each man served in the army and the 
closeness of the emotional community, that there were no scenarios in which a group of 
soldiers teased and mocked each other. Instead of assuming that such joking interactions 
did not exist, we should ask why they were not included in our texts. In this case, the 
Pullo and Vorenus episode does not link backward or forward to other parts of the Bellum 
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Gallicum, and the narrative is not advanced by the episode. Instead, its purpose seems to 
be to promote and endorse the soldiers’ competition for virtus.143 Caesar’s literary goals 
had no place for focalized episodes about what it was like to be a soldier in camp, but 
they had plenty of use for displaying the virtus of his men. 
 Tacitus uses a similar scene to illustrate the opposite point: Vitellius’ men have no 
disciplina militaris and use competition between each other to the detriment of Vitellius’ 
army.144 He is explicit about this argument: “According to the habits of their 
commanders, legates and tribunes either emulate their discipline or revel in fancy 
dinners; and in the same way a soldier is either focused or free (legati tribunique ex 
moribus imperatorum severitatem aemulantur vel tempestivis conviviis gaudent; proinde 
miles intentus aut licenter agit, Hist. 2.68).”  
 Vitellius’ army’s emotional community, in other words, is not functioning as an 
army should. This situation leads to interpersonal competition between a Roman 
legionary and a Gallic auxiliary, and the two men brawled in drunken disorder. 
Eventually, the legionary fell, and the auxiliary mocked him in his defeat (postquam 
legionarius prociderat, insultante Gallo, 2.68). Tacitus does not report what the Gaul said 
exactly, but the fight spread to the other soldiers watching, and soon led to a riot between 
the legionaries and the auxiliaries. Two entire auxiliary cohorts were killed in the riot. 
It is important to note that the two soldiers were not equals: the legionary was a 
member of the Fifth Legion, and the auxiliary was a member of the local, Gallic (non-
                                                
143 See Phang 2008: 47. 
144 Hist. 2.68 in particular, or the second half of Hist. 2 in general. 
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Roman) force. While they both served in the same army, and therefore were members of 
its emotional community, that community was already splintered and weak, as Tacitus 
takes great care to explain. And futher, the smaller emotional communities (those of local 
auxilaries and of career Roman soldiers) were clearly not weakened in the same way, 
since the soldiers came together on those sides to fight amongst each other. In this 
episode, then, Tacitus proves the importance of a cohesive emotional community in the 
army, and one that is operating with full capacity of its emotional apparatus. 
Situation G: Mockery beyond the Community 
Shortly after describing the riot between legionaries and auxilaries, Tacitus 
reinforces this point when he recounts the interactions of the soldiers (milites this time, 
not more specifically legionarii or auxilii) and local civilians. This is Situation A in 
Figure 1.3, featuring ridicule from Romans outside the emotional community. In this 
instance, the army is currently stopped just seven miles outside Rome, and Vitellius 
served his soldiers generous portions of food. To join in on the picnic, the people of 
Rome traveled to the army.  
This interaction between Romans who were not in the fractured emotional 
community of Vitellius’ army proves fatal. The townspeople caught the soldiers off guard 
and cut their belts, then asked about the soldiers’ weapons (incuriosos milites—vernacula 
utebantur urbanitate—quidam spoliavere, abscisis furtim balteis an accincti forent 
rogitantes, 2.88). The soldiers did not appreciate being made laughing-stocks (ludibrium) 
and could not brook the ridicule (non tulit ludibrium insolens contumeliarum animus, 
2.88). To cope with the humiliation of being seen accincti and having been caught off-
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guard by townspeople, they attacked and killed some of the townspeople, including 
relatives of a soldier. Again, Tacitus recounts this story to describe the “many and fatal 
results” (multae et atroces caedes) of the lack of discipline and unity in Vitellius’ army.  
Situations A and B: Correcting Foreign Mockery 
In the situations we have discussed so far, the ridiculers and the victims of 
ridicule have been Roman; that is, they have all been part of the larger Roman emotional 
community. But the army was in a position to interact with non-Romans on a regular, and 
highly emotional, basis. When the army’s emotional community encounters ridicule from 
the foe, there is no need to negotiate the hierarchy of military command. Instead, it is 
assumed that if the Roman army is at war with a combatant – an Other over whom the 
army is asserting its dominance – then the enemy should not be in a position of power 
from which to issue hurtful ridicule at the army.145 
In the next two situations, A and B, the Roman army’s emotional community 
experiences ridicule from a foreign enemy (who should not be in a position of authority 
over the Roman army). In Situation A, the Roman army sees the truth in the criticism 
concealed in the ridicule, and the combination of criticism and verbal conquest by the 
enemy is sufficient to send the army into the shame state. However, since these episodes 
are presented to us by Roman authors, we see the army recuperate enough to leave the 
shame state and, over time, recover their pride.  
                                                
145 This is not to say that every instance of ridicule is hurtful or that every ridiculer needs to be in a 
position of power over his or her victim: see above, Introduction, for more. 
 78 
Pride is an important part of ridicule and the shame state in confrontations 
between non-Romans and the Roman army’s emotional community. As the armies vie for 
control, they engage in a contest of pride. To their enemy, an army with too much pride is 
superbus. When an army is ridiculed or defeated or both, it is faced with the sudden, 
painful renegotiation of its pride.  
LIVY AND THE CAUDINE FORKS 
Livy’s description of the Roman loss at the Caudine Forks provides a good 
example of the Roman army’s emotional community in a situation in which the army 
experiences ridicule and the ensuing shame state; the emotional state of the army is 
mapped directly onto the military and legal maneuvers in the episode, resulting in a 
detailed depiction of the emotional community’s experience. This episode is particularly 
detailed because Livy, given his penchant for “thrilling” his readers with depictions of 
emotions146 and for crafting moralizing narratives out of his histories, uses the defeat as 
an opportunity for his Roman army to display virtue and overcome a setback. As Clark 
has demonstrated, the military narrative of the third and second centuries BCE is 
presented, by Livy and others, as a story of victory and conquest.147 Any defeat or loss is 
only a temporary setback in a longer, victorious campaign.  And, in order to make the 
eventual victory seem all the more impressive, Roman authors exaggerated the military 
                                                
146 sic Oakley 2005: 62: “L., alert to the emotions of the protagonists in his history, likes to thrill his 
readers by depicting the stupefying effect of a sudden or surprise development.” 
147 Clark’s Triumph in Defeat (2013) traces the victory narrative in Republican history, demonstrating 
how military losses are emphasized precisely to make the eventual victory seem more impressive. She does 
not use the surrender at the Caudine Forks, and she does not identify ridicule as a tool used by historians to 
craft this narrative.  
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losses that came before: the more devastating the defeat, the more impressive the 
victory.148  
Livy uses the process of ridicule and the shame state in the Roman army to 
present this victory-through-loss narrative in his histories. His extended discussion of the 
defeat at the Caudine Forks features the emotional reaction of the soldiers individually 
and the army as a community, and, later, the Romans as a whole. Although the Caudine 
Forks episode may have been a minor loss, in terms of casualties, the defeat affected the 
Romans deeply. It was remembered among the worst defeats in Roman history, among 
Allia, Trasimene, Cannae, and Arausio.149 As if he assumes that it is so infamous that his 
readers will already know in what year it occurred, Livy mentions the Caudine Forks 
disaster in the first sentence of Book 9 (Sequitur hunc annum nobilis clade Romana 
Caudina pax, 9.1). Livy uses ridicule to emphasize the humiliation of the defeat at the 
Caudine Forks, elevating it, or perhaps demoting it, to the levels of the very worst 
military losses in Roman history.150 
                                                
148 Haimson Lushkov 2015: 64. 
149 Oakley 2005: 38.  
150 The imperial grammarian Fronto mirrors Livy’s version of the Caudine Forks story arc as victory-via-
defeat. Fronto groups Caudium with Allia, Cannae, Numantia, Cirta, and Carrhae in a description of 
Roman defeats that led to victories. Fronto is discussing a passage from Ennius’ Telamon, in which 
Telamon tells his sons that he was aware that they were being sent to deadly wars; Ennius draws the 
comparison to Mars and the Romans, and Fronto lists several battles in which Mars (and the Roman army) 
turned “problems into prizes and terrors into triumphs.” (An cunctetur de militibus nostris Mars Pater illa 
dicere: ‘Ego cum genui, tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli; / Praeterea, cum in terrae orbem misi ob 
defendendum imperium, / Scibam me in mortifera bella non in epulas mittere.’ Haec verba Telamo Troiano 
bello de suis liberis semel elocutus est; Mars de Romanis saepe multisque in bellis hoc carmine usus est: 
Gallico bello apud Alliam, Samnitei apud Caudium, Punico ad Cannas, Hispanico apud Numantiam, 
Iugurthino apud Cirtam, Parthico ad Carrhas. Sed semper et ubique aerumnas adoreis terroresque nostros 
triumphis commutavit; Fro. Parth. 1.3-13) 
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To begin, I will provide some context for the episode. Livy begins the ninth book 
of his Ab Urbe Condita with a description of the defeat at the Caudine Forks, in the 
Second Samnite War. According to Livy, the Roman army is deceived by Samnite 
soldiers, disguised as local shepherds, into believing that an allied city, Luceria, was 
besieged by the Samnites. In order to come to Luceria’s aid as quickly as possible, Livy 
explains that the Roman army opted to march through a narrow gorge instead of taking a 
longer but more open route. The Samnite army trapped the Roman army in the gorge, 
known as the Caudine Forks. With nowhere to escape, the Roman army is forced to 
surrender to the Samnites without a battle or any bloodshed.  
The Samnites are surprised by their victory, and are unsure what to do. The 
Samnite commander, Pontius, consults his father Herennius, who advises that the 
Samnites either release the entire army or kill them all, since any moderate punishment 
would render the Romans eager for revenge. Pontius instead decides to make an 
agreement with the Roman generals and sends the army under the yoke. Sending an army 
under the yoke (mittere sub iugum) is a long-standing form of torturous humiliation and 
embarrassment.151 When the army returns to Rome with a sponsio, or agreement, with the 
                                                
151 When an ancient Italian army surrendered, there were three options: death, enslavement, or submitting 
to the yoke. When total death and destruction was deemed too much violence, and when enslavement was 
too much to handle, complete humiliation and literal subjugation (deriving from sub and iugum) was a 
sensible third option. But submitting to pass under the yoke was not a simple choice for a defeated army. 
Submission to the yoke was a sign of the ultimate humiliation for ancient Italians. The yoke was 
constructed of three spears, two set in the ground and a third tied across the top. Soldiers were stripped of 
their arms and made to walk under this arch of spears individually.  
 Comparable practices in ancient and medieval Europe, including even the passing of a victorious 
Roman army under a triumphal arch on the way into city, suggest that the practice was one of purification. 
Going under the triumphal arch strips the victorious army of any miasma of bloodshed; if a conquered army 
is stripped of its weapons and then passes under the yoke, it is cleansed of any spiritual weapons, too. So, to 
submit to the yoke, an army is physically and spiritually rendered unarmed and harmless, rendering it no 
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Samnites, the greater Roman enmotional community is horrified and humiliated, and they 
refuse to submit to the arrangement.152  
Livy’s careful treatment of the emotional reaction of all parties in the episode 
makes it a particularly fruitful examination of ridicule in the emotional community of the 
Roman army. Livy emphasizes the ridicule and the ensuing shame state so that it 
becomes part of their military defeat, and so much so that even the Romans at home 
experience the shame state. Attention is also paid to the Samnites’ emotional state: Livy 
consistently casts the Samnites’ success at the Caudine Forks as a result of their use of 
trickery, in contrast to the Roman virtue that eventually leads to their victory in the war. 
Livy uses superbia five times to describe the Samnites’ tactics, each time emphasizing 
their unlikely or inappropriate position of power over Rome.153 
Ridicule, Surrender, and the Shame State 
The Samnites, Livy explains, have an elaborate plan to trick the Romans. The 
Samnites disguise some soldiers as shepherds who would tell the Romans that their allied 
city, Luceria, was under attack by Samnites. Since the Romans are such faithful allies, 
Livy explains (haud erat dubium quin Lucerinis opem Romanus ferret, bonis ac fidelibus 
                                                                                                                                            
longer a threat. This conversion is a spiritual necessity when a triumphant army returns home and disbands, 
but it is a humiliating disgrace for a conquered army to be forced by its conquerors to pass under the yoke. 
See Fowler 1920: 70- 75, Halliday 1924: 94, and Nock 1926. 
152 Haimson Lushkov 2015: 71.  
153 9.2.14 praeterquam quod hostes superbe increpabant (meanwhile their enemies arrogantly scoffed at 
them), 9.5.9 iugum hostile et ludibria victoris et voltus superbos et per armatos inermium iter (the hostile 
yoke and the taunts of the victor and their haughty faces and the unarmed walk through the armed enemy), 
9.9.5 an, si eadem superbia qua sponsionem istam expresserunt nobis Samnites… (if the Samnites with that 
same arrogance with which they compelled us to agree to that sponsio), 9.12.1 Samnitibus pro superba 
pace infestissimum cernentibus renatum bellum, Omnia quae deinde evenerunt non in animis solum sed 
prope in oculis esse (The Samnites understood that a most bitter war was returned instead of a haughty 
peace, and they not only imagined but really almost saw with their eyes everything that resulted from it.), 
9.14.10 ubi errorem fraus superbe vicisset (where [Samnite] fraud had arrogantly won over [Roman] error). 
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sociis, 9.2.5), the Roman army hurried to their allies’ aid. They became trapped in a 
valley near Caudium, as the Samnites prevented them from exiting either end of the 
valley. When the Samnites’ fraud is revealed (cum fraus hostilis apparuisset, 9.2.9), the 
Romans were overwhelmed with a stupor as they entered a shame state.  
Sistunt inde gradum sine ullius imperio, stuporque omnium animos ac 
velut torpor quidam insolitus membra tenet, intuentesque alii alios, cum 
alterum quisque compotem magis mentis ac consilii ducerent, diu 
immobiles silent; deinde, ubi praetoria consulum erigi videre et expedire 
quosdam utilia operi, quamquam ludibrio fore munientes perditis rebus ac 
spe omni adempta cernebant, tamen, ne culpam malis adderent, pro se 
quisque nec hortante ullo nec imperante ad muniendum versi castra 
propter aquam vallo circumdant, sua ipsi opera laboremque inritum, 
praeterquam quod hostes superbe increpabant, cum miserabili confessione 
eludentes. Ad consules maestos, ne advocantes quidem in consilium, 
quando nec consilio nec auxilio locus esset, sua sponte legati ac tribuni 
conveniunt, militesque ad praetorium versi opem, quam vix di immortales 
ferre poterant, ab ducibus exposcunt.  9.2.10- 15 
 
They then stopped cold without any command, and a stupor came over all 
of their minds, and their limbs were almost paralyzed. They all looked at 
each other, as each one thought another was more capable in his mind and 
his plans, and they stood silent for a long time. Then, when they saw the 
tents of the consuls being set up, some of the men got out tools, although 
they understood that it would be ridiculous to fortify the encampment 
when everything was lost and all hope was gone. Nevertheless, so that 
they didn’t add blame to their misfortunes, each one, on his own, with no 
one encouraging or ordering him, began to fortify the camp close to the 
water. Meanwhile, the enemy began to chide them haughtily, and they 
mocked themselves with pathetic candor about their works and their 
laughable effort. The demoralized consuls did not even call a meeting, 
since it was no time for a meeting or help, but the legates and the tribunes 
came together of their own accord, and the soldiers, turning to the 
headquarters tent, appealed to their leaders for help, which even the 
immortal gods could scarcely have given. 
 
The Roman army’s emotional community has entered a shame state; the leaders of the 
community are maestos (9.2.15). Livy takes care to point out the torturous physical 
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symptoms of the emotional state: sistunt gradum, stupor, torpor, immobiles. The men 
have frozen in their tracks, unable to do anything but look at each other in horror and 
disbelief as they realize that the Samnites have tricked and trapped them. This arrest is 
the first sign of the shame state. Livy’s description of the men’s helplessness conveys not 
only their sense of being trapped, but also their unfamiliarity with the situation. The 
Roman army, Livy seems to say, does not know what to do with this lowly position. 
When the men are able to shake themselves into even futile action, their 
embarrassment is only compounded by the laughter of their enemies. Livy labels their 
attempts to fortify their position a ludibrium (9.2.12) and calls their work inrisum (9.2.13) 
– their efforts are so pointless that they have become laughable. The use of these laughter 
terms suggests that the very situation is a kind of ridicule for the Romans, who should not 
have fallen for a trick or found themselves trapped. The Roman soldiers understand the 
dire situation, and try to laugh at themselves to pull their emotional community out of its 
sorry position (eludentes, 9.2.14). Livy’s word choice here is telling: the soldiers’ 
attempts at finding some sense of optimism is representative of their delusion in the 
seriousness of their situation. Their attempt at light-heartedness is hampered by the real 
mockery of their enemy (superbe increpabant, 9.2.14). Livy uses the word increpabant to 
suggest the kind of derisive rebuke expected in a superior’s derision of an inferior. 
Likewise, superbe emphasizes the haughty or condescending nature of the Samnites’ 
laughter, and to emphasize the power reversal of the situation. To a Roman solder, being 
mocked by any non-Roman indicates that that mocker does not understand their power 
relationship; in their defeat at the Caudine Forks, though, the Roman soldiers are 
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certainly in the weaker position. Livy’s use of superbe here also hints at the Roman 
victory to come: the Samnites may be haughty now, but they will return to their true 
position imminently. Livy’s treatment of the emotional reaction of the soldiers, combined 
with the emphasis on derisive laughter, establishes this moment as a low for the militiae 
emotional community. 
In contrast to the Romans, the Samnite army is delighted (laeti) by the 
developments, but they are just as clueless about what to do next. When they turn to an 
elder, Herennius Pontius, he advises drastic action – either complete pardon or total 
condemnation – because a middle ground would trigger a dangerous emotional response.  
“Ista quidem sententia” inquit “ea est, quae neque amicos parat nec 
inimicos tollit. Servate modo quos ignominia inritaveritis: ea est Romana 
gens quae victa quiescere nesciat. Vivet semper in pectoribus illorum 
quidquid istuc praesens necessitas inusserit, nec eos ante multiplices 
poenas expetitas a vobis quiescere sinet.” 9.3.12- 13 
 
“That,” he said, “is indeed a policy which neither wins friends nor 
destroys enemies. Just spare those whom you have provoked to anger with 
humiliation; the Roman race is one that does not know how to be quiet 
once defeated. Whatever present necessity will be burned on them will 
live forever in their hearts, and it will not allow them to be still until they 
have exacted a punishment many times worse from you.” 
  
Herennius warns the Samnites about making the Romans’ shame state worse through 
further humiliation. Livy’s description of the emotional reaction to the Romans’ 
entrapment at the Caudine Forks resonates ominously in this passage. The evocative 
expression ignominia inritaveritis, for example, occurs only here in the historians.154 
Herennius’ suggestion that the emotions of the Romans would cause a future problem for 
                                                
154 Oakley 2005: 73. 
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the Samnites is not considered seriously by his fellow Samnites, but for Livy’s readers it 
foreshadows the eventual defeat of the Samnites, or Rome’s erasure of its ignominia and 
their humiliation at the Caudine Forks.  
 The Samnites, of course, do not heed Herennius’ warnings and decide to send the 
Romans under the yoke. With this scene change, Livy redirects his readers’ attention to 
the emotional status of the Roman army community. Their situation is hopeless; any 
attempts to change their position are in vain (frustra, 9.4.1); the war is done and over 
with, the Samnite Pontius reminds them (debellatum esse, 9.4.3),155 even if the Romans 
do not seem to know how to be defeated and made prisoners (ne victi quidem ac capti 
fortunam fateri scirent, 9.4.3). The Samnites have determined to force the Romans to 
submit to the yoke and to the terms of an agreement of peace.  
Word that they would be sent under the yoke sends the Roman emotional 
community spiraling deeper into a shame state. The Romans groan so loudly (tantus 
gremitus omnium subito exortus est, 9.3.6) and are overwhelmed with such sorrow (tanta 
maestitia incessit, 9.3.6) that it seemed like they had been given a death sentence (ut non 
gravius accepturi viderentur si nuntiaretur omnibus eo loco mortem oppetendam esse, 
9.3.6).  
After a turn of silence, the Romans try to make sense of their position. Lucius 
Lentulus, a lieutenant – since the consuls were too deep in their shame state to speak – 
suggests that the shame and humiliation of surrender is better for the soldiers to bear than 
                                                
155 The verb debellare features prominently in the context of one’s enemies and power relationships in 
Vergil’s Aeneid; see below at page 108. 
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a total loss of the city, and as such it is a kind of public service for the soldiers to bear for 
Rome (“At foeda atque ignominiosa deditio est.” Sed ea caritas patriae est ut tam 
ignominia eam quam morte nostra, si opus sit, servemus, 9.4.15- 16). In this discussion, 
Lentulus recasts the shame state as another form of military service, in an effort to make 
it more palatable for the emotional community by making it more honorable. After all, as 
Lentulus says, this submission is necessary, and even the gods are not superior to 
necessity (indignitas et pareatur necessitati, quam ne di quidem superant, 9.4.16).  
The time for the punishment is set, and the Romans renewed their lamentations. 
Livy focuses again on the physical symptoms of the shame state, and the emotional 
reactions of the community. 
Redintegrauit luctum in castris consulum aduentus, ut uix ab iis abstinerent  
manus, quorum temeritate in eum locum deducti essent, quorum ignauia 
foedius inde quam uenissent abituri: illis non ducem locorum, non 
exploratorem fuisse; beluarum modo caecos in foueam missos. Alii alios 
intueri; contemplari arma mox tradenda et inermes futuras dextras 
obnoxiaque corpora hosti; proponere sibimet ipsi ante oculos iugum 
hostile et ludibria uictoris et uoltus superbos et per armatos inermium iter, 
inde foedi agminis miserabilem uiam per sociorum urbes, reditum in 
patriam ad parentes, quo saepe ipsi maioresque eorum triumphantes 
uenissent: se solos sine uolnere, sine ferro, sine acie uictos; sibi non 
stringere licuisse gladios, non manum cum hoste conferre; sibi nequiquam 
arma, nequiquam uires, nequiquam animos datos.  9.5.6- 10 
 
Then a time was set for handing over the hostages and for sending the 
unarmed army under the yoke. The consuls’ return renewed the grief in 
the camp to the point that the soldiers could hardly keep hands from them, 
through whose temerity, the soldiers said, they had been led into this 
place, through whose faintheartedness they were about to leave it more 
shamefully than that had come to it. They had no guide for the regions, 
and there had been no scouting; they had blindly been sent into a trap like 
wild animals. They all looked at each other. They gazed upon their 
weapons, soon to be handed over, and their right hands, about to be 
unarmed, and their bodies at the mercy of the enemy. They pictured 
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themselves at the enemy’s yoke and the taunts of the victors and their 
haughty faces and their unarmed march through their armed enemies; and 
from there the miserable trip of their shameful army through their allies’ 
cities, their return to their parents and their homelands, where their 
ancestors had often returned triumphant. They alone had been conquered 
without wound, without sword, without a fight. They had not been allowed 
to draw swords, nor to engage in hand to hand battle with the enemy. For 
nothing they had been given arms, for nothing they had been given 
strength, for nothing they had been given courage.  
 
Livy mixes depictions of the physical symptoms with descriptions of the mental anguish 
of the shame state. The soldiers’ grief sounds in the camp (redintegravit luctum in castris, 
9.5.6), and they resort to the clueless gazes of their earlier shame state (alii alios intueri… 
9.5.8). The men are barely able to restrain themselves (ut vix ab iis abstinerent manus… 
9.5.6).  
Meanwhile, they imagine (ante oculos, 9.9.5.8) the worst: the utter humiliation of 
walking under the yoke. Livy equates the yoke itself with the ludibria of the Samnites 
(9.5.8), their voltus superbus (9.5.9) or haughty countenances, and being stripped of their 
military paraphernalia before the armed enemy (per armatos inermium iter, 9.5.9). After 
that, the miserable trip home (miserabilem viam, 9.5.9) looms large, through allied cities, 
and back to their formerly victorious families. When the soldiers imagine the shame of 
explaining their defeat without engaging the enemy, their shame state is deepened. 
The actual event of passing under the yoke was worse than their imaginations, 
(haec frementibus hora fatalis ignominiae aduenit, omnia tristiora experiundo factura 
quam quae praeceperant animis, 9.5.11). The shame of seeing their leaders stripped was 
so great that the men forgot their own problems and felt the need to avert their eyes from 
such an unspeakable sight (ut suae quisque condicionis oblitus ab illa deformatione 
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tantae maiestatis velut ab nefando spectaculo averteret oculos, 9.5.14).156 As the leaders 
of the army and of the emotional community, they were supposed to be the embodiment 
of the best of the emotional apparatus. To see that stripped away was devastating to the 
rank and file of the emotional community, and only served to further than own shame and 
humiliation. 
 The Samnites deepen the Romans’ shame state by ridiculing them as they endure 
the humiliation of submitting to the yoke. 
Primi consules prope seminudi sub iugum missi; tum ut quisque gradu 
proximus erat, ita ignominiae obiectus; tum deinceps singulae legiones. 
Circumstabant armati hostes, exprobrantes eludentesque; gladii etiam 
plerisque intentati, et uolnerati quidam necatique, si uoltus eorum 
indignitate rerum acrior uictorem offendisset. Ita traducti sub iugum et 
quod paene grauius erat per hostium oculos, cum e saltu euasissent, etsi 
uelut ab inferis extracti tum primum lucem aspicere uisi sunt, tamen ipsa 
lux ita deforme intuentibus agmen omni morte tristior fuit. 9.6.1- 3 
 
The consuls were first to be sent under the yoke, half-naked. Each man, in 
order of rank was next; then finally the legionaries, one by one. The 
enemy stood around, fully armed, rebuking them and mocking them. 
Swords were pointed at most of them, and some were wounded and even 
killed, if their face offended the victor by showing their indignity too 
deeply. And so they were led under the yoke. And what was even harder 
was that after they emerged from the pass, under the eyes of their enemies, 
just as if they had been led out of hell, they seemed to look at the light for 
the first time. But that light was sadder than any death because the soldiers 
could see their shameful progression. 
 
Livy has made it clear that the very thought of submitting to the yoke was painful 
to the emotional community; the humiliation is amplified because the Samnites have 
witnessed it and ridiculed it. Livy uses both exprobantes and eludentes to express the 
ridicule that the Romans endured; these words convey both the reproachful derision and 
                                                
156 See Barton 2002 for more about the power of the gaze in this scene. 
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the more spirited mockery of the Samnites. The force behind their ridicule is clear: the 
Samnites are armed, with their swords pointed at the unarmed Romans, and they go so far 
as to actually kill some of the Romans, who did not show sufficient deference to the 
Samnites. The experience of the shame state is physically forced upon the Romans, on 
pain of death. 
When their humiliation ended, the men began their trip home. Their sad shame 
(pudor, 9.6.4; miseratio, 9.6.5; adeo super maerorem pudor, 9.6.9) made them anxious 
about facing their normally haughty allies (superbiam ingenitam Campanis, 9.6.5). 
Indeed, their shame state intensified at Capua, since they admitted in a meeting with the 
Campanians there that the Samnites had accomplished more than an impressive military 
victory, which is all the Gauls had done in years past; the Samnites had also conquered 
Roman virtue and ferocity (habere Samnites victoriam non praeclaram solum sed etiam 
perpetuam, cepisse enim eos non Romam, sicut ante Gallos, sed, quod multo bellicosius 
fuerit, Romanam virtutem ferociamque, 9.6.13). This line epitomizes the entire episode. 
The sentiment will prove to be very wrong, of course, since the Romans will regain their 
virtutem ferociamque by defeating the Samnites decidedly. But that Roman victory seems 
all the more impressive because of how low the Roman army felt after their defeat, and 
how much of their emotional apparatus – represented by their virtutem ferociamque – 
they needed to recover.  
Recovery from the Shame State 
Livy crafted the defeat at the Caudine Forks as a nadir for the Roman army, but 
he also planted seeds of hope for their recovery. First, a Capuan ally, Aulus Calavius, 
 90 
explains to the morose Romans that their emotional reaction (or, in our terms, shame 
state) was actually a sign of their strength:  
dicitur A. Calavius, Ovi filius, clarus genere factisque, tum etiam aetate 
verendus, longe aliter se habere rem dixisse: silentium illud obstinatum 
fixosque in terram oculos et surdas ad omnia solacia aures et pudorem 
intuendae lucis ingentem molem irarum ex alto animi cientis indicia esse. 
aut Romana se ignorare ingenia, aut silentium illud Samnitibus flebiles 
brevi clamores gemitusque excitaturum, Caudinaeque pacis aliquanto 
Samnitibus quam Romanis tristiorem memoriam fore; quippe suos 
quemque eorum animos habiturum, ubicumque confessuri sint; saltus 
Caudinos non ubique Samnitibus fore.   9.6.3- 5 
 
Aulus Calavius, son of Ovius, a man famous in birth and deeds, and at that 
time also respectable because of his age, is said to have declared that it 
was another situation entirely. He said that their obstinate silence, their 
eyes fixed on the ground, and their ears deaf to any consolation, their 
shame in looking on the light – these were signs of a spirit bursting with 
anger. “Either I am ignorant of the Roman spirit,” he said, “or that silence 
in short time will be Samnite cries and groans of anguish, and that the 
Caudine peace will someday become a memory sadder to the Samnites 
than the Romans, since each people would have their own spirit wherever 
they might meet, but the Samnites would not always have a Caudine 
Forks.” 
 
Calavius encourages the Romans to recognize that their emotional reaction to their 
humiliation is an indication of their previous beliefs about themselves. He suggests to the 
Romans that their shame state – the symptoms of which he identifies as their silence, 
disengagement, and inability to be consoled – is not their final emotional state. His 
analysis is consistent with the pattern of ridicule and the shame state outlined by 
psychologists.157 Although the community’s emotional apparatus is currently unsettled 
and in a shame state, it can be recovered. To do so, the Roman army needs to correct the 
                                                
157 See Introduction. 
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perceptions of the power relationship between the Romans and Samnites. If the Roman 
army successfully reasserts its position of power over the Samnites through a more 
decisive military victory, then the Caudine Forks will indeed become a painful memory 
to the Samnites. 
 After Calavius’ encouraging speech, Livy jumps to Rome to feature the Romans’ 
reaction to the news of the Caudine Forks. The emotional community of the townspeople 
has an emotional reaction (concitationem animorum, 9.7.10) similar to the army’s 
emotional community: they feel sadness (tristior, 9.7.6; maestior, 9.7.9), anger (irasci, 
9.7.9; iratis, 9.7.10; even hatred, odisse, 9.7.10), shame (ignominiosae, 9.7.6), and grief 
(luctus, 9.7.8; miserabilis, 9.7.10).158 The consuls shut themselves in their homes and 
refuse to do any business, except nominating a dictator to oversee government business – 
including an election – in this time of emergency (9.7.12). The entire city enters a shame 
state as a result of the humiliation of the Caudine Forks. 
                                                
158 9.7.6- 10: Iam Romae etiam sua infamis clades erat. Obsessos primum audierunt; tristior deinde 
ignominiosae pacis magis quam periculi nuntius fuit. Ad famam obsidionis dilectus haberi coeptus erat; 
dimissus deinde auxiliorum apparatus, postquam deditionem tam foede factam acceperunt, extemploque 
sine ulla publica auctoritate consensum in omnem formam luctus est. Tabernae circa forum clausae, 
iustitiumque in foro sua sponte coeptum prius quam indictum; lati clavi, anuli aurei positi; paene maestior 
exercitu ipso civitas esse; nec ducibus solum atque auctoribus sponsoribusque pacis irasci sed innoxios 
etiam milites odisse et negare urbe tectisve accipiendos. Quam concitationem animorum fregit adventus 
exercitus etiam iratis miserabilis.  
 
For the infamous disaster was already known at Rome. They first heard that the men were trapped; then 
came more news, sadder because of the disgraceful peace than the danger. They had begun to hold a levy 
on account of rumor of a blockade, but then they dismissed the aid when they heard that such a shameful 
surrender was made. And immediately, without any official declaration, there was grief of every sort. The 
stalls around the Forum closed and all business suspended before an announcement was made. Tunics with 
broad stripes and golden rings were put away. The citizens were almost more devastated than the army 
itself, and they were not only enraged at the leaders and those who had created and sponsored the peace, 
but they also hated the innocent soldiers and refused to accept them into the city or their homes. But the 
arrival of the army, which was pitiful even to angry men, tamed this spirited passion.  
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 First on the agenda for the newly elected government was the peace of the 
Caudine Forks. The Romans did not want to accept the ignominia of the forced surrender 
and the ensuing humiliation of the yoke: this is a sign that the Roman public and the 
newly elected officials were in the process of recovering from their shame state. When 
Spurius Postumius, the consul who had negotiated the peace settlement, was called to 
explain his actions, Livy makes it clear that Postumius was still suffering in a shame state 
because of the shame of the Caudine Forks peace: “When he stood up, with that very 
same expression on his face as when he had gone under the yoke, he said, “I am not 
unaware, consuls, that I am called to speak about my shame (ignominia), not to be 
granted honor” (qui ubi surrexit, eodem illo vultu quo sub iugum missus erat, “Haud sum 
ignarus,” inquit, “consules, ignominiae non honoris causa me primum excitatum 
iussumque dicere,” 9.8.2- 3).  
Spurius Postumius’ speech was so moving that the senate took pity on him, and 
their pity transformed into resentment and anger at the reduction of such a great man into 
such a miserable figure (modo miserarentur quod vir talis etiam praecipuum apud hostes 
supplicium passurus esset ob iram diremptae pacis, 9.8.12). This emotional shift is the 
next sign of the Romans’ recovery from the ridicule and humiliation at the Caudine 
Forks.  
To recover their hurt pride and save face, the Romans needed to address two 
problems: the shameful nature of the peace agreement, and the humiliation of the army’s 
surrender. To correct the first problem, the Romans retroactively, and perhaps 
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unlawfully, reframed the peace agreement with the Samnites;159 to rectify the second 
problem, the Roman army’s emotional community needed to recover from its shame state 
and adjust the Samnite army’s (mis-)understanding of their power relationship. 
Postumius suggests that he, along with the other men who had sponsored the 
peace, should be given over to the Samnites in a rejection of the peace agreement. He 
describes the Samnites as haughty (“with that same arrogance,” eadem superbia, 9.9.5) 
for forcing the Romans into a surrender and for presuming that they had conquered the 
Romans. When he finished speaking, he had led the Romans out of a shame state. Livy 
vividly describes the sense of a new dawn at Rome: “When the senate passed this motion, 
it was as if light had dawned on the state” (hoc senatus consulto facto lux quaedam 
adfulsisse civitati visa est, 9.10.2). The Romans praised Postumius for his leadership 
(eum laudibus ad caelum ferebant, 9.10.3), and everyone felt as if Rome had been saved 
from slavery because of him (emersisse civitatem ex obnoxia pace illius consilio et opera, 
9.10.4). The city was so ablaze with passion that volunteers repopulated the Roman army 
(in civitate ira odioque ardente dilectus prope omnium voluntariorum fuit, 9.10.6).  
Postumius and this new contingent of the Roman army arrived at the Samnites, 
with the explanation that Postumius and others had unjustly agreed to the peace and 
therefore the Roman people wished to “be absolved of the heinous crime” of surrender 
(quo populus Romanus scelere impio sit solutus hosce homines vobis dedo, 9.10.7). The 
                                                
159 Livy is confusing and conflicting and probably purposefully vague about the exact nature of the peace. 
The key problem is whether the agreement was a foedus or a sponsio, which would limit the responsibility 
of the agreement to the sponsores of the agreement. If the peace could be recast as a more informal 
agreement rather than a sanctified pact, the Romans could more completely erase the shame of the Caudine 
peace. For more, see Oakley 2005: 31ff. The legal arguments of the Romans’ handling of the agreement are 
not necessary to our understanding of their emotional reactions in the situation, so I leave them aside. 
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Samnite leader, Pontius, rejects the new terms of the surrender and refuses to 
acknowledge Postumius’ reconfiguration of the battle (nec ego istam deditionem 
accipiam inquit nec Samnites ratam habebunt, 9.11.1). But, importantly, he does 
challenge the Roman people, suggesting that if they would like to redo the peace 
agreement, then they should also redo the battle at the Caudine Forks: “I appeal to the 
Roman people: if they regret the sponsio made at the Caudine Forks, then let them 
replace their legions in the valley where they were surrounded. Let no one deceive 
anyone, let everything be as though it hadn’t happened.” (populum Romanum appello; 
quem si sponsionis ad furculas Caudinas factae fuerunt. nemo quemquam deceperit; 
omnia pro infecto sint… 9.11.3- 4). Pontius’ charge is meant as a challenge: if the 
Romans want a do-over, then they should suffer through the same circumstances in which 
they were so miserably defeated the first time.  
But Pontius gives the Roman emotional community what they were seeking: an 
opportunity to literally erase the humiliation of the defeat at the Caudine Forks. With 
their new pride in leadership and in their emotional community, the Romans are able to 
find victory in the renewal of war, and the Samnites realize that the Romans would not 
end a war without victory (geri posse bellum Romani pro victoria certa haberent, 
Samnites simul rebellasse et vicisse crederent Romanum, 9.12.3- 4). The Samnites 
understand “too late and in vain” (sero ac nequiquam, 9.12.2) that, by humiliating the 
Romans with ridicule and a “haughty peace” (superba pace, 9.12.1), the Romans would 
recover their emotional state and return a “most bitter war” (infestissimum renatum 
bellum, 9.12.1) in exchange for their brief humiliation. 
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The Caudine Forks episode is a complicated fabric, with snags in the Romans’ 
religious and legal correctness, but Livy uses the emotional state of his Roman army’s 
emotional community to create a compelling narrative. The evocative descriptions of the 
army’s shame state, and their eventual recovery, gives a casual reader an opportunity to 
follow along with the story, but it also gives Livy the opportunity to give his Romans a 
more impressive victory, both moral and military, because of their triumph over a more 
dismal setback.  
VERGIL’S AENEID 
 In the following passages, I provide examples of ridicule in the context of the 
army in the Aeneid.160 As I will show later, Vergil’s representation of ridicule in the army 
provides a template for Tacitus to use in his own histories. Vergil contrasts pious Aeneas, 
a model leader of the militiae emotional community, with the derisive and superbus 
Rutulian king Turnus.161 Although Turnus’ men attempt to ridicule Aeneas’ men, the 
Trojans’ emotional community is too strong and healthy to be wounded by ridicule. 
Vergil carefully avoids assigning ridicule, sarcasm, or the like to the Trojans in general, 
and Aeneas in particular;162 this characterization both solidifies the Trojans’ chivalrous 
piety and draws all the more attention to the ridicule when it does originate from Aeneas, 
at the final scene of the Aeneid.  
                                                
160 Obviously the army in the Aeneid is not yet Roman but Trojan; but here, as always in the Aeneid, 
Aeneas and his men stand for future Romans. 
161 Indeed most of the ridicule is in the second, or war-like Iliad-like, half of the Aeneid. The combative 
nature of the war between the Trojans and the Italians certainly lends itself to aggressive verbal expression, 
like ridicule. See Highet 1972 on types of speech in the Aeneid. 
162 In sharp contrast to the Homeric heroes: see Keith 1924 and Highet 1972: 116. 
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In this section, I show that Vergil portrays Turnus and the Rutulians as ridiculers 
as part of his characterization of them as the enemy. I show how Vergil has his hero 
Aeneas navigate the complications of pride (superbia) without stepping outside the mores 
of his emotional community. By responding to ridicule without entering a shame state 
and without succumbing to anger,163 Vergil’s Aeneas sets a model for Roman heroes yet 
to come. 
Parcere Subiectis et Debellare Superbos 
 Vergil makes the credo for his proto-Roman army clear during Aeneas’ katabasis. 
In a parade of heroes in the underworld, Aeneas’ father Anchises gives him a tour of 
future Roman successes and shares a glimpse of the imperium that the Romans will one 
day wield. His words speak both to Aeneas, in the context of the story, but also to 
Vergil’s audience of Romans.164 Anchises’ apostrophe Romane (6.851) is an example of 
this double audience. After describing the glories of future Rome, Anchises provides 
some guidance to Aeneas in how to achieve these accomplishments (which, of course, 
Vergil’s audience knows well have already been achieved).  Anchises’ final charge to 
these audiences is to be mindful of their own authority, by sparing the conquered and 
conquering the superbi:  
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento 
(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem, 
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. 6.851- 853165 
                                                
163 I address the ira of Aeneas in the final scene, in which he kills Turnus after seeing Pallas’ belt, below 
at page 122. 
164 Austin 1977: 263, Toll 1997: 42ff, Reed 2007: 40, cf. Horsfall 1995: 144- 6. 
165 On Anchises’ command, see Lloyd 1972: 126ff, Austin 1977: 263f, Galinsky 1988: 323, Putnam 1995: 
18f, Horsfall 2014: 583ff.  
 97 
 
Remember, Roman, to rule the nations with your power  
(these will be your skills), to establish peace with law,  
to spare the conquered, and to subdue the proud. 
 
The verb debellare recalls Livy:166 his tendency to use the word puts in mind the Roman 
victory narrative, as discussed above. Anchises’ words suggest that superbia is something 
to be corrected in one’s enemies. If we interpret these lines as a mission statement for 
Romans both in and beyond the Aeneid, then adjusting the exaggerated self-assessment of 
one’s enemy becomes a patriotic duty. For the characters of the Aeneid, and as a message 
for those reading along, conquering one’s ridiculers is a step toward fulfilling one’s 
destiny. 
Vergil certainly provides us with some handy examples of conquering the proud 
(debellare superbos). In the second half of the Aeneid, the Rutulian king, Turnus, and his 
allies are regularly described as superbus: Turnus five times, Turnus’ brother-in-law 
once, the Etruscan king Mezentius twice, the Laurentines once, and in general several 
more times.167 Turnus is characterized as a violent braggart of a hostis whose superbia is 
out of control; he and his men are constantly shown as ridiculers. Aeneas, on the other 
hand, is pious and dutiful, and his men deflect ridicule without any losses. Vergil uses 
superbia to highlight another contrast between his antagonist and his hero, and the scenes 
of ridicule illustrate the idealized reaction of the Roman army’s emotional community. 
                                                
166 Horsfall 2014: 586 considers debellare superbos to be “an outstanding lexical allusion… altogether 
ignored... the verb is distinctively Livian, 3x in the first pentad, 7x in the second, 49x in the remaining 
books.” 
167 Turnus 7.544, 10.445, 10.514, 12.236, 12.236; Remulus 9.634; Mezentius 11.15; Laurentines 8.613. 
Vergil uses forms of superbia 40 times in the Aeneid, and only Turnus is described as such more than once. 
Turnus’ name may play on the Greek τύραννος (tyrant), which would in turn evoke thoughts of regnum and 
superbia. See Cairns 1989: 67ff for more on Turnus as a “bad king.” 
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Turnus 
 Turnus is introduced in book seven of the Aeneid when the Fury Allecto appears 
to him at night, having been sent by Juno to stir up Turnus and his men against Aeneas.168 
Allecto appears in the guise of Calybe, an aged priestess of Juno, and rebukes Turnus for 
his inaction. Allecto calls Turnus inrise (425), perhaps “fool” or “mocked one:” Turnus 
will be the butt of every joke if he loses his betrothed, Lavinia, to the newcomer 
Aeneas.169 Allecto immediately draws attention to the connection between Turnus and 
inridere. 
Turnus is not impressed with her rousing speech, and Vergil describes his reaction 
as “mocking” (inridens, 435), thus immediately establishing the tone of Turnus’ 
speech.170 In reacting this way, he embodies the condescension and derision that Allecto-
as-Calybe had warned him, by calling him inrise (425) would be assigned to him by the 
Latins.171 He begins by asserting his superiority over Allecto-in-disguise: he claims to 
have superior knowledge of events (non, ut rere, …effugit, 437) and a close relationship 
with Juno (nec regia Iuno/ immemor est nostri, 438- 439). Allecto, of course, as an 
immortal sent by Juno personally, is more aware of current events and of Juno’s state of 
mind than Turnus is. This misunderstanding of the power dynamic serves the dual 
                                                
168 On the appearance of Allecto to the sleeping Turnus as a reference to the appearance of Hector’s ghost 
to Aeneas in book 2, see Horsfall 2000: 297. Given my analysis of Turnus’ characterization in this scene, I 
agree with Feeney 1991: 170, and disagree with Horsfall 2000: 296f, that Turnus is asleep in this passage. 
169 cf. Horsfall 2000: 290 on inrise. 
170 cf. Cairns 1989: 69, Schenk 1984: 43f; pace Horsfall 2000: 298, who does not see “open disrespect” 
until ne…finge at 438.  
171 ibid. 295.  
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purpose of establishing Turnus as superbus but also providing Allecto with an 
opportunity to give Turnus his comeuppance. 
He then belittles her appearance (victa situ verique effeta, 440; technically 
describing senectus but in essence describing Allecto). He continues his ridicule of 
Allecto by suggesting that her own old age is mocking her (senectus…ludit, 440- 441). 
He then sends her away, landing a final blow by claiming that such affairs are men’s 
work. 
Hic iuvenis vatem inridens sic orsa vicissim                435 
ore refert: 'classis invectas Thybridis undam 
non, ut rere, meas effugit nuntius auris; 
ne tantos mihi finge metus. nec regia Iuno 
immemor est nostri. 
sed te victa situ verique effeta senectus,                440 
o mater, curis nequiquam exercet, et arma 
regum inter falsa vatem formidine ludit. 
cura tibi divum effigies et templa tueri; 
bella viri pacemque gerent quis bella gerenda.' 7.435- 444 
 
The young man, mocking the seer, in turn 
spoke these words: “That a fleet has entered the waters of the Tiber  
has not, as you think, escaped my notice. 
Don’t assume it’s a big fear of mine. And Queen Juno 
is not forgetful of me. 
But you, O mother, old age, conquered by weakness 
and barren of truth, vexes with idle cares and mocks you with false fear, 
you prophetess amidst the wars of kings. 
Your duty is to attend to the gods’ statues and their temples; 
men will make war and peace, by whom wars are supposed to be waged. 
 
Turnus’ mockery of Allecto is particularly based on her guise as an old woman. He 
laughs at her supposed weakness and barrenness, and suggests that she has been fooled. 
His tone is entirely dismissive (non, ut rere… 7.437), and he is cruel to her, though he 
acknowledges she is in a position of some authority (as a priestess). His pompousness is 
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borne out as he contrasts himself with her, emphasizing how privileged he is to be a 
favorite of Juno’s, and how it is his duty to carry on the important matters of war and 
peace. This is our first real impression of Turnus as a character.172 His nature, or personal 
emotional apparatus, is made clear before he is overwhelmed by the Fury. 
Allecto, understandably, does not react well to Turnus’ ridicule. She flies into a 
rage (exarsit in iras, 445) and hurls Turnus’ own words back into his face:  
Talibus Allecto dictis exarsit in iras.                445 
at iuveni oranti subitus tremor occupat artus, 
deriguere oculi: tot Erinys sibilat hydris 
tantaque se facies aperit; tum flammea torquens 
lumina cunctantem et quaerentem dicere plura 
reppulit, et geminos erexit crinibus anguis,                450 
verberaque insonuit rabidoque haec addidit ore: 
'en ego victa situ, quam veri effeta senectus 
arma inter regum falsa formidine ludit. 
respice ad haec: adsum dirarum ab sede sororum, 
bella manu letumque gero.'                455 
sic effata facem iuveni coniecit et atro 
lumine fumantis fixit sub pectore taedas. 7.435- 457 
 
With these worse Allecto burned in anger. 
And a sudden trembling seized the young man’s body as he spoke, 
and his eyes froze: the Fury hissed with so many snakes 
and she presented herself with such a form. Then, turning her 
fiery eyes on him as he hesitated and tried to say more, 
she pushed him back and raised up a pair of serpents from her hair, 
and she bellowed forth, cracking her whip, and added these words: 
“Oh, look at me, conquered by weakness, whom old age, barren of truth 
mocks with false fear amidst the wars of kings. 
Look at this: I am here from the home of the dread sisters,  
and I bring war and death in my hand.” 
                                                
172 I take this characterization as representative of “the nature of the character,” not quite yet influenced by 
the furious nature of the Fury, cf. Horsfall 1995: 158 and Thomas 1998: 285, and pace Stahl 1990: 182. 
Cairns 1989: 68ff describes this negative characterization as a binary for Aeneas’ characterization, but also 
concedes that Turnus’ furor here is “divinely inspired.” I do note, as does Horsfall 1995: 159- 60 (citing 
“poetical indirection [that] imposes critical caution”), that the perhaps-sleeping Turnus and the perhaps 
allegorical Allecto confuse our understanding of Turnus. 
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Thus speaking she threw a torch at the young man and 
planted the torch, smoking with dark light, in his chest. 
 
Her lines victa situ, quam veri effeta senectus / arma inter regum falsa formidine ludit 
(7.452- 453) mimic Turnus’ lines sed te victa situ verique effeta senectus, / o mater, curis 
nequiquam exercet, et arma/ regum inter falsa vatem formidine ludit (7.440- 442). As she 
aggressively demonstrates her power over Turnus, she twists his words to sound as 
foolish as they were cruel. In other words, she mocks him for his mockery. She 
emphasizes her vigor by physically forcing him down (reppulit, 450) and snapping her 
whip (verberaque insonuit, 451). Her verbal and physical assaults leave him astonished. 
She not only addresses his withering dismissal but belittles him, terrifies him into a 
stupor, and rather efficiently recorrects Turnus’ understanding of their interpersonal 
power dynamic. 
 Turnus jumps up and immediately sets off to do as Allecto orders. His physical 
symptoms of being frozen in terror and trembling with fear (7.456- 457), and sweating 
and arousal from sleep (7.458- 459) are understandable physical reactions to fear and 
nightmares. They could also be evidence that Turnus is under Allecto’s spell. Either way, 
his characterization as a ridiculer is our first impression of him: inridens is the first 
modifier used to describe Turnus in the poem, and his comments mocking Allecto’s 
disguise occur before she attacks him with her snakes and torch. So, in our dichotomy of 
hero and foe, victim and ridiculer, good pride and bad: Turnus is inridens, or a ridiculer, 
and a proud enemy. As a leader of his army’s emotional community, he promotes a spirit 
of derisive hostility. 
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 Turnus’ characterization in this opening scene is maintained throughout the rest of 
the Aeneid as a foil to Aeneas.173 Where Turnus first displays his general impiety through 
his disrespect to Allecto/Cabyle in this scene, Aeneas is known as pius Aeneas 
throughout the poem.174 Turnus, as we will see in the following sections, is driven by 
violent anger (furor, ira, violentia)175 and superbia. Cairns describes the contrasts 
between Turnus and Aeneas “particularly in respect of kingly qualities to do with war and 
peace.”176 In other words, the two men, as leaders of their army’s emotional community, 
embody opposite emotional apparatuses.  
Numanus Remulus 
 Turnus, as the leader of his own army’s emotional community, is a representative 
of the emotional apparatus of that community. Another example of that community’s 
characterization as prideful and aggressively derisive is echoed in the character of 
Numanus Remulus, Turnus’ intended brother-in-law, who appears just once, in Book 
Nine. In his short appearance, Numanus confirms the derisive characterization of the 
Rutulains, and gives an opportunity for the Trojans to display their virtus by effortlessly 
silencing him, correcting his assessment of them. This scene occurs during the 
confrontation between Trojans and the Rutulians after the Trojans Nisus and Euryalus are 
killed in a raid on the Rutulians’ camp. Since Numanus’ ridicule is part of the aftermath 
of this raid, it is important to note two aspects of the Trojan response to the deaths of 
                                                
173 Schenk 1984, Cairns 1989. 
174 Cairns 1989: 58ff.  
175 Turnus alone is ascribed violentia in the Aeneid, at 11.354, 11.376, 12.9, and 12.45. See Putnam 1995: 
247. 
176 Cairns 1989: 70. 
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Nisus and Euryalus. First, Vergil does not dwell on the shame state experienced by the 
rest of the army’s emotional community; second, the Trojans enjoy the reparation of 
pride and self even without enduring an episode of the shame state.  
Vergil sets the scene for Numanus’ taunts with heightened tensions and emotions 
after the raid. However, as Numanus Remulus points out at 9.598, the Trojans were not in 
a shame state after the defeat of Nisus and Euryalus. Vergil simply says that they “stood 
around, sad” (stant maesti, 471) upon seeing the impaled heads of their comrades. Vergil 
deflects the grief of the Trojan army to Euryalus’ mother, who mourns her son in an 
extended description at 9.473- 592. Her reaction to her son’s death serves as an outlet for 
Trojan emotions. As she laments, filling the sky with her cries (caelum dehinc questibus 
implet, 480), she offers her own body to the Rutulians and begs the gods to take her away 
from her grief (494). She addresses her dead son in a series of anguished rhetorical 
questions (e.g. “Is this what you bring home to me, son? Is this why I have followed you 
across land and sea?” hoc mihi de te, / nate, refers? hoc sum terraque marique secuta? 
490- 1), emphasizing her relationship to the dead Euryalus with an enjambed nate at the 
beginning of the line. Vergil emphasizes the physical descriptions of her grief (e.g. “But 
suddenly the warmth left the bones of that poor woman;” at subitus miserae calor ossa 
reliquit, 475). Her grief touched the men around her: hoc fletu concussi animi, 
maestusque per omnis it gemitus (“Their hearts shook with this wailing, and a groan of 
sorrow went through them all,” 498). Just as the Trojans were touched by Euryalus’ 
mother’s grief, a war trumpet sounds (at tuba…increpuit, 503- 4) and shakes the 
community back to its battle stations. The community does not enter a shame state; they 
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do not even enter an extended stage of grief. They pause long enough to be moved by a 
woman’s motherly grief, they empathize, and they continue their task. 
The Rutulian army, on the other hand, has a reaction more befitting a shame state 
in mourning for their own dead after the Nisus and Euryalus episode.177 They are 
described as “weeping” (flentes, 451), and there is much grieving in their camps (nec 
minor in castris luctus, 452), and they rush together to their dead and wounded (ingens 
concursus ad ipsa corpora… tepidaque recentem/ caede locum, 455- 6). They follow 
Turnus into anger and agression (Turnus in arma viros…suscitat, 462- 3; variisque 
acuunt rumoribus iras, 464), mounting the heads of Nisus and Euryalus on spears, 
seeking to avenge their losses. Vergil implies that the Trojans are able to overcome this 
setback without experiencing the lows of a shame state. They mourn appropriately, but 
they are not so overwhelmed as to require an impressive recovery from a major setback. 
Unlike the Romans at the Caudine Forks, their victory is presented without the fluff of an 
exaggerated loss. The Rutulians, however, follow their leader Turnus in his tendency for 
violentia and aggression.  
 When the Rutulians approach the Trojan camp, the two armies clash in a fierce 
battle. With Turnus wounded after an aristeia on the battlefield, the focus shifts to 
Ascanius as he kills Numanus Remulus, who is engaged to marry Turnus’ sister.  This is 
our first (and only) glimpse of Numanus Remulus, but he memorably follows the 
                                                
177 I would not quite label this a shame state, either, since the term implies a constellation of emotions and 
values that are not all present. Only one emotion (maestas) and its symptoms (flentes, luctus) are described. 
In contrast to the Trojans, who were moved by Euryalus’ mother’s emotions, the entire community 
experiences a strong reaction to their setback.  
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example of Turnus’ immediate mockery.178 He mocks the Trojans mercilessly with a long 
rant about the manliness of the Italians and the feminine weakness of the Trojans. 
Numanus is puffed up and swollen with pride (tumidus novo praecordia regno, 596)179 
and shouts out with a huge voice that conveys this pride in himself (ingentem sese 
clamore ferebat, 597). Numanus displays the symptoms of having excessive, and 
therefore negative, pride. His mocks the Trojan army with a series of boasts and taunts, 
seeking to undermine their courage and their position with derisive jokes and mockery 
(595- 620). 
Numanus begins by implying that the Trojans should be in a shame state after the 
embarrassing beheadings of their compatriots, as the rest of the army stands in the 
fortifications rather helplessly: “Aren’t you ashamed, you twice-captured Phrygians, that 
you’re being besieged and held behind ramparts again, and holding off death with walls?” 
(non pudet, obsidione iterum valloque teneri / bis capti Phryges, et morti praetendere 
muros? 598-9). He belittles their experience as an army (and therefore an emotional 
community) by pointing out their defeats (bis capti Phryges, 599), mocking their position 
behind their walls, and minimizing their previous opponents (non hic Atridae nec fandi 
fictor Ulixes, 602). Since Vergil has not presented the Trojans as experiencing the shame 
                                                
178 Discussed in detail at Baraz 2013: 266f. 
179 At 11.715- 718, the Rutulian ally Camilla also describes her foe, known only as the “son of Aunus,” as 
“puffed up with pride” (vane Ligus frustraque animis elate superbis, 715). His taunt, which infuriated 
Camilla with a bitter smart (dixit, at illa furens acrique accensa dolore, 709) is one example of ridicule 
originating in the Trojans’ side. Vergil deflects any blame by putting the taunt in the mouth of a Ligurian 
ally, since Ligurians were said to be liars and tricksters (dum fallere fata sinebant, 701). Even still, Vergil 
tempers this suggestion by noting that the son of Aunus only turns to a tactic of craftiness (consilio versare 
dolos ingressus et astu/ incipit haec, 704- 5) once Camilla has physically cornered him. 
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state, Vergil suggests instead that the community is strong, though in mourning and under 
the pressure of an attack.  
Numanus attacks the Trojans with several points of mockery. He laughs at the 
idea that the Trojan army should even pose a threat to the Rutulian army, at least as far as 
marriage goes (en qui nostra sibi bello conubia poscunt! 600). He suggests that their 
aggression must be madness or divinely inspired (quis deus Italiam, quae vos dementia 
adegit? 601). These taunts are designed to undermine the emotional community’s 
determination, or animus, and cause the army to disintegrate. A splintered emotional 
community would be easier to defeat, and certainly the ridiculing army could derive 
pleasure from seeing their enemy in such a state.  
Numanus suggests that the Trojans are too feminine (vere Phrygiae, neque enim 
Phryges, 617) to be soldiers, whereas the Rutulians are hardened soldiers from birth (eg: 
durum a stirpe genus natos ad flumina primum/ deferimus…, 604- 5). Vergil adds weight 
to Numanus’ taunts in his word choice: the taunts are dira, or dreadful curses, and 
Numanus boasts (iactantem) and sings out (cantantem) his jeers (621). This haughty 
presentation and body language increase the impact of Numanus’ ridicule. 
Despite Numanus’ attempts to weaken the Trojans’ resolve by ridiculing them, 
the Trojans do not enter a shame state. Ascanius could not bear Numanus’ taunts (talia 
iactantem dictis, 621) and waited only long enough to ask Jupiter’s approval in his killing 
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Numanus (625- 9). When the arrow neatly kills Remulus, slicing his skull in half, 
Ascanius vaunts his rebuttal to the Rutulian ridicule:180 
effugit horrendum stridens adducta sagitta 
perque caput Remuli venit et cava tempora ferro 
traicit. 'i, verbis virtutem inlude superbis! 
bis capti Phryges haec Rutulis responsa remittunt':          
hoc tantum Ascanius. Teucri clamore sequuntur 
laetitiaque fremunt animosque ad sidera tollunt. 9.632- 637 
 
The taut arrow raced forth with a terrible whistle.  
It went through Remulus’ head and cleaved his hollow temples  
with its steel. “Go on, mock virtue with haughty words!  
We twice-captured Phrygians send the Rutulians this response!”  
and then Ascanius spoke no more. The Teucrians followed with cheers 
and they shouted for joy and raised their spirits to the stars. 
 
He dares the Rutulians to continue Numanus’ ridicule and his superbi words, and notes 
the “twice-captured” Trojans are nonetheless capable of responding to ridicule with fatal 
results (634- 5). Much as Allecto twists Turnus’ mocking words into a taunt of her own, 
Ascanius is able to reflect the taunt against the Trojans, using Numanus’ words against 
him. The Trojans cheer, their spirits lifted because they have conquered the haughty foe 
(636- 7). 
 The Trojans’ reaction, led by Ascanius, demonstrates their judgment of the 
Rutulians and Numanus’ ridicule. Ascanius calls Numanus’ taunts superba verba, the 
words of someone with excess pride, or someone who has misjudged his relationship 
with the victim(s) of his ridicule. By quite literally silencing Numanus, Ascanius corrects 
the power relationship. Not only was Numanus incorrect in reducing the Trojans to 
                                                
180 Hardie 1995: 187 points out that Numanus Remulus is not the only Italian with a Rem- name to be 
killed immediately after mocking newly built walls (cf. Remus). 
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simply “twice-captured Trojans,” he was also wrong about his own strength and valor. 
Moreover, Jupiter’s omen of thunder from a clear sky (630- 1) indicates that Ascanius 
and the Trojans have the king of gods on their side. Just after Ascanius kills Numanus, 
Apollo congratules Ascanius on his valor (macte nova virtute, puer, 641). These divine 
endorsements reinforce the Trojans’ position over the Rutulians. 
 This scene is important to the themes of superbia and ridicule in the Aeneid 
because it reinforces the characterization of the Rutulians as quick to ridicule, just like 
the leader of their emotional community, Turnus. At the same time, Vergil depicts the 
Trojans as a strong emotional community that does not break down into a shame state 
when faced with ridicule or trauma. Instead, they have the gods’ blessing to correct the 
misunderstanding that allowed for the ridicule in the first place. When Ascanius kills 
Numanus, he also silences the criticism of their ridicule. 
Aeneas and Turnus 
 The themes of superbia and ridicule have informed the characterizations of 
Aeneas and Turnus, as leaders of their emotional communities, through the second half of 
the Aeneid. Aeneas is shown as a strong and sympathetic character, while Turnus’ 
subversive, derisive superbia is emphasized. In the final scene, however, Aeneas kills 
Turnus as he supplicates Aeneas for his life. This unexpected action leaves the audience 
feeling unsettled, and the sudden ending of the poem leaves no time to understand his 
behavior. I argue that the end of the Aeneid, and Aeneas’ actions, are best understood 
through the framework of emotional community, as I have outlined it.   
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 Vergil re-establishes the characterizations of both leaders early in Book 12. 
Turnus opens the book by burning implacably and gathering his courage for battle (ultro 
implacabilis ardet/ attollitque animos, 3- 4). His violentia (9) grows restlessly like a 
wounded lion’s (6) as he speaks impatiently (turbidus, 10; ‘nulla mora in Turno,’ 11) to 
Latinus, who acknowledges Turnus’ ferox virtus (20).181 Turnus responds to Latinus’ 
pleas with violentia (45), even growing more angry as a result of Latinus’ pandering 
(exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo, 46). He threateningly describes his bloodlust, 
even haughtily calling out Venus, as Aeneas’ mother (52- 3). Turnus, as ever, is hot-
headed and violent. 
 Vergil reminds us of Aeneas’ piety: Aeneas makes a sacrifice and vows to be a 
pious son-in-law to Latinus, showing deference to his “father-in-law Latinus” 
(socer…Latinus, 192) and husband, naming his future city after his wife Lavinia (mihi 
moenia Teucri/ constituent urbique dabit Lavinia nomen, 193- 4). In this same oath, 
Vergil has Aeneas promise to be merciful to the Italians, to build a new city instead of 
conquering them and depriving them of a home (non ego nec Teucris Italos parere 
iubebo/ nec mihi regna peto: paribus se legibus ambae/ invictae gentes aeterna in 
foedera mittant, 189- 92). With this oath, Aeneas emphasizes his own pietas and 
clementia, both important aspects of the militiae emotional community.182  
                                                
181 Latinus’ speech to Turnus is calm (olli sedate respondit corde Latinus, 18) and placating; an attempt to 
flatter and appease Turnus and dissuade him from battle against Aeneas. I would argue that ferox virtus can 
be read as both a compliment – intending to flatter Turnus’ virtus, as a soldier – and a veiled insult – 
drawing attention to his unstable hostility, with ferox.   
182 As Tarrant 2004: 112f notes, pietas and clementia are also important features of Augustus’ own 
emotional apparatus and propaganda campaign. 
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 Because these characterizations have been developed in the previous books, and 
redeployed in the beginning of Book 12, we are primed to expect certain behavior from 
each man, as leader and representative of his emotional community. For example, when 
Turnus’ allies break the peace treaty for the second time,183 Aeneas attempts to control 
the situation and maintain the emotional apparatus of his community, shouting that the 
final match is intended to be between himself and Turnus. He is again called pius Aeneas, 
and he is unarmed (dextram tendebat inermem nudato capite, 12.311- 312). Aeneas 
exhorts his army to contain their ira and the negative emotions that have disrupted the 
order of the emotional community: 
At pius Aeneas dextram tendebat inermem 
nudato capite atque suos clamore vocabat: 
“quo ruitis? quaeve ista repens discordia surgit? 
o cohibete iras! ictum iam foedus et omnes 
compositae leges. mihi ius concurrere soli; 315 
me sinite atque auferte metus…” 12.311- 316 
 
But pious Aeneas was holding out his unarmed hand,  
with his head bared, and shouting loudly to his men, 
“Where are you running? What is this sudden outburst of confusion? 
Hold back your anger! The treaty has already been agreed upon, 
and all the rules are set. It is my right alone to do battle; 
Allow me to do it, and put away your fears.” 
 
Aeneas is dismayed that his emotional community is disintegrating under the pressure. 
He calls out the negative emotion (ira) and quality (discordia) that are overwhelming his 
army in an attempt to correct his community’s emotional apparatus. But suddenly Aeneas 
is wounded, and he falls back. At the sight of Aeneas stepping away, Turnus burns with 
                                                
183 The Rutulians were spurred in part by the sight of Turnus submitting to the treaty and to single combat 
with Aeneas, and in part by the encouragement of Juturna, his sister, and her dismay that the Rutulians did 
not feel pudor at the sight of their leader sacrificing himself for all of them.  
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sudden hope (subita spe fervidus ardet, 325) and leaps proudly onto his chariot (saltuque 
superbus/ emicat in currum, 327- 8). Turnus’ proud nature is too strong to submit to the 
Trojans. The narrator, with the knowledge of his future defeat, labels Turnus as superbus 
to indicate that he has misestimated his position relative to Aeneas. So far, each man has 
maintained his characterization and emotional apparatus: Aeneas is pius, and Turnus is 
superbus. 
 A turning point comes when Venus puts an idea into Aeneas’ head: he should 
attack the Latins’ city while Turnus and the Rutulians are preoccupied (555ff). When the 
Rutulians realize what is happening, Turnus seeks out Aeneas, and the two leaders finally 
have their confrontation. Venus’ inspiration has shifted Aeneas from his usual emotional 
situation, and he begins to take on characteristics that are typically at odds with his 
emotional apparatus. For example, Aeneas is exultant with joy (laetitia exsultans, 12.700) 
when he goes to meet Turnus for their final duel. This fierce glee recalls Aeneas’ reaction 
at the death of Mezentius (viso Tyrrheni sanguine laetus, 10.787), contributing to the 
slow buildup of Aeneas’ ferocity in these final scenes.184 With a savage spirit 
(saevo…pectore, 12.888), the pinnacle of his savagery is his mockery of Turnus: 
Aeneas instat contra telumque coruscat 
ingens arboreum, et saevo sic pectore fatur: 
'quae nunc deinde mora est? aut quid iam, Turne, retractas? 
non cursu, saevis certandum est comminus armis.         890 
verte omnis tete in facies et contrahe quidquid 
sive animis sive arte vales; opta ardua pennis 
astra sequi clausumque cava te condere terra.' 
ille caput quassans: 'non me tua fervida terrent 
dicta, ferox; di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis.'         Aen. 12.887- 895 
                                                
184 Tarrant 2012: 269. 
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Aeneas pushes on and brandishes  
his huge tree-like spear, and with a bitter heart he says,  
“Why more delay now? Or are you, Turnus, still turning back?  
We must fight not in a race but with savage weapons hand-to-hand. 
Change yourself into all shapes and draw out whatever  
strength either of mind or body. Choose to follow  
on wings the lofty stars, or to hide in the hollow ground.”  
Turnus, shaking his head, said “Your hot-blooded words do not terrify me, 
fierce one. The gods do, and Jupiter as an enemy.” 
 
This time, it is pius Aeneas who does the mocking, Aeneas who is burning with rage. His 
opening line (quae nunc deinde mora est? aut quid iam, Turne, retractas? 889) recalls 
Turnus’ words at the beginning of Book 12, where he proclaims nulla mora est in Turno; 
nihil est quod dicta retractent/ ignavii Aeneadae; 12.11- 12).185 Aeneas turns Turnus’ 
words against him, just as Allecto had done to Turnus. While this mockery, and the 
haughtiness (exultans 12.700, saevo pectore 12.888, ferox 12.895) that accompanies it, is 
not unusual for the battlefield, as we have seen, it is highly unusual for Aeneas to be the 
one doing the ridiculing.186 The bombast of his speech and body language cannot be 
ignored or misinterpreted; our attention is drawn to this uncharacteristic ridicule.  
Even more surprisingly, Turnus is quiet and calm in his response. He begs Aeneas 
for his life (humilis supplex, 12.930), his eyes cast down and aside (oculos dextramque… 
protendens, 12.930-1) in supplication. Unlike the mortally wounded Hector begging 
Achilles for proper burial (Il. 22.338- 43), Turnus begs Aeneas to spare his life. But as 
Hector asked Achilles to consider the grief of his father, Turnus calls Aeneas’ attention to 
                                                
185 Tarrant 2012: 319. 
186 cf. note 162 above. 
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both of their aged fathers.187 Turnus seeks to flatter and persuade Aeneas by emphasizing 
the values of Aeneas’ emotional appartus, arguing essentially that sparing Turnus would 
be the action most consistent with the clementia of the militiae emotional apparatus.188 
 Aeneas has a brief moment to consider whether or not to kill Turnus. His 
decision, based on Anchises’ command (6.851- 3), is to make a judgment about whether 
or not Turnus is superbus.189 If he is, then by killing him, Aeneas would be following 
Anchises’ charge of debellare superbos.190 If he is sufficiently penitent for any past 
superbia, and if he is more of a suppliant than a braggart, then he is instead merely a 
subiectus and therefore deserves pardon.191 In this moment, Aeneas must judge whether 
to get the last word and final vengeance over his ridiculer, or whether to let his enemy 
live.  
As Aeneas is processing all this, he notices that Turnus was wearing the belt of 
Pallas, who had been under Aeneas’ protection when Turnus killed him. Turnus, in 
choosing to wear the belt as a trophy into battle with Aeneas, was displaying one last bit 
of superbia.  
ille, oculis postquam saevi monimenta doloris          
exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira 
                                                
187 Tarrant (2012: 331- 2) points out the danger in reminding Aeneas of grieving parents, since it might 
call to mind Evander, Pallas’ father, rather than Turnus’ father. 
188 cf. Aeneas’ own vow at 12.189ff, as discussed above. 
189 Other interpretations include Aeneas killing Turnus either as a sacrifice for Pallas, or as punishment for 
having killed Pallas. The miasma of killing Pallas in a way that would require a death penalty would render 
him inappropriate for use as a sacrificial victim. See Tarrant 2012. 
190 Although, as Tarrant 2012: 18 explains, a Roman audience would not necessary have considered 
Turnus, as an enemy of war, even eligible to be considered as subiecti. 
191 The determination of Turnus as superbus or subiectus is essentially a distinction between the 
pessimistic or the optimistic view of the poem, where Aeneas’ actions are a representation of Vergil’s view 
of Augustan Rome. 
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terribilis: 'tune hinc spoliis indute meorum 
eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas 
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.' 
hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit           
fervidus;  12.945- 951 
 
Aeneas, after he drank in with his eyes the trophy,  
the reminders of cruel grief, burned with fury and terrifying  
in his anger, said, “You, clad in the spoils of my men,  
taken away from me here? It is Pallas– Pallas!– who sacrifices you  
with this wound and exacts punishment from this wretched blood.”  
 
That Turnus wears Pallas’ belt is the evidence some readers need to understand that 
Aeneas killed Turnus as a just punishment or even “righteous revenge” for his actions.192 
Because Aeneas was spurred on by furiae (furiis accensus, 946)193 and consumed with 
terrifying anger (ira terribilis, 946- 7), we can understand that he is not acting 
independently, and certainly not as a leader of his emotional community.194  
The sudden reversal of the characters of the hero and his superbus antagonist has 
long flummoxed readers of the Aeneid.195 The careful characterization of Aeneas and 
                                                
192 Keith 1924: 560. 
193 Cairns 1989: 83f argues for a distinction between furor (described as a negative quality in the 
emotional apparatus) and furibundus on one hand and furiae and furo/furens on the other. Furor/furibundus 
are always negative, but furiae/furo/furens are not necessarily condemnatory. Citing Aen. 8.494 ergo omnis 
furiis surrexit Etruria iustis, he argues that furiis are sometimes perceived as iustis and therefore good; this 
would be the sort of furiae compelling Aeneas to take action against Turnus. Cairns’ suggestion essentially 
places him in the “righteous anger of Aeneas” camp.  
194 contra Harris (2001: 246): Aeneas has indeed “fall[en] into emotional excess.” Tarrant (2012: 19) 
suggests that Vergil’s narration (furiis accensus, ira terribilis) and Aeneas’ speech (of sacrificing Turnus 
for Pallas) both contribute to the “intense emotional state.” The other rationales for killing Turnus are 
“ultimately beside the point” when we consider Aeneas’ emotional apparatus when he kills Turnus. 
195 See, for example, Gill 2004: 118ff for an examination of the scene in consideration of several different 
ancient philiosphical approaches. The scene is not an exact match for any one of these viewpoints, though 
Gill eventually determines that the most supported view is the Stoic, in which Aeneas in the final scene 
does not live up to the Stoic models established for him throughout the rest of the poem, which makes his 
killing of Turnus all the more disturbing. In this way, Gill’s analysis echoes my understanding, here, of 
Aeneas as a leader of his emotional community, departing from the norms of the emotional apparatus. 
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Turnus leading up to this moment makes us expect that Turnus would continue his 
haughtiness, and that Aeneas, in finally defeating Turnus, would be the embodiment of 
the ideal leader of the Roman army.196 Instead, Aeneas is presented as furiis accensus et 
ira terribilis: inflamed by the furies and terrifying in his anger (12.946- 7).197  The 
Aeneid’s ending is disconcerting and sudden because there is no resolution for the 
expectations established for the emotional community. The leader of that community, 
who is supposed to embody the ideals of the apparatus, is suddenly not behaving in a way 
that is consistent with the emotional community. 
Livy’s version of the defeat at the Caudine Forks used ridicule and the experience 
of the shame state to emphasize how low the Romans had fallen before their eventual 
triumph. We might expect the Aeneid, with Vergil’s careful characterization of Aeneas, 
Turnus, and their respective armies, to follow this same pattern of victory narrative. 
Instead, Aeneas and Turnus almost seem to switch personalities. The end of the Aeneid is 
unsettling because these characters are acting contrary to our expectations and outside the 
bounds of their emotional apparatuses. Vergil heightens this confusion by ending the 
Aeneid suddenly, in the middle of our reanalysis of Aeneas’ behavior. 
We are left to attempt an understanding of Aeneas and Turnus. The Rutulian king 
is usually defiantly haughty and derisive, but by the time Turnus reaches Aeneas in hand-
                                                
196 cf. Tarrant 2004: 109: “For a moment, at least, the original roles of Aeneas and Turnus seem to be 
reversed, with Turnus as the figure who represents pious respect and Aeneas and his men portrayed as 
violent offenders.” 
197 Galinsky has argued for the distinction between the violent, unbridled passion of Turnus’ furor, which 
stands opposed to the justice-meting anger of Aeneas’ ira, most memorably featured in the final scene of 
the poem. He suggests that Turnus, Latinus, and Aeneas fulfill three levels of emotion as described in 
Aristotle’s NE 1108a4 (Galinsky 1988: 334). Turnus’ furor is anger in excess, Latinus’ lack of anger is 
deficiency, and Aeneas’ ira is observance in the mean. See also Galinsky 1994. 
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to-hand combat, he has already learned from his sister Juturna that the gods have 
abandoned their cause (12.869- 86). Aeneas is typically pious and merciful, but when he 
is reminded of Turnus’ nature as a superbus, Aeneas kills him. In the end, he has in fact 
conquered the haughty (debellare superbos), but the context is surprising and confusing. 
This conclusion to the characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus is unsettling because it 
inverts everything that the audience has come to expect of each man, as representative 
leaders of their emotional communities.  
TACITUS’ ANNALES 
Tacitus echoes Vergil’s themes of superbia, ridicule, and the destiny of Rome, but 
his use of ridicule and the shame state forms a more complicated victory narrative than 
Livy’s version of the Caudine Forks. The German chieftain Arminius serves as the main 
antagonist in the German wars of Tacitus’ first and second books of the Annales.198 
Tacitus draws on the Aeneid for inspiration for Germanicus as a good-natured leader, like 
Aeneas, and for Arminius as a haughty foe, like Turnus. In so doing, he elevates his own 
work by comparison to Vergil’s, but he obfuscates this binary through his admiration for 
Arminius and by the Roman failures in Germany. Ultimately, Tacitus’ depiction of 
ridicule, the shame state, and the militiae emotional community is the most complicated 
of our three case studies. Tacitus’ conflicted presentation of the typical victory narrative 
reflects the general pessimism of his histories. 
                                                
198 As Baxter 1972 argues, this section of the Annales serves as an important contrast between Germanicus 
and Arminius, as other episodes in the Annales serve as contrasts between Augustus and Tiberius, 
Germanicus and Drusus, and Germanicus and Tiberius. 
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Germanicus 
Germanicus is portrayed as a good and thoughtful leader, in a way that recalls 
Vergil’s Aeneas. Bews goes so far as to call Book Two of the Annals “Germanicus’ 
book” because of the attention paid to his character in this section of the Annals, and the 
literary aspects that recall Vergilian themes.199 Leaving aside the well-demonstrated 
parallels in style and language,200 I focus instead on Germanicus’ emotional qualities that 
recall Aeneas. Tacitus is careful to draw attention to Germanicus as a pious leader, and a 
military leader who embodies the ideals of the emotional community. A series of 
snapshots of Germanicus interacting with his men give us this impression. For example, 
in one episode, Germanicus slips out into the night, in disguise and unbeknownst to his 
men, in order to learn what the soldiers are saying as they relax around their campfires. 
The soldiers praise Germanicus in the standard ways a military leader and member of the 
royal family is praised: his good looks, his parentage, his leadership skills, and so on.201 
Their conversations at once stress the features of Germanicus as a successful military 
leader and the qualities that make the Romans good soldiers, while distinguishing the 
Romans from their enemy. In other words, this passage illustrates this Roman army as an 
emotional community: the soldiers are identifying certain virtues and features that are 
valued in the Roman army of Tacitus’ Annales. 
                                                
199 Bews 1973: 38: “Book Two of the Annals is in a real sense Germanicus’ book. Virgilian language 
appears in the description of his campaigns in Germany, his travels in the East and in Egypt, in the account 
of his death and in the description of subsequent mourning for him.” 
200 See in particular Edelmaier 1964: 134ff, Baxter 1972, Bews 1973. Rutland 1987, and Foucher 2000: 
99ff for more on the influence of Vergil on Tacitus in the Annales. 
201 For more on lineage as part of the emotional apparatus of a community, see the next chapter on the 
domi emotional community of senatorial Romans. This domi emotional community has social restrictions 
on membership, and since leaders of the militiae emotional community were also often members of the 
domi emotional community, there is some overlap in their characteristics. 
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Nocte coepta egressus augurali per occulta et vigilibus ignara, comite uno, 
contectus umeros ferina pelle, adit castrorum vias, adsistit tabernaculis 
fruiturque fama sui, cum hic nobilitatem ducis, decorem alius, plurimi 
patientiam, comitatem, per seria per iocos eundem animum laudibus 
ferrent reddendamque gratiam in acie faterentur, simul perfidos et ruptores 
pacis ultioni et gloriae mactandos. 2.13.1 
 
At nightfall, he left the general’s tent in secret and unbeknownst to his 
sentries, with a single attendant, covering his shoulders with a wild beast’s 
pelt, and he turned to the streets of the camp. He stood near the tents and 
enjoyed his reputation, as some of the men, in seriousness and in jest but 
with the same spirit, praised their commander’s lineage, others his 
appearance, most his patience and his kindness. They admitted that they 
must show their appreciation on the battlefield and slaughter their 
perfidious and traitorous enemy as a sacrifice for vengeance and for glory.  
 
This description of Germanicus’ character and leadership recalls descriptions of other 
famous Roman leaders, like Sulla (Iug. 96.2)202 and, importantly, Aeneas. That a Roman 
general would bother poking around his army’s camp at night seems too precious for 
some scholars,203 but the scene provides Tacitus with an opportunity to show Germanicus 
as a caring leader, and a member of his army’s emotional community. The men casually 
praise him, and single out several characteristics (including his nobilitas, decus, patientia, 
                                                
202 The phrase ioca atque seria (cf. per seria per iocos, 2.13.1 above) in particular recalls Sallust’s 
description of Sulla, though in a slightly different context: Ad hoc milites benigne appellare, multis 
rogantibus, aliis per se ipse dare beneficia, invitus accipere, sed ea properantius quam aes mutuum reddere, 
ipse ab nullo repetere, magis id laborare, ut illi quam plurimi deberent, ioca atque seria cum humillimis 
agere, in operibus, in agmine atque ad vigilias multus adesse, neque interim, quod prava ambitio solet, 
consulis aut cuiusquam boni famam laedere, tantummodo neque consilio neque manu priorem alium pati, 
plerosque antevenire. (Iug. 96.2) 
 
Moreover, he spoke in a friendly manner to the soldiers, granting many things at their request and others on 
his own accord; he was unwilling to accept them himself and repaying them more promptly than money. 
He  himself never asked for repayment, but rather worked to have as many men as possible in debt to him. 
He spoke in jest or earnest with the humblest men, and was often with them in their work, in formation, and 
on watch. Meanwhile, he did not, like those who are depraved with ambition, undermine the good name of 
the consul or any other good man. He only tried not to allow anyone to outdo him in counsel or in action, 
and in fact he surpassed many. 
203 See e.g. Goodyear 1981 ad loc. 
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and comitas) for attention. While not all of these virtues are part of the emotional 
apparatus as outlined above, they do describe an elite leader in Augustan Rome, as 
Germanicus was.  
Tacitus similarly characterizes Germanicus elsewhere in the Annals. Germanicus 
is kind and generous in the face of Gnaeus Piso’s aggression and insults made behind 
Germanicus’ back (2.55). Although Germanicus knew about the slander of his name 
(insectationibus) and the attempts to undermine him, he nevertheless rendered aid when 
Piso needed assistance after some storms. While Tacitus does not present this as direct 
ridicule in the style of Situation D above, Germanicus responds in a similar way. He 
disagrees with Piso’s assessment of him, and he corrects that assessment by acting in a 
way that demonstrates how he embodies the emotional community. 
After Germanicus’ death, he is mourned for his good nature (mansuetudo, 2.72), 
shown to friends and enemies alike. Tacitus compares Germanicus to Alexander the 
Great, saying the former had more clementia, temperantia, and other virtues (ceteris 
bonis artibus, 2.73), and that Germanicus could have also surpassed Alexander in gloria 
militiae if only he had had more control over affairs, even if he failed to conquer 
Germany.  
 One final important element in Germanicus’ characterization is his piety. While 
pius is the most common descriptor of Aeneas in the Aeneid, the word is never used to 
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describe Germanicus.204 Instead, Tacitus characterizes Germanicus as pious, as when he 
sees the bones of the Varian army for the first time and is moved to provide burial for the 
lost soldiers: igitur cupido Caesarem invadit solvendi suprema militibus ducique, 
permoto ad miserationem omni qui aderat exercitu ob propinquos, amicos (And so a 
desire came over Caesar to provide final rites to the soldiers and their leader, as the entire 
army present with him was moved to pity concerning their neighbors, their friends;. 
1.61.1). 
 Germanicus’ piety for his soldiers is heightened by comparison to Tiberius’ 
indifference and coldness, which Tacitus has him present as decorum befitting an 
emperor and religious leader: 
Igitur Romanus qui aderat exercitus sextum post cladis annum trium 
legionum ossa, nullo noscente alienas reliquias an suorum humo tegeret, 
omnis ut coniunctos, ut consanguineos, aucta in hostem ira, maesti simul 
et infensi condebant. primum extruendo tumulo caespitem Caesar posuit, 
gratissimo munere in defunctos et praesentibus doloris socius. quod 
Tiberio haud probatum, seu cuncta Germanici in deterius trahenti, sive 
exercitum imagine caesorum insepultorumque tardatum ad proelia et 
formidolosiorem hostium credebat; neque imperatorem auguratu et 
vetustissimis caerimoniis praeditum adtrectare feralia debuisse.  1.62.1-2 
 
And so six years after the disaster, the Roman army, who was present, 
buried the bones of those three legions. No one knew whether he buried 
the remains of a stranger or a family member, but they all considered all of 
them to be kinsmen. As their anger towards the enemy grew, they felt at 
once mournful and hostile. Once the funeral mound was built up, Caesar 
placed the first grass, as a fellow in suffering with those present and with 
the greatest gratitude to the departed. But Tiberius disapproved, either 
because all of Germanicus’ actions were met with disapproval, or because 
he believed that the army would consider the enemy more formidable and 
                                                
204 Baxter 1972: 248ff outlines some parallels between Aeneas and Germanicus, pointing out that while 
Tacitus does not use the word pius, the most common descriptor of Aeneas, to describe Germanicus, he 
nonetheless characterizes Germanicus as pius thoroughly enough to evoke thoughts of Aeneas. 
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would be more reluctant for battle due to the image of the unburied, and a 
commander (who was gifted with the augury and ancient sacred rites) 
ought not to associate with funerals.205 
 
The description of Germanicus and his army here works in two ways: it first builds anger 
towards the enemy (aucta in hostem ira), which is necessary for the Roman army to stage 
a comeback and defeat Arminius. It suggests a shame state (maesti simul et infensi) in the 
emotional community, although the army does not endure the nadir of the shame state 
experienced by Livy’s version of the army at the Caudine Forks. The scene emphasizes 
the piety of the men, in burying their long-lost comrades, and it lays groundwork for a 
victory narrative.  
 Tacitus depicts Germanicus as the pious, respected leader of his militiae 
emotional community and the embodiment of his community’s emotional apparatus. 
Although his campaign in Germany was ultimately unsuccessful, Tacitus’ depiction of 
Germanicus suggests that we should understand him as a good leader. His 
characterization of Germanicus follows Vergil's Aeneas, and, as we will see in the next 
section, Tacitus’ Arminius recalls Vergil’s Turnus.  
Arminius 
Like Turnus to Aeneas, Arminius provides a foil for the Roman hero Germanicus. 
Arminius was a son of the Cheruscan chieftain, and lived in Rome for a time as a 
hostage. He had trained in the Roman army auxiliary forces, where he gained Roman 
citizenship. Like Jugurtha before him, and Tacfarinas and Julius Civilis after him, he 
                                                
205 On Tacitus’ disapproval of Tiberius and whether his depiction of Germanicus is similarly negative, see 
Bews 1973 and Rutland 1987. 
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trained under Romans, he received citizenship and other rewards, and then he turned on 
Rome. In 9 CE, he brought a fictitious report of a German rebellion to the attention of P. 
Quinctilius Varus. When Varus and his three legions were trapped in the Teutoburg 
Forest, Arminius and his men ambushed the Roman army and completely destroyed 
them. Seeing that defeat was imminent, Varus fell on his sword. After the defeat, the 
Romans were driven from Germany. According to Suetonius, the devastated Augustus, 
upon hearing the news of Varian disaster, cried out, “Quintilius Varus, give me back my 
legions!” (Quintili Vare, legiones redde, Aug. 23).  
Tacitus implies that Arminius is especially dangerous because of his education in 
Rome. Arminius understands Romans – almost is Roman – and is therefore a serious, 
inside threat. To convey the gravity of this threat, Tacitus uses allusions to Vergil’s 
Turnus to characterize Arminius as an enemy of Rome (and therefore also uses allusions 
to Aeneas to describe his own protagonist, Germanicus).206 He nevertheless relies on his 
readers’ prior knowledge of the infamous Arminius, referring to “Arminius and Segestes, 
both famous names: the first for perfidy towards us, the other for his fidelity to us” 
(Arminium ac Segestem, insignem utrumque perfidia in nos aut fide (1.55). Tacitus uses 
scenes of ridicule and the shame state to sharpen these charactizations.  
The audience’s introduction to the character of Arminius is through his own 
father-in-law, Segestes, whose daughter he had married against her father’s wishes. 
Segestes had warned Varus and the Romans that Arminius was planning an attack against 
                                                
206 Edelmaier 1964: 134- 5 noted that the descriptions of Arminius’ violentia, perfidia, and audacia 
recalled Vergil’s Turnus. 
 123 
them; he was ignored, and Varus’ army was destroyed at the Teutoburg Forest. Segestes 
serves as a German foil for Arminius; the safe barbarian who is an ally of Rome. Segestes 
notes that his daughter is with him unwillingly (filiam necessitate huc adductam fateor, 
1.58); Tacitus suggests that she is more like her husband than her father.207 Tacitus has 
Segestes beg for acknowledgement of his loyalty, highlighting his own faithfulness to 
Roman interests and, importantly, Arminius’ disastrous deception of Varus: non hic mihi 
primus erga populum Romanum fidei et constantiae dies (“This is not the first day of my 
fidelity and constancy to the people of Rome;” 1.58). Segestes mentions his own fidelity 
and constancy to the Roman people (fidei et constantiae, 1.58) and his conduct of foreign 
affairs in consideration of Roman interests (amicos inimicosque ex vestris utilitatibus 
delegi, 1.58) in an unstated contrast to Arminius’ behavior. Segestes argues that he has 
even brought Arminius’ perfidy to the attention of Romans, to no avail (ergo raptorem 
filiae meae, violatorem foederis vestri, Arminium apud Varum, qui tum exercitui 
praesidebat, reum feci, 1.58). 
After such an introduction to Arminius, Tacitus turns to Arminius’ reaction to 
Segestes’ proposal. Our first glimpse of Arminius highlights his disposition to inordinate 
anger. Of course a soldier, especially a leader of soldiers, needs to have some of the kind 
of furious passion that compels him to glory and success on the battlefield (ira, impetus, 
etc.); we have seen a summary of these qualities as we defined the emotional community 
                                                
207 Arminius’ wife is pregnant at the time of Segestes’ speech; their son is raised at Ravenna by Romans. 
Tacitus delays the discussion of the son’s life and the ludibrium, or ridicule or outrage, he endured, and this 
story is now lost. (Arminii uxor virilis sexus stirpem edidit: educatus Ravennae puer quo mox ludibrio 
conflictatus sit in tempore memorabo, 1.58). That their son lives life in exile (perhaps the sole source of 
ludibrium?) is an opportunity for pathos for Arminius; without the rest of the story, Tacitus’ word choice 
here is tantalizing.  
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of the army. But, like Vergil’s Turnus, Tacitus explains that Arminius has an abundance 
of anger. 
Arminius has been driven beyond his normally violent nature by the capture of his 
pregnant wife and the continued fight with his father-in-law, Segestes (Arminium super 
insitam violentiam rapta uxor, subiectus servitio uxoris uterus vaecordem agebant, 1.59). 
Arminius had kidnapped his wife away from her first fiancé, and Segestes has kidnapped 
her again and dragged her to Rome, where the Romans would hold her and their son 
captive. Tacitus’ characterization of Arminius is as someone who is dangerous (insitam 
violentiam) and angry at the Romans (agebant vaecordam) – a volatile combination for 
an enemy leader. Arminius’ separation from his wife and the intervention of her father 
parallels Turnus’ separation from Lavinia and Latinus’ decision to betrothe her to Aeneas 
instead of Turnus. This separation has similarly disastrous results in both the Aeneid and 
in the Annales. 
Arminius’ outburst of mockery adds to his inititial characterization:  
neque probris temperabat: egregium patrem, magnum imperatorem, 
fortem exercitum, quorum tot manus unam mulierculam avexerint. sibi 
tres legiones, totidem legatos procubuisse; non enim se proditione neque 
adversus feminas gravidas, sed palam adversus armatos bellum tractare. 
cerni adhuc Germanorum in lucis signa Romana, quae dis patriis 
suspenderit. 
 
And he did not restrain the insults, saying, “What an outstanding father! A 
great commander! A brave army! Together they carried off one poor 
woman. Because of me alone, three legions and three generals have fallen 
– for I do not wage war with betrayal nor against pregnant women, but out 
in the open against armed men. In the groves of Germany you can still see 
the Roman standards, which I hung for our ancestral gods.” 1.59 
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Tacitus has Arminius shout insults about Segestes, mocking his greatness as a father and 
a leader, and about Segestes’ army, laughing that they have not really accomplished 
anything by kidnapping his pregnant wife. Since Segestes is a Roman ally, Tacitus’ 
Roman army is vicariously offended. Tacitus does not explicitly label Arminius’ outburst 
as mockery; instead he says that Arminius did not hold back his insults (neque probris 
temperabat, 1.59). But his next comments are intended to belittle, and his tone is 
sneering. This opening series of accusatives of exclamation, with asyndeton, gives an 
impression that his remarks are impulsive, by which Tacitus only intensifies his 
characterization of Arminius as a rash and angry leader. Arminius’ tendency to derision, 
and his propensity for anger, recall Vergil’s depiction of hot-headed Turnus. 
 Arminius builds on this reputation for ridicule with boasts that, through his efforts 
alone (sibi, 1.59) in manipulating Varus, three entire legions and general have fallen. He 
disparages both Segestes and the Romans by pointing out this success. He claims not to 
fight dirty (non enim… proditione, 1.59), a claim that Varus would probably have 
disagreed with, and against men who could stand up to his challenge (neque adversus 
feminas gravidas, sed palam adversus armatos, 1.59). His remarks are intended to 
intimidate and belittle the Romans. 
He denigrates Segestes, claiming that he is subservient to the Romans (as indeed 
he is, as we have just seen) and lives in their territory, with his son placed into the 
sacerdotium hominum. This text is difficult here, and so the phrase has generated much 
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discussion.208 Some scholars have advised that Arminius is mocking the imperial cult, so 
that a sacerdos hominum diminishes the divinity of the emperor. This suggestion is in 
keeping with Tacitus’ development of Arminius’ mocking attitude throughout the speech, 
and his character more generally throughout the Annales. The phrase at once derides 
Segestes and the Romans.  
 This first glimpse of Tacitus’ Arminius – that he is both angry and mocking – is a 
thorough enough introduction to his character throughout the Annales. Arminius mocks 
everyone, including his brother, and this aggressive humor is symbolic of his threatening 
nature. When Tacitus has Arminius meet his brother, known to us only by a Latin 
nickname, Flavus (“Blondie”), the brothers stand on opposite sides of a riverbank, 
underscoring the division between them. Arminius inquires after his brother’s new scars, 
and his brother’s reply details how he was rewarded for his service in the Roman army. 
Arminius scoffs in return, belittling his brother for his connection with Rome, and 
therefore the Romans in general. 
et postquam digressi, unde ea deformitas oris interrogat fratrem. illo locum 
et proelium referente, quodnam praemium recepisset exquirit. Flavus aucta 
stipendia, torquem et coronam aliaque militaria dona memorat, inridente 
Arminio vilia servitii pretia.  2.9.2-3 
 
And after they left, Arminius asked his brother where the mark on his face 
came from. When he had been told the place and the battle, Arminius 
inquired what reward he had received. Flavus named his increased pay, his 
collar, his crown, and other military decorations, and Arminius laughed at 
the cheap price of servitude. 
 
                                                
208 See Goodyear 1981: 87- 88 for a summary of the issue. The word hominum is in question, with 
suggestions of hoc unum, ignominiam, Roman, Vbiorum, and more. Goodyear concludes, as do I, that with 
no satisfactory suggestion we must therefore proceed with caution.  
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Arminius continues to provoke his brother and the Romans with comments in Latin, as if 
he wants to be certain that his sneers are understood: on the other side [of the river], you 
could see Arminius shouting threats and declaring battle, for he kept interjecting many 
comments in Latin, as he had served as a leader of the tribes in Roman camps 
(cernebatur contra minitabundus Arminius proeliumque denuntians; nam pleraque 
Latino sermone interiaciebat, ut qui Romanis in castris ductor popularium meruisset, 
2.10.3).  
 Arminius’ anatagonism extends to other Germans, including his rival 
Maroboduus, whom he mocks, calling him a “fugitive, inexperienced in battle, protected 
by his lair in Hercynia, a betrayer of the fatherland, and a satellite of Caesar” (fugacem 
Maroboduum appellans, proeliorum expertem, Hercyniae latebris defensum, … 
proditorem patriae, satellite Caesaris, 2.45.3). This biting criticism insults Maroboduus, 
but it also recalls Vergil’s Georgics: frustra defensa latebris/ vipera (“the viper protected 
in vain by its lair,” 3.544- 5). This Vergilian allusion raises questions at multiple levels. 
Like his characterizations of Germanicus and Arminius after Aeneas and Turnus, a 
Vergilian allusion elevates his work.209 Tacitus also strengthens the connections between 
his version of the Roman army and Vergil’s. But he puts this allusion in the mouth of 
Arminius, whose Roman-ness is a tool used against the Romans; the implications of a 
                                                
209 Tacitus talks about the “trivial affairs” of his histories, perhaps imitating Vergil (nobis inarto et 
ingloriosus labor, Georg. 4.6) at the same time he reaches for loftier subject matter or genre. See Joseph 
2012: 375. 
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Vergilian allusion from a Latin-speaking German enemy are confusing.210 Whether or not 
we are to understand that Germanicus or his men understood the Vergilian reference, if 
Tacitus’ readers recognize a literary allusion in the mouth of Arminius, it seems to be a 
compliment paid to Arminius by Tacitus. In the battle immediately following this speech, 
we observe Arminius fighting bravely, as described above; although the Germans lost the 
battle, Arminius comes out relatively unscathed. 
 The final touch to Arminius’ characterization is Tacitus’ flattering obituary for 
him, at the end of the second book of the Annales, after much of Rome’s interactions with 
Arminius had ended. Tacitus calls him the liberator haud dubie Germaniae, and notes 
admiringly that he provided a challenge to Rome even at her strongest. In doing so, 
Tacitus acknowledges Germanicus’ failed campaign in Germany, crediting Arminius 
with the Germans’ success, essentially reversing the characterizations of Aeneas and 
Turnus.211 
ceterum Arminius abscedentibus Romanis et pulso Maroboduo regnum 
adfectans libertatem popularium adversam habuit, petitusque armis cum 
varia fortuna certaret, dolo propinquorum cecidit: liberator haud dubie 
Germaniae et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, 
sed florentissimum imperium lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello non 
victus. septem et triginta annos vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, 
caniturque adhuc barbaras apud gentis, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui 
sua tantum mirantur, Romanis haud perinde celebris, dum vetera 
extollimus recentium incuriosi. 2.88.2-3 
 
But Arminius, excited by the retiring Romans and the rout of Maroboduus, 
aimed at kingship and held himself in opposition with the free spirit of his 
                                                
210 This is assuming, of course, that Tacitus’ readers recognize the reference to the Georgics at all. 
Woodman notes that Velleius Paterculus calls Maroboduus a snake (serpentem, 129.3), so perhaps there is 
more to this name-calling than we understand (2010: 2). 
211 Timpe 1970: 11ff provides a biography of Arminius and argues passim for the veracity of Tacitus’ 
assessment of Arminius as liberator haud dubie Germaniae.  
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people. He was attacked by weapons, and while he was fighting with 
mixed results, he died through the treachery of his neighbors. He was, 
without a doubt, the liberator of Germany who challenged the Roman 
power at its strongest, not in the beginning stages of the Roman people, 
like the other kings and leaders did. He was not clearly defeated in battle, 
and he was not defeated in war. He lived thirty seven years, and held 
power for twelve years. He is sung even now among the barbarians, 
although he is unknown to the Greek annalists, who are only impressed by 
their own, and similarly is hardly well-known to the Romans, while we 
extoll the old days and are not interested in our own.   
 
Although Tacitus has patterned his Arminius after Vergil’s Turnus, his presentation of 
Arminius is complicated by admiration for him. He unequivocably grants Arminius 
victory over Germanicus and the Romans; he not only praises Arminius, but also voices 
frustration that other Greek or Roman historians do not acknowledge his triumphs, as he 
has just done.  
Ridicule in the Annales 
 In the final scenes of his description of Arminius’ and Germanicus’ conflict, 
Tacitus follows Vergil’s characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus, and relies on his 
audience’s understanding of the social rules of ridicule and the shame state. The stylized 
depictions of Germanicus and Arminius inform the expectations of Tacitus’ audience so 
that when Tacitus presents the two armies in conflict – in full military battle, in a war of 
words, or somewhere in between – readers understand how each leader and his men will 
react. Like Vergil’s Aeneas and his men, Germanicus and his army will eventually be 
victorious.212 Like Turnus and his men, Arminius flaunts his power through mockery. 
Tacitus’ goal in presenting the Germans’ ridicule of the Roman army is to provide an 
                                                
212 The Romans never regain the territory beyond the Rhine, however, so their victory is not without its 
limits.  
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opportunity for the Romans to recover their pride and vanquish their derisive enemy. He 
then is able to present a satisfying narrative arc for his Roman audience: a good leader, a 
challenge from a worthy opponent, and a moral and military victory for the Romans. 
 A series of interactions between Arminius’ Germans and Germanicus’ Romans 
from Book II of the Annales illustrates the role of ridicule in Tacitus’ history. Tacitus 
presents snapshots of the Germans’ ridicule and the Roman responses to it. His choice of 
taunts recalls both the Aeneid and the real humiliation of the Varian disaster, which 
surely would have been felt keenly by Germanicus and his Roman army.  
The first of these exchanges occurs just as Tacitus depicts the disguised 
Germanicus visiting his troops and overhearing his own praises as the troops declare their 
recommitment to Rome and to Germanicus. A derisive German interrupts this scene, just 
as the Romans were discussing their commitment to their cause and their leader: 
inter quae unus hostium, Latinae linguae sciens, acto ad vallum equo voce 
magna coniuges et agros et stipendii in dies, donec bellaretur, sestertios 
centenos, si quis transfugisset, Arminii nomine pollicetur. intendit ea 
contumelia legionum iras: veniret dies, daretur pugna; sumpturum militem 
Germanorum agros, tracturum coniuges; accipere omen et matrimonia ac 
pecunias hostium praedae destinare.  2.13 
 
Meanwhile, one of the enemy, who knew some Latin, drew his horse up 
near the wall and promised, in the name of Arminius, to each deserter 
wives and land and a daily stipend of 100 sesterces for the duration of the 
war. This insult fired up the anger of the legions. “When day comes, there 
will be a fight!” they said. “Roman soldiers will take fields from the 
Germans and drag back German wives! What a welcome omen – the 
wives and money of the enemy are marked out as booty!”  
 
As the Romans gather around their fires vowing vengeance for Rome and praising their 
leader – in other words, embodying an idyllic scene of a thriving militiae emotional 
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community at rest – a German soldier provokes the Romans, in Latin, with promises of 
riches and women if they would join the German cause. Tacitus notes that the German 
soldier can speak Latin, so his taunts are fully understood, and not just some intimidating 
but unintelligible war cries. The German declares his insults with the authority of “the 
name of Arminius” (Arminii nomine, 2.13), so that the Romans can feel the full shame of 
mockery of the German chieftain and his men. The Romans recoil in response because 
they reject the premise of this mockery, since the Germans were foreigners and therefore 
well removed from the militiae emotional community. Their emotions turn to anger 
(iras), and the soldiers are offended at his suggestion that they desert the Roman cause.  
 This exchange of contumelia is the first example of an episode of ridicule and 
response between the two sides. Each instance of ridicule causes an emotional reaction: 
in this case, the Romans become angry because they are annoyed that someone they 
perceive to be beneath them (an enemy soldier, but not an important or impressive one) 
has mocked them. (This is an example of Situation B.) In order to correct the German’s 
misunderstanding of the power dynamic, the Romans simply respond with derision of 
their own, adding as much authority as possible in order to appear more powerful in their 
reply. By labeling his offer an “omen” they add a dimension of religious authority. The 
Romans use the German’s words against him, reasserting their position in the power 
relationship, correcting his challenge to their status. So, the German soldier’s attempt to 
weaken the Romans through ridicule fails. Even after a minor skirmish later that night 
(adsultatum est castris, 2.13), the Germans are unable to rattle the Romans. The 
emotional community is strong. 
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The following day, Tacitus gives the Romans another signal of their superior 
position in the power relationship: an omen in the form of a dream encouraged 
Germanicus that the Romans could successfully fight in the forest or swamps like the 
Germans (nox eadem laetam Germanico quietem tulit, 2.14). He gives a rousing speech, 
in which he demeans the Germans’ weaponry and reminds his men that shame did not 
prohibit the Germans from retreat: “without any shame at the disgrace, without any care 
for their leaders, they leave and flee. They are frightened in the face of adversity, and 
even in success they are mindful of neither divine nor human law” (sine pudore flagitii, 
sine cura ducum abire, fugere, pavidos adversis, inter secunda non divini, non humani 
iuris memores, 2.14). Germanicus uses the vocabulary of his own community’s emotional 
apparatus (pudor, cura, pavidos) and the negative actions and consequences of his own 
community (flagitium, abire, fugere; divini and humani iuris) to make the Germans’ 
actions more severely transgressive to the Romans. Tacitus is able to intensify both the 
Germans’ status as barbaric enemy and the Romans’ moral and military might. 
Germanicus’ men respond enthusiastically to his speech (orationem ducis secutus militum 
ardor, 2.15.1): both the Roman leader and the Roman soldiers are confident. Their 
emotional community is strong, and they are assured of their superiority over the 
Germans. 
But Tacitus shows a similar situation in the German camp. Arminius, like his 
Roman counterpart, gives a stirring speech to rouse his own army’s emotional 
community. Arminius reminds his soldiers that the Romans they are about to face are the 
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leftovers of the army that they already defeated so devastatingly at the Teutoburg 
Forest:213 
nec Arminius aut ceteri Germanorum proceres omittebant suos quisque 
testari, hos esse Romanos Variani exercitus fugacissimos qui ne bellum 
tolerarent, seditionem induerint… meminissent modo avaritiae, 
crudelitatis, superbiae: aliud sibi reliquum quam tenere libertatem aut mori 
ante servitium?  2.15 
 
Nor did Arminius or the other German chieftains fail to note that these 
were the Romans of Varus’ army who had fled most quickly, who could 
not tolerate war and preferred mutiny… Just remember the greed, the 
cruelty, the pride of the Romans: what is left for them to do but to cling to 
their liberty or to die before slavery? 
 
Arminius reduces the very men, whom Germanicus has just been shown instructing and 
encouraging, to the cowardly and mutinous soldiers whom the Germans had already 
overpowered. Arminius emphasizes the lows of the Roman army’s emotional community 
in an effort to encourage his own army that the Romans will be easy to conquer.  
His criticisms of Rome’s avarice and corruption are resonant with Tacitus’ own 
political beliefs,214 so while his criticism is intended as an insult to the Romans, Tacitus, 
through Arminius, also implies a critique of Rome. Arminius points out the Romans’ 
avaritia, crudelitas, and superbia, qualities that are not consistent with the emotional 
apparatus. Because of his prior service in the Roman army, Arminius has enough 
knowledge of the Roman army’s emotional community to understand the effect of such 
claims on the community. In particular, his accusation of superbia is a loaded one, since 
                                                
213 The accuracy of Arminius’ description of the misbehavior of these soldiers is confused: he confuses, 
perhaps intentionally or perhaps not, the actions of the legions of L. Caedicius, L. Aspernas, Varus, 
Caecina, and Vitellius. See Goodyear 1981: 226. 
214 Shumante 2012: 496f. 
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superbia is a quality of a person (or army, in this case) who thinks too highly of himself, 
and this sort of comparison is dangerous in a military situation. By giving Arminius this 
speech, Tacitus makes him an impressively dangerous enemy, since Arminius 
understands the Roman army’s emotional community and therefore better knows how to 
defeat it. At the same time, Tacitus also provides his audience with another connection 
between Arminius and Turnus. 
The battle that follows is narrated quickly and without much detail. Tacitus adds 
details that improve his readers’ impression of the Roman success: for instance, 
Germanicus witnesses a divine omen of eagles (octo aquilae petere silvas et inrare visae 
imperatorem advertere, 2.17). Such an extraordinary coincidence of “Roman birds” 
(Romanas avis, 2.17) and especially eight eagles for the eight legions – is doubtful in its 
authenticity but favorably embellishes the Roman victory.215 He also pauses to note that 
Arminius fought admirably in hand-to-hand combat (2.17), but tempers this praise with 
embarrassing details of the German defeat, allowing his readers to join in on the army’s 
ridicule. Some German soldiers had climbed trees to hide out the battle, in a shameful 
refuge (turpi fuga, 2.17), and the Romans laughed at them (per ludibrium, 2.17) as they 
launched arrows at the hiding men and felled the trees they were hiding in. The Romans’ 
victory is so easy and their superior position so assured that the soldiers – and Tacitus’ 
audience – can laugh at the vanquished enemy. 
                                                
215 In Goodyear’s words, the omen is “far too good to be true;” though bird omens are not uncommon in 
battle narratives (1981: 232). Furneaux (1896: 307) notes that, as of the late nineteenth century, eagles are 
rarely even seen in the area. 
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 The battle was “great and, for us, not bloody” (magna ea victoria neque cruenta 
nobis fuit, 2.18), and Germanicus and his army celebrated by making a trophy of the pile 
of captured German weapons, inscribing it with the names of the defeated tribes (miles in 
loco proelii Tiberium imperatorem salutavit struxitque aggerem et in modum tropaeorum 
arma subscriptis victarum gentium nominibus imposuit, 2.18). Such a celebration was 
keenly felt by the Germans, at whose expense the trophy was erected. Tacitus describes 
the emotional reaction of the Germans, which we can identify as a shame state: 
Haut perinde Germanos vulnera, luctus, excidia quam ea species dolore et 
ira adfecit. qui modo abire sedibus, trans Albim concedere parabant, 
pugnam volunt, arma rapiunt; plebes primores, iuventus senes agmen 
Romanum repente incursant, turbant.  2.19 
 
This spectacle caused more pain and anger in the Germans than their 
wounds, their losses, their devastation. Those who had just been preparing 
to leave their homes and retreat across the Elba now wanted to fight, to 
take up arms. Commoners and nobles, young and old suddenly attacked 
the Roman line and threw it into confusion. 
 
Tacitus specifies that the trophy caused the Germans more suffering (dolore et ira) than 
the military defeat itself did. The trophy was an embarrassing spectacle for the Germans, 
and their reaction is one we would expect from a military emotional community 
encountering ridicule. They first feel the depressing emotions of the shame state, and then 
experience the surge of vengeful emotions as they seek to correct their position in the 
power relationship. As an army emotional community, they are particularly prone to the 
violent emotions like ira, so the military response that Tacitus describes is the predictable 
consequence in this situation.  
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 Tacitus, however, claims that the resurgence of the Germans was surprising for 
Germanicus and the Romans, who did not expect to find such strength in their enemy’s 
emotional community. The ensuing battle was life or death for both sides (spes in virtute, 
salus ex victoria, 2.20), and the fighting continued all day. Tacitus concludes that the 
cavalry battle was inconclusive (equites ambigue certavere, 2.21), which seems 
suspiciously pessimistic after such praise earlier in his narrative.216  
 Tacitus cannot conclude his narrative with an indecisive victory (or an optimistic 
description that attempts to conceal an actual defeat); that would leave the Germans 
victorious. Instead, Tacitus explains that the Romans built another trophy: “after praising 
the victors in a speech, Caesar built up a pile of weapons, with a boastful sign that said 
‘the army of Tiberius Caesar, after subduing the nations between the Rhine and the Elbe, 
dedicated this memorial to Mars, to Jupiter, and to Augustus’” (laudatis pro contione 
victoribus Caesar congeriem armorum struxit, superbo cum titulo: debellatis inter 
Rhenum Albimque nationibus exercitum Tiberii Caesaris ea monimenta Marti et Iovi et 
Augusto sacravisse, 2.22). 
 Goodyear points out that the claim to have defeated the tribes in this region is a 
“proud but untenable claim,” since Germanicus had not even reached the Elbe, much less 
conquered the territory. The “haughty sign” is a reflection of the complicated history that 
Tacitus was writing. On one hand, the heaping up of weapons in a monument is the act of 
victors, triumphant in their defeat of an enemy. Tacitus’ use of debellatis recalls 
Anchises’ command to future Romans to defeat the proud (memento… debellare 
                                                
216 Furneaux calls it a “virtual admission” of defeat (1896: 311). 
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superbos, Aen. 6.853), especially in light of his characterization of his antagonist and 
protagonist after those of the Aeneid.217 But on the other hand, Tacitus calls the sign 
superbus.218 Following our earlier discussions of superbus used to describe sympathetic 
characters or objects, we would understand Tacitus to imply that this monument, or 
perhaps the Roman army it was set up to honor, was once-great, or about-to-be-
dishonored. The victory in Germany was not the triumph of Aeneas’ foundation of the 
land that would be Rome, and neither was it the conquering of neighboring tribes, as in 
Livy. It was a victory, but barely. In framing it this way, with his references to earlier 
narratives of ridicule and recovery in Livy and Vergil, Tacitus offers his readers a 
pessimistic, ironic understanding of the war in Germany.  
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have identified the Roman army as an emotional community, and 
described its emotional apparatus. I have focused on this militiae emotional community’s 
reaction to ridicule, as depicted in three different authors. Livy’s version of the surrender 
at the Caudine Forks includes a straightforward depiction of ridicule and the shame state 
as part of a victory narrative. Vergil’s characterizations of his heroic Trojans, who adhere 
to the community’s emotional apparatus, and of the ridiculing Tarquins, who are too 
                                                
217 Baxter (1972) notes that the use of debellare here recalls both Aen. 6.853 and a similar passage at 
5.730f, where Aeneas dreams that Anchises tells him that he must defeat the hard and rough people with 
Latin civilization (gens dura atque aspera cultu / debellanda tibi Latio est). The only other occurrence of 
debellare in the Aeneid is a description of Lausus, Mezentius’ son, the tamer of horses and defeater of wild 
beasts (equum domitor debellatorque ferarum, 7.651). Tacitus uses the word debellare only seven times in 
extant works, including just twice in the Annales; the other passage is at 12.38, in a description of the war 
in Britain against Caratacus (as if the war was won, quasi debellatum foret, 12.38). 
218 Baxter 1972: 263 simply “notes” the interesting adjective superbo without further comment. Tacitus’ 
word choice seems to be a tacit admission of the implications of one side calling its enemy superbi. 
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proud and mocking, shatters in the last scene, when his protagonist and antagonist do not 
act in accordance with their chracterizations. Tacitus combines both Vergil’s 
characterizations and Livy’s shame state and victory narrative in order to complicate the 
war between Germanicus, the hero who was a little disappointing, and Arminius, the 
enemy who was a bit impressive. When we consider these issues through the lens of 
emotions and communities, we reach a new understanding of the texts.  
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Chapter 2: Ridicule and the Domi Emotional Community 
 In this chapter, I define another emotional community and its emotional 
apparatus: that of the senatorial elite of the late Roman republic. We can understand the 
details of membership and the features of the emotional apparatus from the works of 
Cicero, the novus homo who worked to become a member of that emotional community.  
As in the previous chapter, I examine the ways in which ridicule highlights the 
membership and the rules of the emotional community by using a case study, Cicero’s In 
Verrem. I conclude that the distinguishing feature of this emotional community is the 
demonstration of membership in that community through the embodiment of the 
emotional apparatus. Unlike the Roman army's emotional community, where we saw that 
Roman historians focused on the emotional recovery to the apparatus' status quo, the 
members of the emotional community of the senatorial elite carefully and constantly 
negotiate their relative status in the community. By focusing our attention on the use of 
ridicule as a tool to navigate status in the emotional community, we observe the 
promotion and regulation of both community members and community values. As a case 
study, the trial against Verres provides Cicero with an opportunity to use his 
understanding of the emotional community to manipulate his audience into granting him 
victory and a better position in the community. By mapping the notions of praise and 
blame in the Roman law courts onto the concepts of emotional communities and ridicule, 
we can better undertsand how pieces like the In Verrem worked in the emotional 
community, and for (or against) its members. 
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INVECTIVE AND RIDICULE 
It will be useful to make some basic distinctions between ridicule in oratory and 
invective before we turn to invective for evidence of the domi emotional apparatus. The 
term “invective” was not one Cicero himself would have used, and its precise definition 
is still debated.219 Since  “invective” is now generally used to evoke the angry attacks 
made in public speeches, I will continue, in the discussion that follows, to define 
invective is the kind of highly personal attack one makes publicly against one's enemy.220 
Ridicule, on the other hand, is a broader category. Ridicule is an attack, although perhaps 
not a tirade against a single person, and probably less angry. It can be public or private, 
though a public ridicule is more humiliating and therefore likely to be closer to 
invective.221 Ridicule can be done to one's friends as much as one's enemies, although, 
again, an overly harsh use of ridicule against one's friends is likely to have a deleterious 
effect on that friendship. One key difference appears to be tone: invective is angry and 
aggressive, whereas ridicule can be inspired from anger, derision, or fun (perhaps cruel 
fun). Ridicule is not necessarily laugh-out-loud funny, but it is usually clever, witty, or 
amusing in a mocking way – a joke with a definitive “loser” as the butt of the joke. 
Invective shares this quality of having a specific victim or target. In its capacity as a 
personal attack, invective is well-suited for the contentious context of oratory, but 
                                                
219 The word invectiva, describing a speech, first appeared in the fourth cenutry CE, though Cicero used 
the cognate verb invehi to describe an attack in a military style. Powell (2007: 1- 2) suggests there may not 
even be enough evidence to determine a genre, and recommends a more nuanced definition that focuses on 
the personal attack, including the In Pisonem and the Philippics, but not the Catilinarians. 
220 By “invective” here, in the context of Cicero’s speeches and the domi emotional community, I refer 
chiefly to rhetorical invective. 
221 Elsewhere Cicero mentions the difference that an audience can make for a joke. At Phil. 2.7, he 
complains that Anthony has read aloud a private letter, since a private joke between two friends can lose its 
humor when shared more broadly.  
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ridicule is more widespread. In addition to differences in audience, the tone of invective 
is an important distinction. Invective is an angry attack. Ridicule can be angry, and in this 
variation is similar to invective; but when ridicule takes the form of mockery or derision, 
the ridiculer seems to take too much delight in the negative re-evaluation of his victim to 
be truly angry. Similarly, when ridicule functions as scorn or disdain, the ridiculer is 
more dismissive of the newly low position of his victim to work up too much anger about 
the situation.  
 
 
Figure 4: Invective and ridicule 
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Invective attacks the corrupt social mores of the community or one or more of its 
members, and thus marks out deviants from the emotional community and identifies their 
misbehaviors. In this capacity of assessment, invective does the same work as ridicule. 
Each technique highlights a social transgression, so invective and ridicule are only 
effective if all parties involved share the same social norms – that is, if they are all 
members of the same emotional community. Further, the topics of ridicule are selected 
because they are important enough in the emotional apparatus to engage in a dispute.222 
Corbeill has argued that invective was able to establish a set of moral rules.223 In thinking 
about ridicule in the context of an emotional community, I am working in the opposite 
direction from Corbeill. I first assert that a community has shared values and emotions, 
then that the community members feel strongly that these values are right and that their 
community membership is important, and finally the community members react strongly 
when either the community's values or its membership are tested (through things like 
deviance and ridicule). That is, an emotional community's existing emotional apparatus 
                                                
222 In other words, if we were to ask if the Romans believed in their ridicule, we might answer: maybe, if 
the speaker were convincing enough. The social pressure to conform to the standards of the emotional 
community would encourage the audience to believe whoever was the most powerfully persuasive, either 
because he was more powerful (closer to the center of the emotional community, or perhaps more 
connected) or because he was more persuasive (using stronger invective or more convincing arguments). In 
the zero-sum game of the oratorical reassessment of community positions, the successful ridiculer gains the 
social standing lost by the victim of the ridicule. See Riggsby 1997 and Craig 2007 on credibility in Roman 
law courts. 
223 Corbeill 1996: 5. The audience of invective, Corbeill argues, shared core values and preoccupations 
that were "essential to the way a Roman of the late republic defined himself in relation to his community."  
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can be reinforced through ridicule, not that ridicule (or, more narrowly, invective) shapes 
the emotional apparatus of that community.224  
The opportunity to disgrace another member of the community through invective 
is really an opportunity for a community member to demonstrate his own success as a 
member of that emotional community. By ridiculing another in front of an audience of 
their peers, the ridiculer is both reaffirming "what was right and proper for the true, elite 
Roman" (i.e. a member of the domi emotional community) and at the same time taking 
advantage of a moment of disgrace to discredit another member. In terms of emotional 
community, the ridiculed member loses prominence in the community, and the ridiculer 
gains significance in the community. 
 Because ridicule and invective do some of the same work, we can turn to 
invective as a source for the inverse of the emotional apparatus of the domi community. 
The most common topics of criticism in invective are representative of what the members 
of Cicero’s emotional community found the most offensive or disturbing. Their 
reappearance in invective is a key to understanding what was unpalatable for the 
community. Since invective shares with ridicule a common goal of pointing out a social 
transgression, these loci of invective can be thought of as inverses of an acceptable social 
position. 
Craig has located a list of seventeen of the most common points of criticism in 
invectives:225  
                                                
224 Arena 2007: 157 is correct, then, that "invective imposed the authority of a system of collective values" 
by making public the otherwise private rumors or whispers of some social transgression. I would add that 
invective does not create this system, as Corbeill suggests, but rather reinforces the system by threatening 
exclusion from the group. 
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1. embarrassing family origins 
2. being unworthy of one's family 
3. physical appearance 
4. eccentricity of dress 
5. gluttony or drunkenness that leads to cruelty or libido 
6. hypocrisy for appearing virtuous 
7. avarice 
8. taking bribes 
9. pretentiousness 
10. sexual misconduct 
11. hostility to one's family 
12. cowardice in war 
13. squandering one's patrimony, leading to financial embarrassment 
14. aspiring to regnum 
15. cruelty to citizens and allies 
16. plunder of private or public property 
17. oratorical ineptitude 
If each of these loci represent an opportunity for invective, and therefore ridicule, then we 
can assume that the opposite of each locus is not an opportunity for such criticism. In 
                                                                                                                                            
225 Craig (2004 and 2007) has assembled a list of "specific content loci that an audience will expect a 
formal invective to contain" (2004: 189), based on the studies of Nisbet 1961, Süss 1920, and Merrill 1975. 
These are simply the features that Cicero tends to dwell on in his invective; issues of truth and merit are 
more complicated, as Riggsby 1997 and Craig 2007 have demonstrated, just like the punchline of a joke 
may be based on exaggeration or falsehood.  
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other words, the ideal member of the emotional community would embody the direct 
opposite of this list (as well as being located near the center of the emotional community, 
with many useful bonds of amicitia). 
 Another method of assembling the emotional apparatus of the emotional 
community is to look for the features that are valued by members of the emotional 
community. In particular, the bits of praise found in speeches like de Lege Manilia and 
the Pro Marcello reinforce some of these features. When Cicero praises Pompey or 
Caesar in these speeches, he hits on certain categories that correspond to the opposites of 
the invective loci. We can therefore develop a sense of the emotional apparatus for this 
community through the negative examples of invective and the positive examples in 
praise speeches. 
 While there are no real republican examples of epideictic praise speeches, like 
Pliny’s Panegyricus for Trajan, many Roman speeches had some elements of praise in 
them.226 In the speech Pro rege Deiotauro, for example, Cicero describes the king 
Deiotaurus as someone to be admired: “in that king are all the virtues” (omnes in illo sunt 
rege virtutes, 26), claiming that he is fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, 
largum, beneficum, liberalem, and frugalem (ibid.). Cicero has explicitly listed several 
praiseworthy aspects of a leader, underscoring his magnanimity and fortitude and sense 
of justice. These are some of the aspects of the emotional apparatus. 
                                                
226 Manuwald 2011: 92. And, as Manuwald delightfully points out (95), Cicero loved to praise himself, of 
course. 
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Contextualizing Cicero’s list of virtues, though, provides us with an even deeper 
understanding of the emotional apparatus. Since Deiotaurus is foreign and a king, he is 
not exactly a member of the domi emotional community. But Cicero tries to convince 
Julius Caesar that, because Deiotaurus’ emotional apparatus is similar to that of the domi 
emotional community, Deiotaurus should be granted Caesar’s clementia. In describing 
and praising Deiotaurus, Cicero is describing and praising his and Caesar’s emotional 
community; in highlighting the generous clementia that Caesar might grant Deiotaurus, 
Cicero also praises and flatters Caesar.  
He avoids conflating the two, however, and distinguishes Caesar from the foreign 
king, saying et quem nos liberi, in summa libertate nati, non modo non tyrannum, sed 
clementissimum in victoria ducem vidimus (And we free men, born in the greatest liberty, 
not only do not see you as a tyrant, but in fact see you as the most merciful leader in his 
victory, Deiot. 34). Cicero is careful to praise Caesar’s character, especially his 
clementia, while steering clear of any hint of regnum. Tyranny in any form, such as 
regnum, was distinctly unsavory for a Roman, and therefore one of the qualities least 
valued in the domi emotional community.227 
 So, now that we have reviewed two methods for gathering information about the 
domi emotional community’s emotional apparatus, I will continue by providing a sketch 
of the emotional apparatus through an outline of the ideal member of the emotional 
community. I have divided the emotional apparatus into four categories of qualities and 
emotions that make up the ideal member of the emotional community: family 
                                                
227 As seen in the Introduction in our discussion of superbia. 
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background, personal qualities, civil conduct, and military conduct. These categories are 
loosely based on the loci of invective. 
CICERO’S EMOTIONAL COMMUNITY 
In order to discuss the relationship between Cicero, his speeches, and his 
emotional community, we must first describe the members of that community and their 
emotional apparatus. I have labeled it the domi emotional community for convenience 
and to distinguish it from the militiae emotional community in Chapter 1. We can think 
of the domi emotional community as the group that controls Roman affairs from the 
city’s center – the senatorial elite of Rome. Some of this emotional apparatus is based on 
the loci of invective, I also distinguish ridicule from invective.  
Membership in the senatorial elite’s emotional community is something of a 
birthright: men born into a senatorial family are eligible to participate at the highest level 
of Roman politics and therefore be members of this emotional community. After the 
Sullan reforms in the first century, membership in the senate was extended to anyone 
who held the office of quaestor.228 Therefore, Cicero, despite his equestrian and non-
patrician background, was able to mingle with senators and participate in the highest 
courts of law. Men who were born into equestrian families and eventually became 
senators, like Cicero, were technically members of the emotional community, but their 
status as novi homines forever marked them out as marginal members of the community. 
These are the men who are the leaders of the city: the senators and some 
equestrians who dominate the public sphere of government and of law courts. 
                                                
228 For more on the Sullan reforms in the senate, see Hawthorn 1962. 
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Significantly, these are also the men who were able to articulate their positions and 
beliefs and commit them to writing. In examining the public speeches and the published 
private letters of these men, we can comprehend their community's emotional apparatus 
and the ways that the community used and responded to ridicule. 
We can also appreciate how membership in this community was articulated 
through these works. The simple ability to give a speech or occupy a particular political 
office indicates an elite status, and a positive reception by the elite audience indicates 
their acceptance of the speaker in their emotional community. For instance, when Cicero 
spoke as prosecutor against Verres, he was a relatively unknown equestrian and praetor, 
but his success against Verres secured his position in at least the outskirts of this 
emotional community.229 Cicero's later election to consul confirmed his position as a 
novus homo and a member of the emotional community, although perhaps he was never 
as confirmed a member as he would have been had he been born a senator.  
Speech-making, then, is a kind of public performance of one's membership in this 
emotional community. The mere permission to speak in front of the assembly is a 
demonstration of a man’s membership in the community. A community member can 
advance his position in the community through speech-making as well: by making 
influential speeches, or perhaps by successfully prosecuting a higher-ranking member of 
                                                
229 For more on Cicero’s rise through the ranks of the senate, see Mitchell 1979. 
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the community. Such a victory would entitle the prosecutor to the defeated man’s 
position in the speaking order of the assembly.230   
To sum up: the members of this domi emotional community are the leading men 
of Rome, who were mostly born into the senatorial social class, or who were elected to it 
as novi homines. The members of the community provide the evidence for their own 
membership, both to each other, through their public speeches, and to us, through their 
extant writings. Men in Cicero’s position, the novi homines, were never quite as accepted 
in the community as those who had been born into it. While the majority of the 
community’s social functions operated on an in-or-out basis – either you could speak in 
the courts, or you could not – those who were most accepted as senators were those who 
had many illustrious ancestors and who had served in many offices themselves. Men like 
Cicero were always regarded with skepticism, despite any, even considerable, talent and 
demonstrated deeds.231 
 The schematic chart below is an example of how such a community might 
function. Each individual, represented by dots, is located within the general bounds of the 
community, represented by the circle. Some members are closer to the center, while 
others remain around the periphery, as a result of their birth or bootstraps entry into the 
community. Individuals in the community are united to one or more others through bonds 
of amicitia, or friendship, represented by solid lines.232 Amicitia was more like a political 
                                                
230 Taylor 1971: 112. See below for more discussion on invective and rhetoric as methods for navigating 
in and out of the emotional community. 
231 On Cicero’s career as a novus homo, see, e.g., Scullard 1965 and Blom 2010. 
232 For more on amicitia, see Brunt 1965 and Konstan 1997. 
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alliance than a union of mutual affection; its diplomatic functions were useful for 
political machinations. Conversely, bonds of inimicitia, represented by the dotted lines, 
represented the animosity between feuding members of the community. Again, inimicitia 
was a political trait: men could enter into a relationship of inimicitia and later recover 
their productive relationship.  
 
 
Figure 5: Social relationships in the senatioral elite in the Roman republic 
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While technically all individuals are members of this community, those that are closest to 
the center of the group and those that have strong bonds of amicitia are the most 
comfortable and powerful in the community. A man born to a long, proud senatorial 
family, who himself has served as consul multiple times, and has many amici will be 
firmly near the center of this conceptual map. 
Cicero’s position, as a novus homo, was liminal, along the edges of the 
community, particularly at the time of Verres’ trial. Cicero was only a quaestor, a low 
ranking official and the first position in the Republican cursus honorum. He had yet to 
make a splash on the Roman oratorical scene, and he did not yet have many bonds of 
amicitia (or, for that matter, inimicitia). The speeches against Verres, however, provided 
him an opportunity to change all this, since he was able to use the speeches to improve 
his position in the ranks of the membership of the domi emotional community. 
Domi Emotional Apparatus 
 Now that we have determined the members of the emotional community, we can 
turn to defining the emotional apparatus under which the community functioned. The 
emotional apparatus is a constellation of emotions and values that are esteemed by the 
community members. It is again important to note that some of the qualities in this 
emotional apparatus are not necessarily emotions. Virtues and personal qualities inform 
the emotional apparatus of an emotional community, as we saw in the previous chapter in 
our discussion of the Roman army’s emotional community. The fulfillment of these 
preferred values earns a person a position in the social group, and their commitment to 
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these values and the social group generates emotions – such as anger, in the case of 
invective – that reinforce the social group through the workings of the emotional 
community. 
In order to identify the emotions and values that comprise the emotional 
apparatus, I propose two methods. First, I turn to the negative example from invective: if 
the targets of invective are members of the domi emotional community and are criticized 
for doing something, then we can assume that the speaker believes that that action is not 
in accordance with the emotional apparatus of the community. These criticisms therefore 
inform our understanding of what was acceptable, by providing examples of the opposite. 
Second, I synthesize some emotions and values from sections of speeches by members of 
the emotional community that praise other members of the emotional community. 
Family Background 
 The first category of qualities in the emotional community corresponds to the first 
two traits outlined by Craig: (1) embarrassing family origin and (2) being unworthy of 
one’s family.233 Nisbet gave examples like one’s father being a slave, or having barbarian 
ancestors, or having ancestors who were in menial professions.234 The vulnerability of 
one’s family background is based on the membership rules of the community, since many 
members are born into the senatorial class, and very few, like Cicero, are able to ascend 
to its ranks through their own means.  
                                                
233 2004: 190. 
234 1961: 192- 7. 
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 This locus of invective, then, speaks directly to membership in the community. 
While an ideal member of the emotional community is born into the community because 
he is born into a senatorial family, others are able to rise up through the cursus honorum 
and become a member of the senate, and therefore the domi emotional community. The 
ideal member is the former, who is a member of the community by birthright. Along with 
this inheritance, the ideal member of the domi emotional community is also a good 
representative of this privilege, and lives up to his family’s respectable name. In contrast, 
for example, Antonius earns Cicero’s invective because he has squandered his patrimony 
and his opportunity to live up to his grandfather’s example in oratorical skill (another 
locus for criticism): Vide autem, quid intersit inter te et avum tuum. Ille sensim dicebat, 
quod causae prodesset; tu cursim dicis aliena. (But look at what a difference there is 
between you and your grandfather! He used to be very careful when he was speaking, and 
said what was useful for his argument. You blurt out somebody else’s words, Phil. 2.42)  
Personal Qualities 
 Prescriptions on a community member’s personal character shaped public and 
private perceptions of his behavior. To combine several of the loci listed by Craig: a 
community member must not be gluttonous, prone to drunkenness, greedy, sexually 
inappropriate, disrespectful of his family, or irresponsible with his finances.235 These are 
                                                
235 He should also not be ugly or deformed, or inclined to wear foreign dress; he should also be highly 
skilled at oratory. These qualities are not so much emotions or personal qualities or virtues, so I leave them 
aside in this discussion. They do, however, contribute to the notion of the ideal member of the domi 
community, since physical characteristics were considered linked to qualities of one’s personality, 
especially if the phsyical qualities are perceived to be connected to a social status. For instance, Cicero 
equates Piso’s appearance with the complexion, hairy cheeks, and discolored teeth of a slave, and suggests 
that his disposition is as untrustworthy as his appearance (Pis. 1). Similarly, he jeers that Antony has the 
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all common topics in invective: Antony is such a drunk that he vomits in public 
proceedings (Phil. 2.62), Catiline squandered his patrimony (Cat. 1.14), Piso is a 
“whirlpool and glutton” who was born to serve his stomach, not praise and glory (Pis. 
41). 
Put simply, he should be in control of himself. He should also be aware of how he 
is perceived, and not claim more or less virtue than he truly possesses. Overestimating 
one’s position is a crime of superbia, as we saw in the previous chapter, or audacia, as is 
sometimes used to label political figures.236 Conversely, if a member of the emotional 
community realizes that he has been assessed to have less virtue or standing than he 
believes that he has, he feels a sense of shame, or pudor, at the underestimation.237 These 
terms reflect the constant reassessment and comparison of one’s standing in the 
community. As I will demonstrate below, ridicule, and the labeling of one’s opponent as 
audax, is one tactic to trigger such reassessment and allow for a rearrangement of the 
social hierarchy.  
                                                                                                                                            
body of a gladiator (Phil. 2.63). These comments are as much about the social status of slaves and 
gladiators as they are about the supposed unseemliness of Piso’s and Antony’s bodies. Since the criticism 
of family background – and any possible connection to slaves or gladiators – is already tied to one’s 
membership in the emotional community, I lay aside these loci of invective. 
236 See below for more on audax as a label for Verres, and see Wirszubski 1961 on the political 
connotations of audaces. He argues that audaces is a label for men who are disruptive in both their personal 
and public lives; Wirszubski takes audaces as a synonym of improbi or mali, or an antonym of boni. In this 
way, someone who is audax steps beyond his role, and someone who is bonus fulfills his role admirably. 
Wriszubski suggests that the epithet was tied to particular figures in the late republic, like Curio or 
Antonius, because of notoreity in their public roles that resonated with rumors of their private lives, too. 
237 Kaster 2005: 28- 65 discusses the contexts for feeling pudor.  
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Civic Conduct 
 As political leaders, members of the domi emotional community were expected to 
behave in a manner befitting their offices, with proper respect to the republic and to their 
fellow citizens. Therefore, he should not take bribes or aspire to regnum. He should 
practice sufficient amounts of sapientia, iustitia, and clementia so that he is not cruel to 
his fellow citizens or to allies, and so that he does not abuse their property. He should be 
qualified – an educated man, a skilled orator – for his office. And he should not claim to 
be more than he is, for fear of becoming pretentious or superbus or audax. 
 For instance, in the speech supposedly in support of Marcus Marcellus, Cicero 
goes out of his way to praise and flatter Caesar. Cicero dwells especially on Caesar’s 
clementia, which was so extraordinary that Cicero called it “unfamiliar and unheard-of” 
(tam inusitatam inauditamque clementiam, Marc. 1). Caesar’s clementia is probably his 
most famous virtue, and is certainly relevant here, since Caesar had forgiven Marcellus 
and allowed him to return to Rome. Caesar’s mansuetudino, potestas, sapientia deserve 
mention (Marc. 1, 18) before Cicero notes that it is Caesar’s deference to the authority of 
the senate and the republic that is truly noteworthy – in other words, Caesar’s pudor 
(Marc. 3). Caesar’s kindness (beneficii, liberalitas) is paired with his sapientia and his 
clementia – the wise, gentle leader doles out forgivenesses to the other members of his 
community. Especially in uncertain times of civil war, “all hope for safety depends on the 
clemency and wisdom of the conqueror” (omnem spem salutis ad clementiam victoris et 
sapientiam contulisse, Marc. 18), when parties on both sides fo the conflict are members 
of the emotional community. 
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Just as a political leaders should have clementia to protect persons under their 
protection, they should also protect and respect property. Cicero attacks leaders, like 
Catiline and Verres, who have plundered property (e.g.: direptio sociorum impunita, Cat. 
1.18). The prosecution against Verres, which I review in detail below, is because of 
Verres’ gross mismanagement of Sicily: “It is not doubtful to any of you, judges, that 
Verres most openly plundered everything in Sicily, both sacred and profane, both public 
and private, and that without the slightest of scruples or even a disguise he carried out 
every kind of thievery and plunder” (Cicero’s opening line at Ver. 2.5.1). These actions 
are betrayals of the public trust and the qualities of iustitia, aequitas, and misericordia 
(justice, fairness, and compassion) that are expected of these leading citizens of Rome.  
Military Conduct 
 The members of the domi emotional community do, of course, venture outside the 
city on military missions, where there are similarly high expectations for their leadership. 
In this category we see some overlap between the virtues of the domi emotional apparatus 
outlined above and the qualities of the army’s emotional community, as detailed in the 
previous chapter. The strength and smarts that are expected of a military leader must be 
combined with the virtue and mercy that are praiseworthy in a civic leader; when a single 
man inhabits both roles, as Pompey or Caesar did, he is praised in the proper context of 
his leadership. 
 Cicero praises Lucius Lucullus with the sort of praise he suggests is owing to a 
great general (magno imperatori): that he had defeated a well-supplied army of a king 
with his Roman virtus, assiduitas, and consilium (Leg. Man. 20). Later, in the same 
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speech, Cicero claims that there are four essential qualities for the ideal general (in 
summo imperatore): knowledge of military matters, virtus, authority, and luck (scientiam 
rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem, Leg. Man. 28). Cicero goes on to praise 
Pompey’s virtues as a general, including his efforts in performing his duty, his bravery in 
danger, his dedication to managing affairs, his swiftness in action, and his thoughtfulness 
in strategizing (labor in negotiis, fortitudo in periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in 
conficiendo, consilium in providendo, Leg. Man. 29). While some of these qualities are 
more befitting a military man – namely, of course, scientia rei militaris, fortitudo in 
periculis, and probably felicitas – virtus is a value that Roman men aspire to more 
generally, and auctoritas is a quality required for all Roman leaders. Qualities that make 
Pompey a great general, like his attention to detail and powerful leadership style, also 
make him a good civil leader. 
 Cicero lumps military leadership with civil leadership in his praise of Caesar, but 
I separate them here. We have already reviewed in detail the emotional apparatus of the 
Roman army, with its military leaders also serving as emotional examples, but it is useful 
to note that Cicero commented on these same emotional skills as valuable in the domi 
emotional community. Men like Pompey and Caesar, then, can serve as links between the 
two communities.238   
                                                
238 There are as many emotional communities as social communities, so generally people are in more than 
one at a time. Men like Pompey and Caesar, who are leaders in both the domi and the militiae emotional 
communities, would be therefore expected to embody the ideals of each community as he interacted with 
members of that community. Such a feat could become complicated if the emotional apparatuses of the 
communities were at odds with one another, but it is possible to emphasize a trait that occurs in both or 
multiple emotional apparatuses – like Caesar’s clementia, for instance – in order to maximize its effects.  
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 Some qualities of leadership are easy to transfer between one emotional 
community to the other, such as Caesar’s clementia or the respect for fellow citizens, 
allies, and their property. Bravery in war was another locus for invective, so men who 
dropped their shields in battle faced scorn at home as well as on campaign. But too much 
honor and glory from military victory was unsavory, since men shed their uniforms at the 
city pomerium. Cicero alludes to this, suggesting that some people say military authority 
is not as impressive as others claim it to be (Marc. 6), but he does use Caesar’s military 
victories in Gaul to praise his gloria and clementia endlessly in the Pro Marcello (6- 9) 
and cede his own loss in the civil wars.239 Most importantly, Cicero claims, is that Caesar 
would have preferred peace to personal gloria (Marc. 15), since the republic would have 
been intact, and he implores Caesar not to chase after gloria at the expense of the rest of 
the community (Marc. 25). 
 The emotional apparatus of the domi emotional community, then, can be 
summarized by constellations of values and emotions: the ideal member of the emotional 
community has a superior family background and comports himself with the highest 
standards of the emotional community. Members of the community who do not act in 
accordance with the emotional apparatus of the domi emotional community risk being 
singled out and excluded from the group. Since membership in the emotional community 
was frequently performed by giving public speeches, one common method of 
                                                
239 The civil wars, that is, that he also denied he ever encouraged: quod quidem meum consilium minime 
obscurum fuit. nam et in hoc ordine integra re multa de pace dixi et in ipso bello eadem etiam cum capitis 
mei periculo sensi. (And indeed my feelings on that matter were not at all a secret, for I said much in favor 
of peace in this assembly, while things were still intact, and even after things fell apart, I still felt the same, 
even in my own mortal danger, Marc. 15.) 
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marginalization from the group was public ridicule in oratory. We will now turn to 
Cicero’s speeches against Verres to explore the ways that Cicero used membership in the 
domi emotional community and the embodiment of its emotional apparatus as parts of his 
argument. 
CICERO’S IN VERREM 
Cicero's campaign against Verres provides us with an opportunity to explore the 
domi emotional community, its apparatus, and the ways ridicule affects them. In 70 BCE, 
Cicero, then only recently returned from his service in Sicily as quaestor, won the right to 
prosecute Verres for crimes of corruption and extortion during his time as governor of 
Sicily. Cicero’s scathing attack on Verres made an oratorical star of Cicero and sent 
Verres to voluntary exile.  
The Verrines are a series of seven speeches composed by Cicero for the trial of 
Gaius Verres on charges of extortion stemming from his service in Sicily as propraetor. 
The first speech, In Q. Caecilium Divinatio, is a contest between Cicero and Caecilius to 
determine which of the two would serve as prosecutor against Verres. Caecilius was 
friendly to Verres, and Cicero easily defeated him. The second group of speeches, the In 
Verrem, is further divided into two sections, Actio Prima and Actio Secunda. The Actio 
Prima is the only one to have been actually delivered in court.240 In this speech, Cicero 
takes the unusual tactic of calling witnesses and reading evidence, rather than performing 
a large speech and waiting for the response of his opponent. Because Verres and his 
                                                
240 See Alexander 1976 and Frazel 2006 for a review of scholarship and a discussion of the delivery of the 
actio prima and the publication of the actio secunda, and Hortensius’ possible responses to both.  
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defender, Hortensius, were attempting to delay the trial in order to wait for more 
favorable, newly elected magistrates to take office, Cicero boldly rearranged the 
traditional order of the trial.241 The results were so devastating that Hortensius declined to 
finish the case, and Verres left for voluntary exile. Cicero, however, in his conquest, 
circulated the remaining five speeches, known together as Actio Secunda, although they 
were never delivered in court.  
In the following case study, I use the Verrine orations to examine how Cicero 
used ridicule in order to navigate the emotional community of the senatorial elite for his 
own personal benefit. I divide my argument into several parts, roughly according to the 
progression of speeches composed in the case. First, I outline how Cicero demonstrated 
his own knowledge of the emotional apparatus, and as a result, Caecilius’ lack of 
understanding of the apparatus, in the Divinatio. I argue that Cicero uses ridicule to 
ostracize Caecilius and to position himself as a member of the in-group of the emotional 
community, thereby winning the right to prosecute Verres. Next, I show that Cicero uses 
three different techniques of ridicule against Verres in the In Verrem: traditional jokes at 
Verres’ expense, invective, and speech acts that label Verres as both ridiculus and audax. 
I conclude that this analysis of ridicule and emotional community bolsters the traditional 
reasons given for Cicero’s publication of the Actio Secunda – namely to circulate and 
promote his own accomplishment.  
                                                
241 Cicero claims to have done this rearrangement of the argument at the last minute; it is also possible, 
perhaps even likely, that he intended to use this tactic from the start. See Frazel 2006: 131ff. 
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I have chosen to focus on the Verrines as a case study for our discussion of 
ridicule and emotional community for several reasons. First, Cicero’s jokes in the Verrine 
orations are infamous. Quintilian claims that Cicero was a great wit (mira quaedam in eo 
videtur fuisse urbanitas, 6.3.3), but, even so, Quintilian has to defend the “more 
uninspired” (frigidius, 6.3.3) jokes in the Verrine speeches as invented by others and 
merely reported by Cicero (ab aliis dicta, 6.3.55).242 Plutarch notes that Cicero made 
many witticisms (πολλὰ χαρίεντα, Cic. 7.4) at the trial, specifically mentioning the puns 
on Verres’ name.243 According to the nineteenth century scholar William Forsyth, the 
“cutting sarcasm and irony” of the in Q. Caecilium Divinatio “has never been 
surpassed.”244 In a review of Cicero’s humor across the genres of his work, Haury 
proclaims that the Verrines are one of the pinnacles of humor in Cicero’s oratory.245 
Cicero’s success in removing Verres from the community while also promoting himself 
in the community makes the Verrines a fascinating study of ridicule and emotions in the 
domi emotional community; I now turn to this analysis. 
                                                
242 Cicero’s humor was not universally loved during his lifetime. Cato is said to have remarked about 
Cicero: ὡς γελοῖον ὦ ἄνδρες ἔχοµεν ὕπατον (“Gentlemen, what a funny consul we have!” Plut. Comp. 
Dem. et Cic. 1.5) Plutarch’s word choice in γελοῖος is as ambiguous as the Latin ridiculus and the English 
funny: Cicero is both funny in that he makes people laugh and funny in that he causes people to laugh at 
him. See Rabbie 2010: 207, Beard 2014: 102. 
243 Plutarch also mentions a joke at Hortensius’ expense, but since this joke is not cited in the orations by 
Cicero himself, I exclude it from this discussion. It is a pretty good zinger and does contribute to Cicero’s 
reputation as a wit, so I will quote it here: “And the orator Hortensius did not dare to defend Verres 
directly, but was persuaded to appear for him at the penalty hearing, taking an ivory sphinx as a reward. 
When Cicero made some oblique comment to him, and he responded that he had no skills in solving 
puzzles, Cicero said, “But you have a Sphinx at home!” (τοῦ δὲῥήτορος Ὁρτησίου τὴν µὲν εὐθεῖαν τῷ 
Βέρρῃσυνειπεῖν µὴ τολµήσαντος, ἐν δὲτῷ τιµήµατι πεισθέντος παραγενέσθαι καὶ λαβόντος ἐλεφαντίνην 
Σφίγγα µισθόν, εἶπέ τι πλαγίως ὁΚικέρων πρὸς αὐτόν τοῦ δὲ φήσαντος αἰνιγµάτων λύσεως ἀπείρως ἔχειν, 
‘καὶ µὴν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας’ ἔφη, ‘τὴν Σφίγγα ἔχεις.’ Cic. 7.6) 
244 1880: 133. 
245 1955: 117; see also Arena 2007: 150, cf. Powell 2007: 2. 
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In Q. Caecilium Divinatio and the Emotional Community 
When Cicero attacked Verres, he was not yet a powerful or wealthy man. He had 
not yet become consul; he had not yet earned a reputation as Rome’s greatest orator. 
Verres, on the other hand, was more established than Cicero, although he himself was 
only the son of a novus homo, and he had several powerful connections of amicitia, 
including the Metellus brothers, who were from a great family and who held several 
offices. Cicero’s efforts paid off, as his reputation as an orator quickly spread, and Cicero 
went on to climb the cursus honorum successfully.  
 In other words, Cicero began the Verrines as a marginal member of the emotional 
community, and he attacked Verres, who inhabited one of the more secure positions at 
the center of the emotional community. This difference in status is important for men 
sparring in this emotional community, since members nearer the center, like Verres, are 
in a more comfortable position to defend themselves. On the other hand, Cicero, from his 
liminal position on the fringes of the community, was not yet powerful enough to affect 
Verres unless his attack were thoroughly and skillfully planned – which, of course, it 
was. 
 Cicero acknowledges this difference in status in the introduction to the Divinatio 
in Caecilium. In this speech, the only surviving example of the divinatio genre, Cicero 
must argue that he, not Q. Caecilius, should prosecute Verres for his crimes.246 To do so, 
Cicero first argues that Verres is such a criminal, and Cicero has such an obligation, that 
                                                
246 Craig 1985: 442. 
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there is no other choice but to have Cicero prosecute Verres.247 Cicero has been asked by 
all the cities of Sicily, with the exception of Syracuse and Messina, to represent them in 
pursuing Verres for his crimes against the province. He frames this task as one of great 
honor and duty; one he is inspired to take up because of his pity for the Sicilians but also 
because of the example and customs of his predecessors in the Roman senatorial elite 
(officio, fide, misericordia, multorum bonorum exemplo, vetere consuetudine instituo 
maiorum, 5). In other words, by prosecuting Verres, Cicero is fulfilling an obligation set 
out by more senior members of the emotional community. He puts this claim at the top of 
his argument, in part to help make his participation in the trial seem a natural choice – 
Cicero is just doing what other members of the emotional community do. Cicero, 
acknowledging that he is not usually one to prosecute criminals (5- 6) notes that his 
position in the community (having served as quaestor in Sicily) has given him a moral 
duty to protect the entire republic from the huge and horrible crimes of Verres (homo 
singulari cupiditate, audacia, scelere praeditus, cuius furta atque flagitia non in Sicilia 
solum, sed in Achaia, Asia, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Romae denique ante oculos omnium 
maxima turpissimaque nossemus, me agente in iudicium vocaretur, 6). Cicero argues that 
a member of the emotional community must prosecute Verres, and that he is in a better 
position to do so than Caecilius. 
 He not only argues that he is in a better political or social position than Caecilius 
to prosecute Verres; he also claims that his emotional apparatus is better suited to do 
                                                
247 Cicero argues for the moral difficulty of Caecilius, a quaestor, prosecuting Verres, his own praetor. See 
Thompson 1962 passim, Stroh 1975: 178, and Craig 1985: 445. 
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so.248 First, he has been chosen by the Sicilians themselves, since he has already proven 
to them his trustworthiness (ad meam fidem…spectatam iam et diu cognitam, 11; cuius 
fides est nobis cognita, 20). Cicero emphasizes that his personal emotional apparatus is 
already proven to the Sicilians to be worthy to prosecute their corrupt governor; he 
implies that Caecilius is too tainted by his closer association with Verres.  
 As further demonstration of his own excellence (particularly compared to 
Caecilius) and Verres’ vice, Cicero argues that he is the candidate whom Verres does not 
want to be selected to prosecute him. Cicero accuses Caecilius of being the weaker, softer 
prosecutor (22- 23). He goes through the list of ideal traits of the emotional community to 
point out how he is the superior choice: he suggests that Caecilius does not understand 
how a prosecution really works, claiming that Caecilius is lacking in the proper oratory 
skills and training (27, 35- 39). Caecilius does not have the virtues of firmness and 
honesty needed in a prosecutor (firmum verumque, 29), and Cicero suggests that 
Caecilius might be persuaded by Verres’ money not to pursue him to the fullest extent of 
the law (30- 35). Cicero belittles Caecilius, suggesting that he think carefully about 
whether he can handle the prosecution, implying that Caecilius does not have the ability 
or mental wherewithal to pursue the case (tu ipse quem ad modum existimes vide etiam 
atque etiam, et tu te collige, et qui sis et quid facere possis considera, 37).249  
Cicero continues with details of Caecilius’ failings. He provides evidence of 
Caecilius’ unsavory dealings while in office in Sicily, when he deprived a woman of her 
                                                
248 cf. May 1988: 34ff. 
249 pace May 1988: 35. I am not convinced that Cicero is truly displaying arrogantia here, since I am not 
sure that he is misrepresenting his own skill or talent, though his comment is certainly demeaning.   
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property (55- 58). While Caecilius claims to be the better candidate for prosecution, since 
he was Verres’ quaestor, Cicero counters that, if praetor and quaestor are like father and 
son, then Caecilius is far too close to the criminal Verres to be trusted himself (61). 
Cicero’s intentions in prosecuting Verres are noble, he says, because they benefit the 
entire republic, whereas Caecilius’ motivation is personal (64).250  
 Cicero imagines Caecilius’ response to such accusations: quid ergo? haec in te 
sunt omnia? (“So what? Do you have all those qualities yourself?” 40). With “rather 
jocular malice”251 he imagines Caecilius as the pitiable victim of the skilled opposing 
orator, Hortensius:  
Te vero, Caecili, quem ad modum sit elusurus, quam omni ratione 
iactaturus, videre iam videor; quotiens ille tibi potestatem optionemque 
facturus sit ut eligas utrum velis, factum esse necne, verum esse an falsum: 
utrum dixeris, id contra te futurum. Qui tibi aestus, qui error, quae 
tenebrae, di immortales, erunt homini minime malo!  Div. Caec. 45 
 
I can already picture it, Caecilius: how he’s going to play you, how he will 
toss you every which way; how many times he’s going to give the power 
and option to choose what you want – whether something happened or 
not, whether something is true or false, and whichever you choose, it’ll 
work against you. Ye gods! What a heat you’ll be in, what confusion, what 
darkness, will there be, you poor thing! 
 
Cicero’s condescension makes for a humorous and insulting scenario.252 He makes it 
clear that even if Caecilius had had the bare minimum of oratorical training, skill in 
rhetoric, and the personal qualities of honesty and virtue that would make him an 
                                                
250 Cicero, of course, would also benefit greatly; see below for more discussion. 
251 Davies 1969: 157, cf. May 1988: 36ff. 
252 This passage is classified as «ridiculiser» by Haury (1955: 117). His derision is emphasized by the 
oratorical flare of several tricola that follow (quid cum… quid cum… quid cum; transigere, expedire, 
absolvere; necessitudinem… morem… religionem; and so on). Cicero is at once showing off his own 
rhetorical skill, diminishing Caecilius’ oratorical power, and shaming him with hypothetical failure. 
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effective orator, Cicero still has more of each of these. Cicero grants that Caecilius is also 
a member of the emotional community, but Cicero argues that he himself is the one who 
better embodies the optimal qualities. Cicero concludes: dubitare quisquam potest quin 
honestius sit eorum causa apud quos quaestor fueris, quam eum cuius quaestor fueris 
accusare? (Can there be any doubt that it is more reasonable for a prosecutor to be 
serving those among whom he was quaestor, than pursuing the man under whom he 
served as quaestor? 65). 
 Cicero’s conclusion is bold: Caecilius, he says, has absolutely nothing to gain or 
lose if he takes on this case, and it will show. Cicero, however, has put his entire future 
on the line – obsides, hostages, as he says – to his own success. If Rome wants a man 
with faith, industry, wisdom, and authority, then Cicero is prepared to serve (quapropter, 
iudices, vestrum est deligere quem existimetis facillime posse magnitudinem causae ac 
iudicii sustinere fide, diligentia, consilio, auctoritate (73). But, if the court chooses 
Caecilius instead, it will be clear that the court did not want an honorable, strict, and 
attentive prosecutor like Cicero (populus Romanus ne tam honestam, tam severam 
diligentemque accusationem neque vobis placuisse neque ordini vestro placere 
arbitretur, providete, 73).  
 Cicero uses the opportunity to compete against Caecilius as a chance to advance 
in the emotional community that both men inhabited. By depicting himself as the more 
closely adhering to the qualities of the ideal emotional community member, Cicero 
secured the position as Verres’ prosecutor. This first step in the trial process, the 
divinatio, is really a comparative evaluation of membership in the emotional community, 
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and Cicero was eager to prove himself and enhance his position. Next, Cicero must take 
on Verres himself.  
In Verrem 
We now turn to the speeches against Verres. In these speeches, as I mentioned 
above, Cicero demonstrates how Verres is a poor representation of the emotional 
community, and he takes the opportunity to re-negotiate their respective positions in the 
community, removing Verres and promoting himself.253 To do so, Cicero employs three 
strategies of ridicule. The first two techniques are more typical of speeches of personal 
attack: he makes jokes and uses invective to ridicule Verres, therefore putting his position 
in the emotional community in jeopardy. His other strategy, using speech acts to label 
Verres as risible, is less common but still effective. Cicero frequently calls Verres 
ridiculus, audax, and amens, which has the effect of labeling Verres as a non-compliant 
member of the emotional community, and one who should be mocked and ostracized. I 
will begin with the basic jokes and wordplay in both Actio Prima and Actio Secunda that, 
especially combined, make a mockery of Verres. 
Puns 
 Cicero indulges in some simple wordplay with several puns on Verres’ name. 
First, Cicero puns on the verr sound of Verres’ name, connecting it to the verb everrere, 
“to clean out” or “sweep away.” The joke suggests that verr- is a reflection of an essential 
part of his character, since it alludes to both his name and his greed. Cicero explains that 
                                                
253 May 1988: 38ff emphasizes the contrast between Cicero’s ethos and Verres’ ethos; while he defines 
“ethos” only broadly, as “character,” as in rhetoric, his use of the term seems comparable to my “emotional 
apparatus.” 
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one of Verres’ first tasks upon arriving in Sicily was to “sweep out” money from his 
citizens. What a clever omen (ex illo omine urbano) his name is, Cicero says, because as 
soon as he landed in Sicily, he began to clean out the province’s public and private 
coffers (ad everrendam provinciam, 2.2.19, 2.2.21). Equating Verres' name with this 
undesirable quality of his character demeans his ability to serve as a civic leader and his 
status in the emotional community.  
Cicero continues the pun on Verres’ name with the verb everrere later in the same 
speech. He bemoans the fact that Verres refused to grant permission to the Sicilians to 
celebrate the Marcelli, but dedicated “glorious festivals” (sacris epulisque, 2.2.52) to 
himself. Verres also arranged to profit off the festivals by arranging contracts, for which 
brazen impudence Cicero cannot contain himself. He marks his indignation with an epic 
hyperbole and tricolon: “time, voice, and lungs would fail me if I wanted to cry out how 
miserable and shameful it is” (nam me dies vox latera deficiant, si hoc nunc vociferari 
velim, quam miserum indignumque sit… 2.2.52). Verres’ actions are so outside the realm 
of acceptable practice that even an epic Cicero could not speak against them. He 
continues, with an address to Verres and an interjection to the festival (O Verria 
praeclara!), to rave about the indignity of the Verrine festival, using anaphora, 
alliteration, and another tricolon to underscore the shameful disgrace of Verres’ actions: 
quo accessisti, quaeso, quo non attuleris… etenim quam tu domum, quam urbem adisti, 
quod fanum denique…? (Where have you gone, I ask you, where you have not brought… 
and even what house, what city, what temple even… 2.2.52)  He concludes that the 
festivals are aptly named Verria, since they were founded in honor of Verres’ natural 
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predisposition to greed – the pun everrere rather than his name Verres (non ex nomine 
sed ex manibus naturaque tua constituta esse, 2.2.52).  
The literary devices that Cicero employs in this section call attention to Verres’ 
inappropriate actions, but the jokes, and in particular, Cicero’s casting of the joke, play an 
important part in renegotiating Verres’ position in the emotional community. By crediting 
the joke to the common talk of the town, Cicero expands the in-group of criticizers of 
Verres, making it easier for his audience to feel comfortable joining them – knowing, of 
course, that his “audience” was reading the circulated copy of the speech that was never 
delivered. With this further level of remove, Cicero knows that readers of his speech will 
know the outcome of Verres’ trial. His audience will already have heard of his success, 
so Actio Secunda is meant to secure those impressions: that Cicero is a representative of 
the community, that he is an impassioned, skilled, successful orator, and that Verres is 
not.  
 Elsewhere, Cicero uses the same tactic with a slightly different pun. This time, he 
credits the pun on Verres’ name with the word for a boar to Romans who were so 
resentful of their situation in Sicily under Verres that they had to joke about it (illi 
homines erant qui etiam ridiculi inveniebantur ex dolore, 2.1.121).254 Cicero highlights 
the emotional state (ex dolore) of the Romans who have been victims of Verres’ crimes 
and even calls them ridiculi. This word, as I will discuss below, has several shades of 
meaning, including that they are humorous, but also that they have been so downtrodden 
                                                
254 Apronius, Verres’ associate, has a name that might pun on another word for boar, aper, but Cicero 
does not take that bait.  
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as to be made fools of. The joke amongst these townspeople is a pun on Verres’ name 
with the word for boar: “it’s no wonder ius verrinum is so worthless” (negabant 
mirandum esse ius tam nequam esse verrinum, 2.1.121). Ius verrinum is a double pun: ius 
is both a sauce and the law, so ius verrinum is pork gravy, and ius Verrinum is Verres’ 
law. This double pun is clever, but it also connects Verres with the qualities of an 
unseemly boar. By distancing himself from the joke, Cicero disavows any corny humor255 
and yet also expands the number of Verres’ critics, letting his peers in the emotional 
community know that there is a significant group who would like to see him marginalized 
from the community.  
The pun continues with another joke, again attributed to the talk of the town: alii 
etiam frigidiores erant, sed quia stomachabantur ridiculi videbantur esse, cum 
Sacerdotem exsecrabantur qui verrem tam nequam reliquisset (“Others were even duller, 
but since they were boiling with rage, they appeared to be funny, cursing the priest 
(Sacerdos) for leaving behind such a worthless pig (Verres),” 2.1.121) The formula is the 
same, as Cicero notes the emotional state of the citizens (stomachabantur) and comments 
on the quality of the boar, or Verres. His goal in repeating these jokes is not to impress 
the audience with his own wit, but to make them understand that Cicero’s opinions of 
Verres’ worthlessness and unfairness (istius nequitiam et iniquitatem, 2.1.121) were 
widespread and common knowledge.  
                                                
255 This is, after all, one of the cheesy puns that Quintilian feels the need to defend in 6.3.3 and 6.3.55. 
Cicero’s humor was often piquant and useful in his speeches, but it also seems to have served as a marker 
of his status as novus homo. See Rabbie 2007. 
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 Cicero extends the attack on Verres to Verres’ henchmen, including Quintus 
Apronius, whom Cicero calls the princeps of Verres’ ministros ac satellites cupiditatum 
suarum (the chief of the aides and ministers of his desires, 2.3.21). The attacks against 
Apronius are particularly vicious;256 Cicero goes into detail describing a debauched party 
hosted by Apronius, where upstanding citizen Quintus Lollius (equite Romano spectato 
atque honesto, 2.3.61) felt demeaned. Since Apronius is a lower-ranking official, Cicero 
does not consider him to be an equal in the emotional community and therefore pursues 
him more aggressively. Apronius’ link with Verres, however, means that Verres is 
nonetheless damaged by Cicero’s attacks on Apronius; we are to assume that anything 
Apronius has done was sanctioned by Verres, or perhaps even participated in. In 
particular, Cicero uses shaming invective to condemn Apronius’ os impurum, or unclean 
mouth.257 The mouth stands in, through synecdoche, for all of Apronius’ (and therefore 
Verres’) bodily faults, including the drunkenness, gluttony, or inappropriate appearance 
mentioned above as loci of invective.  
 Cicero uses puns to mock Verres’ deficiencies in the emotional community. The 
verr- pun allows Cicero to connect Verres to unseemly creatures (boars) and habits 
(“sweeping out” treasuries, vel sim.). Given the Roman soft spot for puns, the 
phenomenon itself is not altogether surprising, despite Cicero’s supposed reluctance to 
mention the puns he claims are in common use. The repetition of the joke helps Cicero 
convince his audience that Verres really is boar-like or corrupt; as I show below, Cicero 
                                                
256 Cicero “points” to Apronius in the “courtroom” in 2.3.22; he harangues Apronius for the next dozen 
paragraphs (through 2.3.33). 
257 Corbeill 1996: 107ff, Richlin 1996: 99. 
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uses a similar technique to label Verres as an outcast of the emotional community. This 
collection of wordplay jokes represents relatively tame ridicule, but when combined with 
other types of ridicule, Cicero is able to achieve his goals. 
Invective 
In addition to the puns and jokes Cicero makes throughout the speeches, he uses 
the traditional loci of invective to disparage Verres. In this section, I provide an overview 
of the invective against Verres, according to the four categories of emotional community 
membership based on invective (family background, personal qualities, civil conduct, and 
military conduct).258  
Little is known, outside of Cicero’s campaign against him, of Verres’ family 
background. Cicero does not attack Verres for being connected to slaves or other persons 
of low origin, and surely he would have taken advantage of this opportunity if it had 
existed.259 Verres’ father, the elder Verres, is mentioned in passing. He is portrayed as the 
sensible inverse of Verres, who begs his son to be more careful in his behavior in Sicily 
(2.4.41) and who, after his son did not heed his warnings and was in court for his crimes, 
fruitlessly begged the senators to spare his son (2.2.95). The son Verres is characterized 
as disrespectful of his father; Cicero claims that the younger Verres never had any 
measure of piety or courtesy for his father (neque pietatis neque humanitatis rationem 
habuisset umquam, 2.2.97) and that he neglected to listen to the advice or authority of his 
                                                
258 As I have mentioned earlier, the In Verrem is not a traditional case of invective, in that the primary 
purpose of the speech is not a personal attack on Verres; it is rather a judicial speech in the prosecution of 
Verres on crimes of extortion. Although, as part of that prosecution, Cicero certainly derides Verres. 
259 Cowles 1917: 3. 
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father (neque in eo quod monebatur auctoritatem patris, 2.2.97). So, while Cicero is quiet 
on Verres’ family hertage, he exploits the relationship Verres had with his father. In this 
way, Verres’ family is symptomatic of his personal qualities, rather than his family 
background. Similarly, Cicero uses prosopopoeia to have Verres’ father attack Verres for 
his failures to meet the standards for personal conduct in the emotional community. 
Throughout the campaign, Cicero attacks Verres for his personal comportment, 
including his dress, his drunkenness and behavior at elaborate parties, his sexual 
escapades, his crudeness, and his body, and usually more than one of these at once. 
Verres’ dress and conduct at public events and his behavior at private parties directly 
relate to his ability to serve as governor of Sicily. For example, Cicero pairs Verres' bold 
and vulgar display of stolen treasure with his choice of inappropriately feminine Greek 
clothing (a tunica pulla and pallium), dwelling especially on the pallium (2.4.54- 5).260 
Cicero exclaims that Verres’ choice of pallium is so singular that it has become infamous 
among all good men in Syracuse. Cicero interjects o tempora, o mores! to punctuate his 
outrage at a leading Roman official, and therefore a member of the emotional 
community, appearing in feminine foreign attire. For Cicero, Verres’ neglect of the 
proper dress for a Roman governor is a sign that he is also neglecting other duties.261 
In the next speech, another episode in which Verres sports a tunica pulla and 
pallium gives Cicero more opportunity for criticism and ridicule in multiple aspects of 
Verres’ life. This time, Verres not only wears Greek clothes unfitting a Roman governor, 
                                                
260 Heskel 2001: 133ff. 
261 See Heskel 2001 for a full discussion of Cicero’s opinions on intersection of dress and comportment. 
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but he also spends time with a mistress on the beach, instead of meeting with other 
government officials (2.5.32). In his revelry, he bared his chest to partygoers, displaying 
the scars on his chest from bites of women, the traces of lust and wickedness (vestigia 
libidinis atque nequitiae), according to Cicero. This incident is an example of Verres' 
worst traits, including his thefts, his rapacity, his desire, his cruelty, his haughtiness, his 
evilness, and his brazenness (furta, rapinas, cupiditatem, crudelitatem, superbiam, scelus, 
audaciam, 2.5.32). Cicero suggests that even Verres’ service as a general cannot possibly 
overcome these negative traits, as Hortensius might have tried to argue. 
These constellations of inappropriate behavior allow Cicero to use prosopopoeia 
to imagine Verres' recently deceased father chastising him for setting a bad example for 
his son, for his plunder of his territory, his betrayal of the people of Sicily and of Rome in 
general: 
tu in provincia tam splendida, tu apud socios fidelissimos, civis Romanos 
honestissimos, in metu periculoque provinciae dies continuos compluris in 
litore conviviisque iacuisti, te per eos dies nemo tuae domi convenire, 
nemo in foro videre potuit, tu sociorum atque amicorum ad ea convivia 
matres familias adhibuisti, tu inter eius modi mulieres praetextatum tuum 
filium, nepotem meum, conlocavisti, ut aetati maxime lubricae atque 
incertae exempla nequitiae parentis vita praeberet, tu praetor in provincia 
cum tunica pallioque purpureo visus es, tu propter amorem libidinemque 
tuam imperium navium legato populi Romani ademisti, Syracusano 
tradidisti, tui milites in provincia Sicilia frugibus frumentoque caruerunt, 
tua luxurie atque avaritia classis populi Romani a praedonibus capta et 
incensa est; post Syracusas conditas quem in portum numquam hostis 
accesserat, in eo te praetore primum piratae navigaverunt; neque haec tot 
et tanta dedecora dissimulatione tua neque oblivione hominum ac 
taciturnitate tegere voluisti, sed etiam navium praefectos sine ullacausa de 
complexu parentum suorum, hospitum tuorum, ad mortem cruciatumque 
rapuisti, neque te in parentum luctu atque lacrimis mei nominis 
commemoratio mitigavit; tibi hominum innocentium sanguis non modo 
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voluptati sedetiam quaestui fuit!' haec si tibi tuus parens diceret, posses ab 
eo veniam petere, posses ut tibi ignosceret postulare?  2.5.137- 138 
 
"You, in that splendid province, among our most faithful allies and the 
most honorable Roman citizens, in a time of fear and danger for the 
province, you lay for many full days together in banquets on the beach! 
No one could find you at home; no one could see you in the forum. You 
hosted the mothers of associates and friends at these parties; among 
women of that sort, you brought your young son -- my grandson -- so that 
his father's life would serve as an example of iniquity, when he is at a 
particularly susceptible age. You, while praetor in your province, were 
seen in a tunic and a purple cloak. You, on account of your love and lust, 
you took up the command of the navy from a representative of the Roman 
people and gave it to a Syracusan. Your soldiers in Sicily needed goods 
and grain. Because of your luxury and greed, one of the Roman people's 
fleets was captured and burned by pirates. In your praetorship, for the first 
time since the city of Syracuse was founded, pirates sailed into the harbor, 
where no enemy had ever entered. You did not wish to cover these many 
disgraces with any pretending on your part, or with the blind eye or silence 
on the part of others, but you took those overseers of ships, without any 
cause, from the embrace of their families, who are your hosts, and sent 
them to death and torture. And in the parents' grief and tears, no mention 
of my name softened you. The blood of innocent men was not only a 
delight but also an advantage to you!" If your father were to say these 
things to you, would you ask for his pardon? Would you be able to ask 
him to overlook these things? 
 
This extended public scolding is uncomfortable to imagine, and was surely designed to 
humiliate Verres. Later in his career, Cicero delighted in the comedic effect of 
prosopopoeiae, using characteristics from senex characters in Roman comedy to ridicule 
Clodius and his sister Clodia.262 Cicero’s imagined elder Verres addresses his son’s 
personal characteristics: attention to revelry and lust, rather than the government or his 
office. He provides a bad example for his impressionable son, with a particular contrast in 
his foreign dress and his son’s age-appropriate attire. Every action that Cicero’s elder 
                                                
262 See Geffcken 1973: 17ff on the prosopopoeiae in the Pro Caelio. 
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Verres mentions is an aspect of the domi emotional community that Verres has violated. 
Cicero continues, through the character of the elder Verres, to point out where Verres 
fails to live up to the emotional apparatus: he plundered the people who were supposed to 
be in his care, and he betrayed the citizens of Rome. His actions were unacceptable for a 
representative of the domi emotional community.  
So far, we have already seen that Cicero claimed that Verres’ personal qualities 
caused him to be an inferior civic and military leader. His predisposition for revelry and 
plunder regularly distracted him from his duties as governor, according to Cicero. 
Moreover, the main reasons for Verres’ trial are his crimes of extortion and corruption, or 
his failures as a civic and military leader. Cicero goes into some detail as he outlines 
Verres’ progress on campaign through Greece, stopping to plunder temples along the way 
(such as Delos, 2.1.48) and to party, of course (2.1.49). Cicero accuses Verres, in a 
combination of both direct address and praeteritio, of stealing the most beautiful statues 
from Greece and setting them up in poor taste in his own house (2.1.49- 51). Cicero 
speaks disparagingly, as if he cannot quite believe what he is not quite saying, while at 
the same time implying that everyone already knows what he is saying. 
Cicero is no less sparing in his ridicule of Verres’ military career. At one winter 
camp, Cicero jokes, it was so cold and stormy that it was difficult to see Verres – out of 
bed (ut eum non facile non modo extra tectum, sed ne extra lectum quidem quisquam 
viderit, 2.5.26). Verres’ military camps were swathed in linen and luxury, full of banquets 
and women (2.5.27- 30), yet Hortensius, to Cicero’s purported disbelief, defended Verres 
as a military man (hunc tu igitur imperatorem esse defendis, Hortensi? 2.5.32). With 
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another clever joke, Cicero concedes that Verres had been quite attentive to his “post,” 
where he had “suffered many losses:” the gambling table (aleatoris Placentini castra 
commemorabuntur, in quibus cum frequens fuisset tamen aere dirutus est, 2.5.33). Once 
again, Cicero has highlighted with ridicule the ways in which Verres fails to live up to the 
standards of the emotional community. 
I have described how Cicero’s presentation of Verres’ faults corresponds to the 
common points of invective, including family background, personal qualities, civil 
conduct, and military leadership. While these accusations against Verres stray from the 
main charges against him, for crimes of extortion, they nevertheless serve to characterize 
Verres on the whole. Cicero has used ridicule to make it easier for the jury to believe that 
Verres would commit such acts, and that he deserves to be punished for his myriad 
crimes.263 Cicero includes these morsels of information in order to characterize Verres as 
so completely unlike the ideal member of the emotional community.264  
Ridiculus 
 This image of the corrupt Verres, put forward by Cicero through his jokes and 
invective, is compounded again by Cicero’s repeated use of the terms ridiculus, audax, 
and amens. With each repetition, Cicero tells his audience that Verres is laughably 
outside the boundaries of the emotional community’s apparatus. This tactic uses 
illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts to simply declare Verres ridiculous. As we 
have seen, ridicule has the effect of isolating an individual from his emotional 
                                                
263 See Riggsby 1997 on (purported) truth in Roman law courts. 
264 cf. Tempest 2007: 23f on the digressio, as she argues for it, in the Actio Secunda. 
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community, so in labeling Verres as ridiculus, Cicero is in essence removing him from 
the emotional community and promoting himself at the same time. 
 The notion of “speech acts” was first presented in J. L. Austin’s How to Do 
Things with Words. According to Austin, and his taxonomy of locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary speech acts, a speech act is an utterance that has a performative 
function, such as congratulating, declaring, promising, or warning.265 A locutionary 
speech act is the linguistic performance of the utterance: the phonetic aspects of the 
utterance itself. An illocutionary speech act further incorporates the pragmatic functions 
of the locutionary act: for example, “I now pronounce you man and wife” is an utterance 
that also takes an action of marrying two people. A perlocutionary speech act has further 
consequences in the speaker or listener. For instance, a warning “Stay away from there!” 
has the illocutionary effect of warning the listener and the perlocutionary effect of 
keeping the listener safe from danger.  
John Searle further developed Austin’s ideas by introducing the concept of the 
indirect speech act, which conveys more of the pragmatic aspects of interlocutors who 
share knowledge relevant to the conversation.266 His classic example is the following 
exchange: 
 Speaker X: “We should leave for the show or else we’ll be late.” 
 Speaker Y: “I am not ready yet.”267 
                                                
265 Austin 1962: 108ff. 
266 Searle’s first work on speech acts was his 1969 book Speech Acts; he has since written numerous 
articles and books refining his approach. 
267 1969: 178. 
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While Speaker Y’s locutionary act does not directly respond to Speaker X’s locutionary 
act, both speakers understand the perlocutionary force of Speaker Y’s comment, that they 
cannot yet leave for the show, since Speaker Y is not ready to go. This indirect response 
makes Speaker Y’s utterance an indirect speech act. As Searle has explained, indirect 
speech acts are usually concerned with the perlocutionary force of the speech acts. 
 In terms of ridicule in Cicero’s speeches then, Cicero’s disparaging comments 
about Verres can be considered a series of indirect speech acts with the perlocutionary 
force of removing Verres from the approved circles of the emotional community. In the 
speeches against Verres, though, Cicero takes an unusual step of using illocutionary 
speech acts to label Verres as ridiculous.268 
 In the speeches against Verres, including the In Q. Caecilium Divinatio and both 
Actiones of the In Verrem, Cicero uses the word ridiculus twelve times, plus variants of 
the verb ridere five times. To provide some contrast, Cicero uses ridiculus only once in 
the Philippics, and never in the In Pisonem. Cicero uses these words far more often in the 
Verrines than in any other of his speeches. By repeating the word ridiculus in reference to 
Verres, Cicero is performing the illocutionary speech act of labeling Verres as ridiculous. 
As we have seen, ridicule provides a social function of weakening the cohesion of a 
                                                
268 Catherine Steel has argued for a similar technique in the post-exile speeches (2007: 105- 127). She has 
shown that Cicero names his target – Verres (named 4.9% of sentences in the Verrines), Catilina (11.4%), 
Antonius (10.2%) – when the target himself is the subject of invective. But when Cicero is speaking against 
a broader social trend – the corruption of the emotional community at large, essentially – as he was in most 
of his post-exile speeches, Cicero does not name a specific target, even though Clodius is frequently a focus 
of invective in these speeches (named in just 0.9% of sentences in the five speeches in which he receives 
the most invective). By naming his targets over and over again, Cicero is driving home the shame and 
ignominia of his invective. In terms of speech acts, Steel has argued that Cicero uses a perlocutionary 
speech act to connect his target’s name with the shame he feels they deserve.  
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larger community. This use of the word ridiculus gives Cicero a method for labeling 
Verres as a deviant from the approved behavior of the emotional apparatus of the 
community. 
Cicero does not use this technique of perlocutionary speech acts in other 
campaigns. Of the 88 uses of the term ridicul- in Cicero’s works, almost half are in his 
philosophical works, and only one other speech (Pro Quinctio) even uses the rid- words 
more than once. I suggest that this perlocutionary speech act technique is therefore rather 
a simple or inelegant tool for attacking one’s opponent. Cicero, as an ascendant member 
of the Roman senatorial class, did not have many opportunities to establish himself. By 
using perlocutionary speech acts in this way, Cicero is demonstrating his knowledge of 
the emotional community and its emotional apparatus. If that is the case, then, Cicero 
needs to use this technique less and less frequently as he becomes a more important 
figure in Roman oratory and in the Roman senatorial elite’s emotional community. 
 A simple use of the indirect speech act occurs when Cicero labels Verres’ 
behavior as deviant: “It’s ridiculous that I’m talking about Verres in the same breath as 
Piso Frugi” (Ridiculum est me nunc de Verre dicere, cum de Pisone Frugi dixerim… 
2.4.57). Cicero has just established the scrupulousness of Piso Frugi, son of Lucius Piso, 
the founder of the extortion law.269 The Piso men are models of their responsibility and 
behavior as leaders and members of the emotional community; Verres’ corruption is so 
far removed from them that it is offensively absurd to even mention Verres in the same 
                                                
269 On Piso’s lex de rebus repetundis, see Richardson 1987. See also Cic. Brut. 27; In Verr. 2.3.195, 
2.4.56-7; de Off. 2.75. 
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sentence as either Piso. Cicero’s use of the word ridiculus is the illocutionary speech act 
declaring that comparing the behavior of Verres and Piso is ridiculous, but its 
perlocutionary force is that Verres’ behavior is ridiculous in its irregularity. As Cicero 
repeats these claims, particularly combined with the other rhetorical strategies in the 
Verrine orations, he performs the perlocutionary, indirect speech act of labeling Verres as 
ridiculus, or a deviant who should be removed from the emotional community.  
 A combination of these speech acts demonstrates the effect of Cicero’s strategy. 
The outburst O rem ridiculam! (2.4.146) interrupts Cicero’s discussion of the reluctance 
of the Syracusans to perform a laudatio in Verres’ honor despite his insistence upon it. 
Cicero’s comment indicates that the entire situation is irregular – that is, not within the 
typical standards of behavior as defined by the emotional community. This speech act 
labels Verres as an outlier.  
But in this case, Cicero goes further to identify the in-group that is excluding 
Verres because of this deviant behavior. Cicero explains that, as he was told by the 
Syracusans themselves (me docent, 2.4.144), they did not wish to produce a laudatio for 
Verres, as was customly done for leaders. Instead, the Syracusans conspired to produce a 
sham laudatio that instead generated derision and pointed out Verres’ corruption (potius 
irrisionem esse illam, quae commonefaceret istius turpem calamitosamque praeturam, 
2.4.144).  
Not only does Cicero perform the illocutionary act of labeling Verres’ actions as 
ridiculus, but he also points out that the group of people who feel that way includes all of 
the leading Syracusans, who have personal knowledge of the situation and who refused to 
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speak on Verres’ behalf. Cicero is therefore expanding the size of the group of people 
who condemn and disparage Verres. Demonstrating the expanse of the in-group makes it 
safer for other members of his emotional community to turn their backs on him and join 
in the derision: they would be conforming to the standards of their community by 
excluding the man who has violated those same standards. 
 Putting the ridiculus-label in the mouths of others is therefore a clever tactic in 
generating support for Cicero’s case. This strategy is similar to the puns on Verres’ name 
and the association Cicero makes between the pun and Verres’ character. If many people 
see the connection, Cicero implies, then that makes it even more powerful and true. At 
2.2.18, for example, Cicero combines the opportunity to pun on Verres’ name (with 
everrere) and give credit to others (homines) who can label Verres with the thoroughly 
funny (perridicule) and appropriate (augurabantur) pun: O praeclare coniectum a vulgo 
in illam provinciam omen communis famae atque sermonis, cum ex nomine istius quid 
iste in provincia facturus esset perridicule homines augurabantur! (What an amazing 
prediction was the common rumor and conversation for that poor province, when from 
that man’s name they hilariously divined the way that he would behave in their province! 
2.2.18)  
 Cicero is careful to label as ridiculus the behavior that he claims is extraordinary 
in its corruption. Ridiculus is the term for unusual behavior or actions outside of the 
norm, and ones that need to be condemned for this deviance. For example, when Verres 
claims not to have kept copies of his financial records: “But this is a ridiculous novelty: 
he has told me, when I demanded his records from him, that he maintained them up until 
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Terentius and Cassius were consuls, but that he stopped after that” (Hoc vero novum et 
ridiculum est quod hic nobis respondit cum ab eo tabulas postularemus, usque ad M. 
Terentium et C. Cassium consules confecisse, postea destitisse, 2.1.60). Cicero does not 
believe that Verres is being truthful, and he uses the terms ridiculus and novus to label 
Verres’ behavior as irregular and suspicious. This is not the traditional way of behaving – 
the way that is endorsed by the emotional community – and Cicero wants to demonstrate 
Verres’ deviance. The situation is similar at 2.1.117, as Cicero protests indignantly to 
Verres’ claims about an inheritance. Iam hoc ridiculum est? (“What is this 
ridiculousness?”) Cicero exclaims, continuing with Quid ait? (“Wait, what is he 
saying?”) and a series of rhetorical questions, as if he cannot fully comprehend Verres’ 
accounts and his corruption. 
Cicero uses the ridiculus-label to indicate that Verres is acting outside the 
guidelines of the emotional community. In the passage below, Cicero returns to another 
of Verres’ crimes in Sicily, and introduces the episode by calling attention to two 
negative qualities of Verres. Cicero drives home the point by bringing up, again, the 
festival in honor of Verres; this time calling it turpia ac ridicula: 
Ac videte hominis impudentiam atque arrogantiam, iudices, qui non solum 
Verria haec turpia ac ridicula ex Heraclii pecunia constituerit, verum etiam 
Marcellia tolli imperarit, ut ei sacra facerent quotannis cuius opera 
omnium annorum sacra deosque patrios amiserant, eius autem familiae 
dies festos tollerent per quam ceteros quoque festos dies recuperarant. 2.4.151270 
                                                
270 See also 2.2.52, where Cicero again decries the Verrine festival and makes the pun on Verres and 
verres: Nam me dies, vox, latera deficiant, si hoc nunc vociferari velim, quam miserum indignumque sit 
istius nomine apud eos diem festum esse, qui se istius opera funditus extinctos esse arbitrantur. O Verria 
praeclara! quo, quaeso, accessisti, quo non attuleris istum tecum diem? Etenim quam tu domum, quam 
urbem adisti, quod fanum denique, quod non eversum atque extersum reliqueris? Quare appellentur sane 
ista Verria, quae non ex nomine, sed ex manibus naturaque tua constituta esse videantur. 
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But consider the impudence and arrogance of this man, judges. He not 
only established the shameful and ridiculous Verres Festival, using money 
from Heraclius, but he also actually ordered that the Marcellus Festival be 
canceled. The Sicilians were supposed to honor with sacred objects, every 
year, the very man who destroyed their sacred objects of all previous years 
and deprived them of their ancestral gods, to whom they owe the recovery 
of that festival and many others. 
 
The festivals are shameful and ridiculous because they are hosted by orders of an 
impudent and arrogant man, Verres, and they appear to make a mockery of the Sicilian 
religious traditions because they do not take into account their long-standing religious 
traditions, like the festival for Marcellus.  
With this illocutionary speech act, Cicero connects Verres both to the label 
ridiculus and to other negative qualities, impudentia, arrogantia, and turpia. These 
negative qualities are the opposite of what would be expected of a member of the 
emotional community, so by closely associating Verres with such terms, Cicero again 
makes Verres an object of ridicule and drives him from the center of the emotional 
community. 
 The other uses of the term ridiculus in the Verrine orations are on similar tracks: 
they all perform a speech act of labeling – identifying Verres as someone who should be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
For daylight, my voice, my lungs would fail me, if I wanted to cry out now about how miserable and 
unbecoming it is that those people have a holiday in that man’s name – those people who think that they 
were completely destroyed by that man’s deeds. O spendid Verrine Festival! Where, I beg you, have you 
gone that you have not brought that day along with you? Or, really, what house, what city, what temple 
even have you ever approached that you did not leave turned out and wiped out? So let them appropriately 
call it the Verrine Festival, and let it seem to be named after your grabbing hands and your nature, not after 
your name. 
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the object of ridicule – and the perlocutionary speech act of actually beginning to remove 
Verres from the emotional community.271 
Audax atque Amens 
 Verres is also labeled as audax and amens for his behavior that breached the 
emotional apparatus of the community. The adjective audax and its cognate noun 
audacia suggest brazen, reckless, or presumptuous behavior. These words are used to 
comment on Verres’ boldness in conduct, because his actions imply an overestimation of 
himself or an underestimation of the importance of the rules of the emotional community. 
In the same way that we saw superbia denote a miscalculation of one’s status in the 
militiae emotional community, audax is a label for a member of the domi emotional 
community who has overstepped his position in the community.272 Cicero frequently 
pairs audax with amens (“insane” or “out of one’s mind”), suggesting that acting out of 
accordance with the emotional apparatus of the domi community is so preposterous that 
Verres must be crazy. 
 Cicero describes Verres as audacissimus atque amentissimus (“most audacious 
and most senseless,” 1.1.7) in the opening paragraphs of the first speech against him, 
                                                
271 Cicero does the same work when he labels Verres as superbus at 2.1.122, 2.2.9, 2.2.192, 2.3.5, 2.4.45, 
2.4.89, and 2.5.32. As we have seen above, superbia is the social mistake of over-estimating one’s position 
relative to others in the community. To a Sicilian audience, or to the Roman senatorial elite, the term 
superbus would connect him with the tradition of the (Greek) tyrant. For superbia or arrogantia and 
tyranny, see Rep. 2.46, Sal. Cat. 6.7, Livy 9.46.8, 28.42.22. See also Dunkle 1967, Erskine 1991, Vasaly 
1993 on superbia, Greek tyrants, and republican political invective. 
272 References to Verres as audax or to his audacia: Div. Caec. 6.6; In Ver. 1.1.5, 1.1.7, 1.1.36, 1.1.52, 
2.1.11, 2.1.15, 2.1.20, 2.1.36, 2.1.40, 2.1.87, 2.1.105, 2.1.128, 2.1.129, 2.1.154, 2.2.48, 2.2.71, 2.2.74, 
2.2.134, 2.2.189, 2.3.5, 2.3.7, 2.3.22, 2.3.24, 2.3.64, 2.3.81, 2.3.83, 2.3.122, 2.3.140, 2.3.141, 2.3.152, 
2.3.155, 2.3.166, 2.3.169, 2.3.176, 2.3.177, 2.3.206, 2.3.208, 2.3.213, 2.4.7, 2.4.73, 2.4.78, twice). 
References to Verres as audax atque amens: In Ver. 1.1.7, 2.1.1, 2.1.6, 2.1.54, 2.1.105, 2.1.142, 2.2.104, 
2.3.40, 2.3.126, 2.4.44, 2.4.99. 
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establishing this characterization of him early in the campaign. Cicero directly contrasted 
Verres with the “good men” (omnibus bonis, 1.1.8) who are judging him in the trial, and 
whom Verres assumes he can bribe. This distinction between the audax atque amens 
Verres and the boni judges of Verres gives Cicero’s audience an easy path to follow in 
thinking of Verres as an aberration, and someone to shun out of the community. 
 The audience will get regular reminders of Verres as audax, or sometimes both 
audax and amens. Cicero begins the Actio Secunda with a reminder of how his audience 
should think about Verres’ personal emotional apparatus (tam audacem, tam amentem, 
tam impudentem; “so audacious, so crazy, so impudent,” 2.1.1) and punctuates the rest of 
the speeches with these labels. He does not allow his audience to forget that Verres is 
audax atque amens, and provides examples of this audacia atque amentia throughout the 
speeches. 
 This framework for considering Verres predisposes the audience to think about 
his aberrant, presumptuous behavior. Cicero constructs this characterization of Verres so 
that his audience can more easily determine that his behavior is not in keeping with the 
community’s emotional apparatus, and so that they can therefore exclude him from the 
emotional community. The terms audax atque amens, however, are not precisely ridicule 
in that they do not invite derisive laughter, but they do indicate that Verres has stepped 
beyond the proper boundaries of his place in the emotional community. This contributes 
to the overall picture of Verres, combining with the ridicule described above and the label 
ridiculus. The audax atque amens Verres is one whose emotional apparatus is not the 
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same as that of the domi emotional community, so Verres himself no longer belongs in 
the emotional community.  
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have defined the membership of the domi emotional community 
and described its emotional apparatus. Using Cicero’s prosecution against Verres, I have 
shown that the case provided Cicero with an opportunity to prove his membership in the 
community by arguing for Verres’ unworthiness. Cicero’s methods of ridicule included 
jokes and wordplay, invective, and speech acts; his attack against Verres was successful, 
as Verres fled from the emotional community, and Cicero gained instant notoreity and 
advancement in the community. 
 This measure of success – that Cicero used ridicule and emotions in his 
community to win the case against Verres and gain personal advancement – reflects the 
rather individual focus of the domi emotional community. Individual members perform 
their membership in the community by giving speeches in court, with the hope that their 
success in court would also entail advancement in their position in the community. This 
individual game is reflected in the discourse about the emotional community: Cicero 
describes how he is closer to the ideal member of the community than Caecilius is, and 
he attack Verres for being such a poor representative of the domi emotional apparatus. 
Cicero’s own speeches promote his own interests in this community, unlike the Roman 
historians, whose depictions of the militiae emotional community played into broader 




 This dissertation has focused on the ways that ridicule and emotion reveal the 
values, rules, and membership of Roman communities. Ridicule and emotion are both, at 
their core, evaluations or judgments of value. Ridicule in turn triggers a chain reaction of 
emotions that varies based on the community’s rules of membership and the assessments 
of relative positions of power, and community members had to navigate these 
negotiations in order to maintain the structure of their community and their own personal 
positions. 
 Roman authors used emotion and ridicule in order to present the narrative that fit 
their own needs. Some, like the historians who described ridicule in the militiae 
emotional community, relied on ridicule’s emotional toll on a community: Livy used it 
for his victory narrative, Vergil for his leading men, and Tacitus for both. These authors 
present the militiae emotional community experiencing ridicule, and recovering from it, 
together, perhaps following the example of leaders like Aeneas or Germanicus. On the 
other hand, members of the domi emotional community used ridicule for personal 
advancement in the community. As we saw in the discussion of Cicero’s In Verrem, his 
argument in the Verrines can be reduced to his analyses of Caecilius and Verres as poor 
representatives of the emotional apparatus. As a result of these arguments, Cicero 
advances in the community, and Verres is removed. In each of these scenarios, we are 
able to understand the values and motivations of the emotional community by the 
reactions the members have when one of those valued items is harmed or diminished by 
ridicule. 
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 There is much more to consider. To my knowledge, “emotional communities” 
have not been the subject of another work in Greek or Roman literature; there are, 
however, a growing number of monographs on emotions.273 The benefit of studying the 
emotional apparatus of a community is to understand the implications and interactions of 
emotions within that specific community.   
To that end, future study of individual emotional communities should prove 
beneficial to our understanding of the engagement between ancient Romans, their values 
and emotions, and their communities. Some literary genres that are most traditionally 
associated with ridicule have been left out of this study completely. In future projects, I 
would be interested to pay attention to some genres that are traditionally associated with 
ridicule, such as the satires of Horace or Juvenal. The studies of ridicule and the power of 
persuasion in satire274 could be supplemented by a study of the emotions and values 
privileged most by Horace or by Juvenal, and an identification of who the members of 
that particular emotional community might be.275 Further, work centered on the 
development of emotions in Catullus could complement, for example, Krostenko’s study 
of community and the language of social performance.276  
Smaller or more intimate emotional communities, especially featuring women or 
other marginalized members of society, might be found in Roman comedy or novel. 
                                                
273 These include Cairns 1993 on aidos; Braund and Gill 1997 on “the passions in Roman thought and 
literature;” Harris 2001 on rage; Kaster 2005 on verecundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia, and fastidium; 
Konstan 2006 on “the emotions of the ancient Greeks;” Fulkerson 2014 on regret.   
274 e.g. Bloom and Bloom 1981. 
275 Or, if the emotional community has a population of one, i.e. Juvenal’s persona.  
276 Krostenko 2001. 
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Attention to multiple communities as represented by a single author could shed insight 
into the finer distinctions between communities: for example, we might consider Cicero’s 
letter in light of his public speeches. Do the letters navigate a different kind of ridicule 
process, since they are addressed from Cicero to an individual, or does Cicero’s intended 
publication of the letters mean that his ridicule works the same way in both genres? For 
that matter, do early Christians use ridicule in their letters and treatises in the same ways 
as Cicero, despite huge differences in their emotional communities? 
This approach to understanding the emotions and communities of ancient Rome is 
very flexible, since each analysis begins with an understanding of the specific members 
and their emotional apparatus. In this consideration of ridicule and emotion, I hope to 
have identified a way of looking at texts that helps us to understand how Romans felt 
about themselves, each other, and the world around them, and how they have 





Alexander, Michael C. 1976. “Hortensius’ Speech in Defense of Verres.” Phoenix 30.1. 
46- 53. 
Alston, Richard. 1999. “The Ties that Bind: Soldiers and Societies” in The Roman Army 
as a Community, eds. Goldsworthy, Adrian and Ian Haynes. JRA Suppl. 34. 
Portsmouth, RI.  
Arena, Valentina. 2007. “Roman Oratorical Invective” in A Companion to Roman 
Rhetoric, eds. Dominik, William and Jon Hall. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Attardo, Salvatore and Victor. Raskin. 1991. “Script theory revis(it)ed: joke similarity 
and joke representation Model.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor 
Research 4:3-4. 293- 347. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. New York: Harvard University Press. 
Bailey, Joanne. 2012. Parenting in England 1760- 1830: Emotion, Identity, and 
Generation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baraz, Yelena. 2008. “From Vice to Virtue: the Denigration and Rehabilitation of 
Superbia in Ancient Rome” in KAKOS: Badness in Classical Antiquity, eds. 
Rosen, Ralph M. and Ineke Sluiter. London: Brill. 365- 97.  
---. 2013. “Modeling Roman Pride” in Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and 
Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture, eds. Chaniotis, Angelos and Pierre 
Ducrey. Verlag. 215- 235.  
Barton, Carlin. 2002. “Being in the Eyes: Shame and Sight in Ancient Rome” in The 
Roman Gaze: Vision, Power and the Body, ed. Fredrick, David. Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore.  
Baxter, Robert T. S. 1972. “Virgil’s Influence on Tacitus in Books 1 and 2 of the 
Annals.” CP 67.4. 246- 269.  
Beard, Mary. 2014. Laughter in Ancient Rome: on Joking, Tickling, and Cracking Up. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Bergson, Henri. 1900. Le Rire: Essai sur la Signification du Comique. Paris: Félix Alcan. 
Bews, Janet. 1973. “Vergil, Tacitus, Tiberius and Germanicus.” PVS 12. 35- 48. 
Billig, Michael. 2005. Laughter and Ridicule: Toward a Social Critique of Humor. 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Bloom, Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom. 1979. Satire’s Persuasive Voice. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
 192 
Braund, Susana. 1998. “Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, 
Seneca, Pliny” in The Propaganda of Power: the Role of Panegyric in Late 
Antiquity, ed. Mary Whitby. Leiden: Brill. 53- 76. 
Braund, Susana and Christopher Gill, eds. 1997. The Passions in Roman Thought and 
Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brunt, Peter A. 1965. “Amicitia in the Late Roman Republic.” Proceedings of the 
Cambridge Philological Society 11. 1- 20.  
Buss, Arnold H. 1980. Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety. San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman and Company. 
Cairns, Douglas L. 1993. Aidos: the Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in 
Ancient Greek Literature. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cairns, Francis. 1989. Virgil’s Augustan Epic. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Clarke, John. 2007. Looking at Laughter: Humor Power, and Transgression in Roman 
Visual Culture, 100 BC – AD 250. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Clark, Jessica H. 2014. Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman Republic. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Craig, Christopher. 1985. “Dilemma in Cicero’s Divinatio in Caecilium.” AJP 106.4. 
442- 446. 
---. 2007. “Self-Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s First Catilinarian 
Oration.” AJP Vol. 128, No. 3. 335- 339. 
Cooley, Alison. 2012. “Commemorating the War Dead of the Roman World” in Cultures 
of Commemoration: War Memorials, Ancient and Modern: Proceedings of the 
British Academy 160, eds. Rhodes, P. J., Polly Low, and Graham Oliver. . 61- 86. 
Corbeill, Anthony. 1996. Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman 
Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Davidson, Donald. 1976. “Hume’s Cognitive Theory of Pride.” The Journal of 
Philosophy 73.19. 744- 757.  
Davies, J. C. 1969. “Cicero, Pro Quinctio 77.” Latomus 28.1. 156- 157. 
Dixon, Thomas. 2003. From Passions to Emotions: the Creation of a Secular 
Psychological Category. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dunkle, J. Roger. 1967. “The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late 
Republic.” TAPA 98. 151- 171. 
Edelmaier, Wilfried. 1964. Tacitus und die Gegner Roms. Diss. Ruprecht-Karl-
Universität. Heidelberg.  
Eisenhut, Werner. 1973. Virtus Romana: Ihre Stellung im römischen Wertsystem. 
München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. 
 193 
Ekman, Paul. 2003. Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve 
Communication and Emotional Life. New York: Times Books. 
Ekman, Paul and Wallace. V. Friesen. 1971. “Constants across cultures in the face and 
emotion.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 17. 124- 129. 
Erskine, Andrew. 1991. “Hellenistic Monarchy and Roman Political Invective.” CQ 41.1. 
106- 120. 
Fay, Edwin W. 1917. “Sobriquet and Stem.” AJP 38. 82- 87. 
Forsyth, William. 1880. Hortensius: a History of Advocates, Ancient and Modern. Jersey 
City, NJ: Frederick D. Linn & Company. 
Fortenbaugh, W. W. 2003. Aristotle on Emotion: a Contribution to Philosophical 
Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics. Second edition. London: 
Duckworth. 
Foucher, Antoine. 2000. Historia Proxima Poetis: l’Influence de la Poésie Épique sur le 
Style des Historiens Latins, de Salluste à Ammiens Marcellin. Brussels: Latomus. 
Fowler, W. Warde. 1920. Roman Essays and Interpretations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Frazel, Thomas, D. 2006. “The Composition and Circulation of Cicero’s In Verrem.” CQ 
54.1. 128- 142. 
Fulkerson, Laurel. 2013. No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Furneaux, Henry. 1896. Annales I-VI. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Galinsky, G. Karl. 1988. “The Anger of Aeneas.” AJP 109: 3. 321- 348. 
---. 1994. “How to be Philosophical about the End of the ‘Aeneid.’” Illinois Classical 
Studies 19. 191- 201. 
Garland, Robert. 1994. “The Mockery of the Deformed and Disabled in Graeco-Roman 
Culture,” in Laughter down the Centuries, vol. 1, ed. Jäkel, Siegfried and Asko 
Timonen. Turku: Turun Yliopisto. 71- 84. 
Geffcken, Katherine A. 1973. Comedy in the Pro Caelio. Leiden: Brill. 
Gill, Christopher. 2004. “Character and Passion in Vergil’s Aeneid.” PVS 25: 111- 124. 
Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums. Garden City: Anchor Books.  
Goldsworthy, Adrian K. 1998. The Roman Army at War: 100 BC – AD 200. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Goldsworthy, Adrian and I. Haynes. 1999. The Roman Army as a Community. JRA 
Suppl. 34. Portsmouth, Rhode Island.  
Goodyear, F. R. D. 1981. The Annals of Tacitus, Books 1-6. Volume II. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 194 
Graham, Elizabeth, Michael J. Papa, and Gordon P. Brooks. 1992. “Functions of humor 
in conversation: Conceptualization and Measurement.” Western Journal of 
Communication 56. 161- 183. 
Graver, Margaret R. 2009. Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Grima, Benedicte. 1992. The Performance of Emotion among Paxtun Women: “The 
Misfortunates Which Have Befallen Me.” Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Haimson Lushkov, Ayelet. 2015. Magistracy and the Historiography of the Roman 
Republic: Politics in Prose. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Halliday, W. R. 1924. “Passing Under the Yoke.” Folklore 35.1. 93- 95.  
Hardie, Philip. 1994. Aeneid. Book IX. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Harris, William V. 2001. Restraining Rage: the Ideology of Anger Control in Classical 
Antiquity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Harrison, Stephen J. 1991. Vergil: Aeneid 10. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Haury, Auguste. 1955. L’Ironie et l’Humour chez Ciceron. Leiden: Brill. 
Hawthorn, J. R. 1962. “The Senate after Sulla.” G&R 9.1. 53- 60. 
Heskel, Julia. 2001. “Cicero as Evidence for Attitudes to Dress in the Roman Republic” 
in The World of Roman Costume, ed. Judith Lynn Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Highet, Gilbert. 1972. The Speeches in Vergil’s Aeneid. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Hochschild, A. R. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Holmes, J. 2000. “Politeness, power and provocation: how humor functions in the 
workplace.” Discourse Studies 2. 159- 185. 
Horsfall, Nicholas. 1995. A Companion to the Study of Virgil. Mnemosyne 151. Leiden: 
E. J. Brill. 
---. 2000. Virgil, Aeneid 7: A Commentary. Leiden: Brill.  
---. 2014. Virgil, Aeneid 6: A Commentary. Berling: De Gruyter. 
Hume, David. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. London: printed for John 
Noon. 
Isen, Alice M. and Gregory Andarade Diamond. 1989. “Affect and Automaticity” in 
Unintended Thought, ed. J. S. Uleman and J. A. Bargh. New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
 195 
Janes, Leslie M. and James M. Olson. 2000. “Jeer Pressure: the Behavioral Effects of 
Observing Ridicule of Others.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26: 
474- 485.  
Joseph, Timothy. 2012. “Tacitus and Epic” in Companion to Tacitus, ed. Victoria Emma 
Pagán. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Kaster, Robert A. 2005. Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Keith, Alison L. 1924. “The Taunt in Homer and Vergil.” CJ 19.9. 554- 560.  
Kemper, Theodore D. 1985. “Review: Hochschild, The Managed Heart.” American 
Journal of Sociology 90. 1368- 1371. 
Konstan, David. 1997. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
---. 2001. Pity Transformed. London: Duckworth. 
Krostenko, Brian A. 2001. Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lateiner, Donald. 2001. “Humiliation and Immobility in Apuleius’ ‘Metamorphoses.’” 
TAPA 131. 217- 255. 
Leighton, Stephen R. 1982. "Aristotle and the Emotions." Phronesis 27.2: 144- 174. 
Lendon, J. E. 1997. Empire of Honour: the Art of Government in the Roman World. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
---. 1999. “The Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius 
Caesar’s Battle Descriptions.” CA 18.2. 273- 329.  
Lewis, Helen Block. 1971. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: International 
Universities Press. 
---. 1976. Psychic War in Men and Women. New York: New York University. 
Lewis, Michael, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett. 2008. 
Handbook of Emotions. Third Edition. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Lloyd, Robert B. 1972. “Superbus in the Aeneid.” AJP 93.1. 125- 132. 
MacMullen, Ramsey. 1984. “The legion as a society.” Historia 33: 440- 456.  
Manuwald, Gesine. 2011. “Ciceronian praise as a step towards Pliny’s Panegyricus” in 
Pliny’s Praise: the Panegyricus in the Roman World, ed. Paul Roche. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 85- 103. 
Martineau, Willia H. 1972. “A model of the social function of humor” in Psychology of 
Humor: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues, ed. Goldstein, Jeffrey H. 
and Paul E. McGhee. New York: Academic Press. 
 196 
May, James A. 1988. Trials of Character: the Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Mitchell, Thomas N. 1979. Cicero: the Ascending Years. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Moore, Timothy J. 1989. Artistry and Ideology: Livy’s Vocabulary of Virtue. Frankfurt 
am Main: Athenäum.  
Morreall, John. 1983. Taking Laughter Seriously. Albany: SUNY Press. 
---. 1987. The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor. Albany: SUNY Press. 
Murphy, J. M. J. 1997. “Hubris and Superbia: Differing Greek and Roman Attitudes 
Concerning ‘Arrogant Pride.’” Ancient World 28: 73- 81. 
Nisbet, R. G. M. 1961. M. Tulli Ciceronis in L. Calpurinum Pisonem Oratio. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nock, A. D. 1926. “Intrare sub iugum.” CQ 20.2. 107- 109.  
Nussbaum, Martha C.. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Perks, Lisa Glebatis. 2012. “Ancient roots of humor theory.” Humor: International 
Journal of Humor Research 25-2. 119- 132. 
Phang, Sara Elise. 2008. Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late 
Republic and Early Principate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Plamper, Jan, and William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns. 2010. “The 
History of Emotions: an Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and 
Peter Stearns.” History and Theory 49.2. 237- 265. 
Platt, Tracey. 2008. “Emotional responses to ridicule and teasing: should gelotophobes 
react differently?” Humor 21.2. 105- 128. 
Pollard, Nigel. 1999. “The Roman army as ‘total institution’? Dura-Europos as a case 
study” in The Roman Army in the East, JRA Supp. 18. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 211- 227. 
Powell, J. G. F. 2007. “Invective and the orator: Ciceronian theory and practice” in 
Cicero on the Attack, ed. Joan Booth. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales. 
Rabbie, Edwin. 2007. “Wit and humor in Roman rhetoric” in A Companion to Roman 
Rhetoric, eds. William Dominik and Jon Hall. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Raskin, V. 1985. Semantic Mechanisms of Humor. Synthese Language Library 24. 
Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Reddy, William M.  2001.  The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of 
Emotions.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 197 
Richlin, Amy. 1991. The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor. 
Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Riggsby, Andrew. 1997. “Did the Romans believe in their verdicts?” Rhetorica 15.3. 
235- 251. 
---. 2006. Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Roseman, Ira J. and Craig A. Smith. 2001. “Appraisal Theory: Overview, Assumptions, 
Varieties, Controversies” in Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, 
Research, eds. Scherer, Klaus R., Angela Schorr, and Tom Johnstone. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 3- 19. 
Rosenwein, Barbara. H. 2002. “Worrying about emotions in history.” American 
Historical Review 107:3. 821- 845. 
---. 2006. Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
---. 2009. “Emotion words” in Le Sujet de l’ émotion du Moyen Âge, ed. D. Boquet and P. 
Nagy. Paris: Beauchesne. 
---. 2010. “Problems and methods in the history of emotions.” Passions in Context: 
Journal of the History and Philosophy of the Emotions I. 1- 32. 
Rutland, Linda W. 1987. “The Tacitean Germanicus: Suggestions for a Re-Evaluation.” 
RhM 130.2. 153- 164. 
Scullard, H. H. 1965. “The Political Career of a Novus Homo” in Cicero, ed. T. A. Dorey. 
New York: Basic Books.  
Segal, Erich. 1987. Roman Laughter: the Comedy of Plautus. Second edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Scheidel, Walter. 2007. “Marriage, Families, and Survival: Demographic Aspects” in A 
Companion to the Roman Army, ed. P. Erdkamp. Malden, MA: Blackwell.  
Searle, John. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shaw, Brent. D. 1983. “Soldiers and society: the army in Numidia.” Opus II. 133- 160. 
Shumate, Nancy. 2012. “Postcolonial Approaches to Tacitus” in Companion to Tacitus, 
ed. Victoria Emma Pagán. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Stahl, Hans-Peter. 1990. “The Death of Turnus: Augustan Vergil and the Political Rival” 
in Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate, 
ed. Raaflaub, Kurt. A. and Mark Toher. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
174- 211. 
Stock, Brian. 1983. The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of 
Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 198 
Stroh, Wilfried. 1975. Taxis und Taktik: die advocatische Dispositionskunst Ciceros 
Gerichtsreden. Stuttgart: Teubner. 
Tarrant, Richard. 2004. “The Last Book of the Aeneid.” Syllecta Classica 15. 103- 129. 
---. 2012. Aeneid. Book XII. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Taylor. Gabriele. 1985. Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment. New 
York: Clarendon Press.  
Taylor, Lily Ross. 1971. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Tempest, Kathryn. 2007. “Cicero and the Art of Dispositio: the Structure of the 
Verrines.” Leeds International Classical Studies 60.2. 1- 25. 
Thomas, R. F. 1998. “The Isolation of Turnus: Aeneid Book 12” in Vergil’s Aeneid: 
Augustan Epic and Political Context, ed. Stahl, Hans-Peter. Swansea: Classical 
Press of Wales. 271- 302. 
Thompson, L. A. 1962. “The Relationship between Provincial Quaestors and their 
Commanders-in-Chief.” Historia 11.3. 339- 355.   
Timpe, Dieter. 1970. Ariminus-Studien. Heidelberg: C. Winter. 
Titze, Michael. 2009. “Gelotophobia: the Fear of Being Laughed At.” Humor 22-1/2. 27- 
48. 
Traina, Alfonso. 1988. “Superbia.” Enciclopedia Virgiliana 4: 1072- 5.  
Uden, Jane. 2014. “The smile of Aeneas.” TAPA 144.1. 71- 96. 
van der Blom, Henriette. 2010. Cicero’s Role Models: the Political Strategy of a 
Newcomer. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Vasaly, Ann. 2009. “Cicero, Domestic Politics, and the First Action of the Verrines.” CA 
28.1. 101- 137. 
Veatch, Thomas C. 1998. “A theory of humor.” Humor 11-2. 161- 215. 
Wiseman, T. P. 1995. Remus: a Roman Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, Craig A. 1999. Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in Classical 
Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williams, J. H. C. 2001. Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, C. P. 1979. Jokes: Form, Content, Use, and Function. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Winick, C. 1976. “The social contexts of humor.” Journal of Communication 26:3. 124- 
128. 
 199 
Wirszubski, Ch. 1961. “Avdaces: a Study in Political Phraseology.” JRS 51. 1 and 2. 12- 
22. 
Wood, Whitney. 2014. “Narratives of Fear, Pain, and Childbirth in Late Victorian 
Canada” in Pain and Emotion in Modern History, ed. Boddice, Robert Gregory. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Woodman, A. J. 2009. “Introduction” in The Cambridge Companion to Tacitus, ed. A. J. 




Laura Brooke Rich graduated as valedictorian from Orange Park High School in 
Orange Park, Florida in 2003. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Linguistics and 
Classics, summa cum laude, from the University of Florida in May 2007. She entered the 
Graduate School at The University of Texas in Austin in August 2007, and earned a 
Master of Arts in Classics in May 2009. 
 
 
Permanent email address: laurabrich@utexas.edu 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
